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NO. 8971

P. 3

September 7, 2010. The hearing on motions inliminesetforFriday, July30,2010, at9:00 a,m.,may
also be vacated.

DATED this _ _ day of July, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
Attorney for Plaintiff

DATED this

l1. ~ July,

2010.

TIIOMAS, WII.LIAMS & PARK, LLP

\

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants

STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESEf TRIAL DATE AND HEARING DATE, P. 2
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DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@twplegal.com

AUG O4 2010

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

ORDER TO
VACATE AND RESET
TRIAL DATE AND
HEARING DATE

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

The Court having reviewed the parties' Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Trial Date and
Hearing Date, and the records and files in this matter, and good cause appearing;

ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET TRIAL DATE AND HEARING DATE, P. 1

001003

...

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
That the trial of this matter scheduled to begin on August 2, 2010, shall be vacated and
reset to begin on September 7, 2010; and that the hearing on motions in limine set for Friday,
July 30, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., is hereby vacated.
DATED this

_!j_ day of___..1,..c,:~~4'-<X-4-• 2010.

ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET TRIAL DATE AND HEARING DATE, P. 2

001004

DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9 th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliarnslaw.com

AUG 2 5 2010

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,
Plaintiff ,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974
PRETRIAL ORDER

Pursuant to the Pretrial Conference conducted by the Court on July 21, 2010, the Parties
'

are hereby ordered:

PRETRIAL ORDER, P. 1

001005

1.

Exhibit Lists. In accordance with the Court's Notice of Trial Setting and Order
Governing Further Proceedings filed December 15, 2009, the parties shall each
file a list of the exhibits the party intends to offer into evidence by Tuesday,
August 31, 2010.

2.

Motions in Limine. Motions in Llmine shall be filed by Friday, September 27,
2010, which shall be heard by the Court on Tuesday, August 31, 2010, at 1:30
p.m, along with any other pretrial motions.

3.

Counsel to confer re: Exhibit Lists and other matters. Counsel are directed to
confer in person by Friday, September 3, 2010, and to attempt in good faith to
reach a stipulation as to the admissibility of exhibits. Toe parties should indicate
those exhibits for which there is no objection as to admissibility, those exhibits for
which there is no objection as to foundation, and those exhibits for which there is
no agreement at all. The parties shall lodge the stipulation with the Court on the
first day of trial.

4.

A.

If the exhibit list indicates that counsel have stipulated to the admission of
the exhibit, the exhibit will be admitted into evidence upon being offered
by counsel. If such a stipulation is noted, opposing counsel will not be
asked if they have any objection to the exhibit.

B.

If the exhibit list indicates that counsel have reached a partial stipulation as
to an exhibit (e.g., foundation, authenticity, business record exception to
the hearsay rule), it will not be necessary for counsel to cover such matters
with a witness. Counsel should note the partial stipulation, and offer the
exhibit so that the Court can rule on opposing counsel's remaining
objections.

Trial Witnesses. By Wednesday, September 1, 2010, Plaintiff is directed to
provide to Defendants a list of those witnesses whom Plaintiff actually intends to
subpoena for trial, as well as those whom Plaintiff intends to call without need for
subpoena. Plaintiff must also provide a good faith estimate of the time expected
for its direct examination of such witnesses.
By Friday, September 3, 2010, Defendants are directed to provide to Plaintiff a list
of those witnesses whom Defendants actually intend to subpoena for trial, as well
as those whom Defendants intend to call without need for subpoena. Defendants
must also provide a good faith estimate of the time expected for their direct
examination of such witnesses.

PRETRIAL ORDER, P. 2

001006

Said lists are subject to Rule ll(a)(l), I.R.C.P.

5.

Jury Instructions. The Parties shall file their proposed jury instructions and
form of verdict by Tuesday, August 31, 2010.

DATED t h i ~ day of ¥ - W l O

j}Jj_flill~
Darla S. Williamson
District Judge

?

PRETRIAL ORDER, P. 3
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DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)

THOMAS, WILLI AMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St, Suite 300
P. O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

AUG ? ., 2010
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Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894

danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUR TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSE LL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

Plaintiff ,

vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corpon tion, JOHN E. BERRYHILL Ill and

AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
}
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

DEFENDANTS' MOTJON
INLIMINE

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby move this Court for an order
instructing Plaintiff, its counsel, representatives and witnesses to refrain from

making mention,

directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, during the voir dire of the jury, opening
statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statements, and pleadin
gs

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE, P. 1

Cs

001008

AIJG.

27. 2010 3:07PM

NO. 9124

P. 3

submitted to jurors or at any other time while in the presence of prospective jurors or impaneled
jurors, of any of the matters set forth below, without first approaching the Bench and obtaining a
ruling of the Court outside the presence and hearing of all prospective or impaneled jurors in
regard to any alleged theory of admissibility of such matters.

This motion is made on the grounds that the matters identified below would be
inadmissible for any purpose upon proper and timely objection and that they have no bearing on
the issues of this action or on the rights of the parties to this action, and on the further grounds
that permitting mention of any such matters would prejudice and confuse the jury, and sustaining
of objections due to mention of such matters would not cure the prejudice, but rather would
reinforce the impact of such prejudicial matters on the jurors.
This motion is supported by the memorandum below and by all matters of record in this

action.

MEMORANDUM
1.

The letter of Defendants' counsel dated April 2, 2009.

The Court has already ruled on the substance of this motion by striking this same exhibit
during summary judgment. 1 As the Court then noted, this exhibit was a letter written by
Defendants' counsel, Daniel Williams, to Paul R. Mangiantini~ Plaintiff's former counsel. The
letter is in response to the letter set forth at Exhibit 9 to the Affidavit of Glenn E. Mo sell, which
is a letter from Mangiantini to John and Amy Berryhill dated February 20, 2009, demanding
repayment of ~400,000. In ruling Defendants' letter struck, the Court cited Millenkamp v.

Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment, Motions to Strike, Motion to Amend Complaint, and Motion to Compel filed April
30, 2010, pp. 5-6. At the time, the subject letter was referred to as Exhibit 10 to the Affidavit of
Glenn E. Mosell of March 22, 2010.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE, P. 2
001009

A~G.27.2010 3:08PM

NO. 9124

P. 4

Davisco Foods Int'/, Inc., 562 F.3d 97~ (9th Cir. 2009), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court erred by admitting a letter that was in response to a request for a settlement prior to
the suit. The Nh1th Circuit ruled that under Rule 408, Federal Rules of Evidence, it was error to
admit such a response into evidence: This Court noted that the Idaho version of Rule 408 is
nearly identical to the federal rule.
Accordingly, under Rule 408, I.RE., the reasoning of Millenkamp, and this Court's prior
ruling, Defendants' counsel's letter dated April 2, 2009, is inadmissible.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant their Motion in
Limine and enter an appropriate order.

DATED this [

9-~f August, 201 O.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE, P. 3

001010

ALJG.27.2010 3:08PM

N0.9124

P. 5

CERTIFEATE OF SERVICE

ziay

of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
I hereby certify that on this
foregoing instrument was served on opposing cowsel as indicated below:
·. . .

'•

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

Via Hand Delivery
V--Via Facsimile: 939-7136
Via U.S. Mail

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMlNE, P. 4
001011

** INBOUND NOTIFICATION : FAX RECEIVED SUCCESSFULLY**
TIME RECEIVED
·August 27, 2010 4:15:50 PM MDT
8/27/2010 4: 14 PM

REMOTE CSID
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-TION
91

FROM: 208-939-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

TO: 2876919
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939- 7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

J. Df:Vi~,
' l •.

; _.,,.'

~-

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
VS.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE: OTHER LITIGATION

Judge Goff

Defendants-Counter Claimants.

******
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its
undersigned counsel, and requests that this Court exclude testimony or documents relating to any
prior or continuing legal matter or litigation to which Glenn Mosell, a non-party, may have been
involved.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER

LITIGATION - 1

001012

8/27/2010 4:14 P~

-

-

FROM:

208-939-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

TO:

2876913

PAGE: 002 OF 003

ARGUMENT

During the deposition of Glenn Mosell, the Defendants inquired about prior or
contemporaneous legal matters or litigation involving Glenn Mosell. The Plaintiff believes the
Defendants may try to introduce evidence of legal conflicts or litigation involving Mr. Mosell
regarding real estate or prior business dealings with other parties not involved in this case.
The Plaintiff, Mosell Equities, and Defendant John Berryhill, were involved in litigation
as co-plaintiffs in John Berryhill, and Masell Equities, LLC., v. Broadway Park, Inc., and

lvfichael G. Matzek, Ada County Case No. CV OC 07-00987, and the proceedings in that case are
relevant to the issues raised in this case. However, Glenn Mosell personally was not a party to
the Broadway Park case.
Any legal proceedings involving Mr. Mosell personally, or Plaintiff Mosell Equities,
other than the Broadway Park case, are irrelevant to these proceedings and therefore should be
excluded according to Rule 402, IRE. Moreover, even if such evidence is somehow relevant,
any probative value would be outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, or the potential to
confuse or mislead the jury, and therefore should be excluded according to Rule 403, IRE.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to:
Daniel E. Williams
TIIOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER
LITIGATION - 3
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE: ASSIGNMENT OF
POTENTIAL PROCEEDS AS
COLLATERAL FOR LOAN

Defendants-Counter Claimants.

Judge Goff

******
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its
undersigned counsel, and requests that this Court exclude testimony or documents relating to any
assignment or pledge of the Plaintiff's potential recovery in this case by the Plaintiff's sole
member, Glenn Mosell, to Glenn Mosell's in-laws as collateral for loans Mosell obtained from

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: ASSIGNMENT
OF POTENTIAL PROCEEDS AS COLLATERAL FOR LOAN - 1

001015

=

8/27/2010 4:10 PM

FR0-8-939-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT

LAW-

2876919

PAGE: 002 OF 003

his in-laws necessitated by the Defendants refusal to repay the loans Mosell Equities made to the
Defendants.
ARGUMENT
During the deposition of Glenn Mose II, the Defendants inquired about a possible pledge
or assignment of the potential proceeds from this case. Glenn Mosen is the sole member of the
Plaintiff LLC, and has pledged some of his interest in the LLC; part of the the potential proceeds
from a successful verdict in this case, to Mosell's in-laws as collateral for a loan the in-laws
made to Mosen. Mosen, the sole member, and the assignor or pledger, is not a party to the case.
Any alleged pledge or assignment by Mosell would be in-elevant to the proceedings
before the Court and therefore should be excluded according to Rule 402, IRE.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: ASSIGNMENT
OF POTENTIAL PROCEEDS AS COLLATERAL FOR LOAN - 2

001016

8/:,,,/2010 4:10 PM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: ASSIGNMENT
OF POTENTIAL PROCEEDS AS COLLATERAL FOR LOAN - 3

001017

AUG.30.2010 4:46PM

N0.9138

P. 2
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DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

AUG 3 O2010

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)

) Case No. CV OC 0909974
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

BERRYHILL & C01\1PANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL m and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' l\fEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
OTHER LITIGATION

)

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Benyhill III, by and through their
counsel of re.cord, hereby respond to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re: Other Litigation.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
IN LIM1NE RE: OTHER LITIGATION, P. 1

001018

AUG.30.2010 4:47PM

NO. 9138

P. 3

ARGUMENT
Plaintiff moves to exclude evidence relating to ..any prior or continuing legal matter or
litigation to which Glenn Mos ell, a non-party, may have been involved." Without analysis,
Plaintiff swnmarily states that any legal proceedings, other than the "Broadway Park" case, are
irrelevant If relevant, on the other hand, Plaintiff argues that an unexplained risk of unfair
prejudice or potential to confuse the jury nonetheless exists under Rule 403.
Glenn Masell is the managing and sole member of Plaintiff Mosell Equities, ILC. He
graduated from U.C, San Diego with a bachelor's degree in economics. 1 He obtained a Series
Six seculities license and worked for Prudential-Bache, exploring a financial services
stockbroker career (Mosell: 11). He also obtained real estate licenses in California and Colorado
(Mosell: 11). He worked as a sales associate broker with Marcus and Millichap, a national finn
dealing in investment sales (Mosell: 14). He then worked for Sperry Van Ness as an investment
broker (Mosel!: 15). He has worked on many millions of dollai·s worth of transactions (Mosell:
19). He has also worked as a commercial real estate developer (Mosell: 23).
Despite this background, Mosen claims in this litigation that he and his limited liability
company were fraudulently induced by John Benyhill to provide funds based on the use of the

Deposition of Glenn E. Mosell of February 5, 2008, at p. 10 in the action entitled
John Berryhill and Mosell Equities, L.L.C., v. Broadway Park, Inc., and Michael G. Matzek,
Case No. CV QC 07-00987 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, In and For the County of Ada. Pertment excerpts are attached to the Affidavit of Daniel E.
Williams Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, as Exhibit ''A", Subsequent
references to this deposition testimony are cited to "Mosell" by page number.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
IN LIMINE RE: OTHER LlTIGATION, P. 2

001019

AUG. 30. 2010 4:47PM

N0.9138

P. 4

term "loan" 2 in the handwritten note set forth at Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
Defendants obviously contend that any supposed reliance on the part of Plaintiff to the reference
to "loan" in the handwritten note was not reasonable or justifiable in part because of his own
background and familiarity with business, notes and bona fide loans. Plaintiff had the kind of
"special knowledge, experience and competence" so as to make it unreasonable for him to rely
on any such stray and ambiguous expression as the handwritten note. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton,
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 108, at 751 (5th ed. 1984), quoted in, Stanley Weiss Assocs., LLC

v. Energy Mgmt., 2004 R.I. Super. lEXIS 72 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004).

Mr. Mosell's expertise in business and financial matters extends to his experience in
litigation with former business partners. Mr. Mosell knew or should have known, based in pait
on his many disputes and lawsuits with his former partners and associates in business, of the
importance of clear contract language. He simply bad no right to rely on the handwritten note if
he really intended that a bona fide loan be created. Defendants should not be denied the right to
point out relevant experiences in Mosell's background, including his prior litigation, which
combine to make his alleged reliance on any misrepresentation completely unjustified.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion in Ii.mine should be denied.
DATED

w&

~ugust, 2010.

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants
2

The handwritten note goes on to state quite clearly that the pwported loan 11will be

transitioned."
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

IN LIMINE RE: OTHER LITIGATION, P. 3

001020

AUG.30.2010 4:47PM

NO. 9138

P. 5

•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thi~ ~ g u s t , 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P, 0. Box 2504

Via Hand Delivery

V Via Facsimile: 939-7136
_

Via U.S. Mail

Eagle, ID 83616

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
IN LIMINE RE: OTHER LlTIGATION, P. 4

001021

-

Y2Aq

AUG 3 1 2010
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J. OAVlj

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

Rt: ..,

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
vs.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

=

NO. _ _ _F1ii:m°'i?T~-AM _ _ _ _F_1L1~.

PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT
FORM

Judge Goff

Defendants-Counter Claimants.

******
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its
undersigned counsel, and hereby provides its Draft Jury Instructions and Proposed Verdict Form.

PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM - 1

001022

•
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via hand delivery to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK

PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM - 2

001023

IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence

INSTRUCTION NO.
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a
proposition, or use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I
mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true
than not true.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001024

-

IDJI 1.20.2 - Burden of proof - clear and convincing evidence
INSTRUCTION NO.

When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by
clear and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is
highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden
than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than
not true.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001025

IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories

INSTRUCTION NO.
On plaintiffs' claim of breach of contract against the defendant,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1. A contt-act existed between plaintiff and defendant;

2. The defendant breached the contract;
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.
The Court has previously determined that the document
presented as Plaintiff's Exhibit _ , constitutes a valid contract. The
Court has also ruled that although the document represents a valid
contract, the terms are ambiguous, and therefore it is for you the Jury
to decide what the parties intended.
The Court has also previously ruled that the jury must decide, as
these documents are separate from and created after Plaintiff's Exhibit
_ __.. if the parties intended that the checks presented as Plaintiff's

Exhibits _

through __ amended the parties contract presented as

Exhibit - - You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict form:
1. Regarding the contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit

) did the

parties intend the money Mosell Equities provided,
$50,000.00, to be a loan?
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2.

Regarding the contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit _ __,) did the
parties intend the money Mosell Equities provided
$50,000.00 to be a loan to remain a loan pending Mosell
Equities' "buy in" of an entity formed by the parties?

3. Did the "buy in" referenced in Plaintiff's Exhibit _ _
occur?
4. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __.. modify the
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
5.

Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __, modify the
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?

6. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __, modify the
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
7. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __, modify the
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
8. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __.. modify the
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
9. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __, modify the
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
10. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __.. modify the
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
11. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __, modify the
contract (Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
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12. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __, modify the
contract (Exhibit ___) and become part of that contract?
13. Has the Berryhill & Company, Inc. breached the contract?
Yes

-No

14. Has Mosen Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill &
Companies' breach? Yes _ _ -No _ _.
15. The amount of damages? $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that

propositions 1 and 2 have been proved, then you should answer these
questions "yes".
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that

proposition 3, no "buy in" occurred, then you should answer this
question "no".
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that

propositions 4 th.rough 12 have been proved, then you should answer
these questions "yes".
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that

propositions 4 through 12 have not been proved, then you should
answer the particular question "no".
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that

propositions 13 and 14 occurred, then you should answer these
questions "yes", and answer question 15.
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Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories

INSTRUCTION NO._ _
On plaintiffs' claim of implied-in-fact contract against the
defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1. The circm;nstances imply a request by the defendant for performance by
plaintiff; and
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to compensate the
plaintiff for such performance; and
3. The plaintiff performed as requested.

You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict
form:
1. Did an implied-in-fact contract exist between Mosell Equities
and Berryhill & Company, Inc.?

Yes

-No

2. Has the Berryhill & Company, Inc. breached the contract?
Yes

-No

3. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill &
Companies' breach? Yes - - - No - -.
4. The amount of damages? $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each

of the propositions has been proved, then you should answer the
questions "yes" and complete question 4. If you find from your
consideration of all of the evidence that any of these propositions has not
been proved, then you should answer that question "no."
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Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories
INSTRUCTION NO.
On plaintiffs' claim of uniust enrichment against the defendant,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:

1. The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant;
2. The defendant accepted the benefit; and
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain
the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value.
The Court has ruled that Mosell Equities had proven
propositions 1 and 2. Consequently, you will only be asked the following
questions on the jury verdict form:
1. Under the circumstances, would it be unjust for the defendant to
retain the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value?
Yes
-No

2. If you answered the preceding question ''yes," please identify
the amount of defendant's unjust enrichment.
$

-----------

If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that the
proposition has been proved, then you should answer the question"yes"
and complete question 2. If you fmd from your consideration of all of
the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then
you should answer that question "no."

Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
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is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories

INSTRUCTION NO.
On plaintiffs' claim of conversion against the defendant, the
plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. That the defendant took and has kept Mosell Equities'
furniture and fixtures without a right to do so;
2. The nature and extent of the damages to Mosell Equities and
the amount thereof.
You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict
form:
1. Did the Defendant take or keep Mosell Equities' furniture and
fixtures without a right to do so?
-No - Yes

2. If you answered the preceding question ''yes," please identify
the amount of Mosell Equities' damages.
$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the

proposition has ,been proved, then you should answer the

question

"yes" and complete question 2. If you find from your consideration of
all of the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved,
then you should answer that question "no."
Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories

INSTRUCTION NO.
On Mosell Equities' claim of fraud against John Berryhill and
Berryhill & Company, Inc., Mosell Equities has the burden of proof on
each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1. That John Berryhill stated a fact to Mosell Equities;
2. The statement was false;

3. The statement was material;
4. The John Berryhill either knew the statement was false or was

unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement
was made.
5. Mosell Equities did not know that the statement was false;

6. John Berryhill intended for Mosell Equities to rely upon the
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;
7. Mosen Equities did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8. Mosen Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the
circumstances;
9. Mosen Equities suffered damages proximately caused by

reliance on the false statement.
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Mosen Equities, and the

amount thereof.
You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict
form:
1. Did John Berryhill state a fact to Mosell Equities?

001035

Yes

-No
-No

2. Was the statement false? Yes
3. Was the statement material? Yes

- No

4. Did John Berryhill know the statement was false or was he

unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the
statement was made. Yes

-No

5. Mosell Equities did not know that the statement was false?
Yes

-No

6. John Berryhill intended for Mosell Equities to rely upon the
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably
contemplated? Yes _ _ - No _ _.
7. Mosell Equities did rely upon the truth of the statement?

Yes

-No

8. Mosell Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the
circumstances? Yes

-No

9. Mosell Equities suffered damages proximately caused by

reliance on the false statement? Yes

-No

10. The amount of damages: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each
of the propositions has been proved, then you should answer questions
1 - 9 "yes" and complete question 10. If you fmd from your
consideration of all of the evidence that any of these propositions has not
been proved, then you should answer that question "no."

001036

-

-

Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.08.1 - Interpretation of contracts - intention of parties

Note: The court must first decide whether determination of the intent of the parties is
properly a jury issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should
the court determine that issue is properly before the jury, the following instruction may
be appropriate:

INSTRUCTION NO.
The terms of the contract are in dispute as to the following
provisions:
Whether the parties intended the funds Mosell Equities provided
were loaned funds?
If the parties intended the funds to be loaned, whether the

parties intended the funds Mosell Equities provided would transition
into Mosell or Mosell Equities' buy in of Berryhill & Company, Inc. or
some other entity created by Mosell and Berryhill?
If the parties intended the funds Mosen Equities provided were

loaned funds, and the parties intended the funds Mosen Equities
provided would transition into Mosen or Mosen Equities' buy in of
Berryhill & Company, Inc. or some other entity created by Mosell and
Berryhill, did the buy in occur?
If the buy in did not occur, do the funds remain as loans to

Berryhill & Company, Inc.?
If Berryhill & Company, Inc. denies the funds it accepted were

loaned funds, and refuses to repay the loaned funds, is Berryhill &
Company, Inc. in breach of the parties' contract?
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You must determine what was intended by the parties as
evidenced by the contract in this case. In making this determination
you should consider, from the evidence, the following:
1.

The contract must be construed as a whole, including all

of the circumstances giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every
part of it.
2.

Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you

fmd from the evidence that a special meaning was intended.
3.

Any communications, conduct or dealings between the

contracting parties showing what they intended and how they construed
the doubtful language may be considered, provided that such may not
completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently
with the remainder of the terms.
4.

The contract should be construed to avoid

any

contradiction or absurdities.
[Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted
with reference to any generally known and customarily accepted
language in that field, unless you find from the evidence that this was
not intended].

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.08.2 - Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract

INSTRUCTION NO.

You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the
contract offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties
occurring before execution of the written agreement, which is
inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement.
While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to
clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to completely
change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or
parts.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.08.3 - Interpretation of contract - ambiguity resolved against drafter

INSTRUCTION NO.
Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the
true intent of the parties cannot be ascertained by any other evidence,
the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the contract against the
party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.08.4 - Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact

INSTRUCTION NO.
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the
consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been
made.

Comments:
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979)

Offered:
Given:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.08.5 - Interpretation of contract - materiality

INSTRUCTION NO.

"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if
(a) a reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or
nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in
question, or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in
determining the choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person
would so consider.

Comments:
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998)
(Second) of Torts, Sections 538(2).)

(tort standard, referring to Restatement

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.09.1 - Amendments to contracts

INSTRUCTION NO.
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the
parties. This requires all of the elements of any other contract.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.10.1 - Breach of bilateral contract - general case - no affirmative defenses

INSTRUCTION NO.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions:
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;

2. The defend ant breached the contract;
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each

of the propositions required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you
must consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the
defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this
instruction has . not been proved, your verdict should be for the
defendant.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.11 - Material bre~ch
INSTRUCTION NO.

A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the
contract.

Offered:
Given:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.13 - Performance of contract - substantial performance
INSTRUCTION NO.

When I say that a party must have "substantially performed"
the contract or that "substantial performance" of the contract is
required, I mean that the important and essential benefits called for by
the terms of the contract have been delivered or performed. A contract
may be substantially performed even though there may have been some
deviations or omissions from the performance called for by the precise
language of the contract.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
001047

IDJI 6.14.1 - Time for performance of a contract

INSTRUCTION NO.
Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the
law will imply a requirement that it be performed within a reasonable
time, as is determined by the subject matter of the contract, the
situation of the parties, and the nature of the performance required. In
such case, it is for the jury to determine what a reasonable time would
be under the circumstances, given all of the evidence in the case.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.41.1 - Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted

INSTRUCTION NO.
There is no dispute in this case that John Berryhill was the agent
of the principal, Berryhill & Company, Inc., at the time of the
transaction described by the evidence. Therefore, Berryhill &
Company, Inc., the principal, is responsible for any act of John
Berryhill, the agent, within the scope of the agent's authority.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.43.2 - Ratification

INSTRUCTION NO.

If an agent acts outside the scope of authority, a principal may
still become bound by the agent's actions if the principal ratifies the
agent's actions. Ratification may be express or implied.

Implied

ratification requires:
1.

Knowledge on the part of the principal of the material

facts connected with the transaction; and
2.

Word or conduct on the part of the principal indicating

an intention to adopt the acts of the agent;

Comments:
See Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47, 54 (1992); Twin Falls
Livestock v. Mid-century Ins., 117 Idaho 176, 182-183 (1998).

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 9.03 - Damages for breach of contract- general format

INSTRUCTION NO.
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the

defendant, the jury must determine the amount of money that will
reasonable and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the following
elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the
defendant's breach of contract:
Special Damages: The the value of the money that Mosell
Equities provided to Berryhill & Company, Inc., plus accumulating
interest.
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for
you to determine.

Given:
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Modified:
Refused:
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STATUTORY INTEREST

INSTRUCTION NO.

LEGAL RA TE OF INTEREST. When there is no express contract in writing fixing a
different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the
hundred by the year on money lent.

Idaho Code Section 28-22-104.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.07 .1- Equitable theories - implied in facts contract

INSTRUCTION NO.
An implied-in-fact contract is a contract where the terms and

existence of the contract are demonstrated by the conduct of the parties,
with the request of one party and the performance by the other often
being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. To
fmd an implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of
the parties to make a contract can be inferred from their conduct. An
implied-in-fact contract is given the same legal effect as any other
contract.
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff has the
burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The circumstances imply a request by the defendant for

performance by plaintiff; and
2.

The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to

compensate the plaintiff for such performance; and
3.

The plaintiff performed as requested.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 6.07.2 - Unjust enrichment - equitable theories
INSTRUCTION NO.

Even though there is no agreement between the parties, under
certain circumstances where a party has been unjustly enriched by the
actions of another the law will require that party to compensate the
other for the unjust gain. To recover under this theory, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving each of the following:
1.

The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant;

2.

T~e defendant accepted the benefit; and

3.

Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the

defendant to retain the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its
value.

Comment:
For the elements of unjust enrichment, see Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 567
P.2d 1 (1977); Common Builder, Inc. v. Rice, 126 Idaho 616,888 P.2d 790 (App. 1995).

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 4.50 - Conversion -- issues
INSTRUCTION NO.

The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions:
1.

That the defendant took and has kept plaintiff's furniture

and fixtures without a right to do so;
2.

The nature and extent of the damages to plaintiff and the

amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
of these propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for
the plaintiff; but, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then your verdict
should be for the defendant.
Comment:
Those conversions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code are not necessarily
covered by this form. The Committee recommends that in cases covered by that Code,
this form be used but that, in addition, the relevant portion of the appropriate Code
section be read or paraphrased as a definition, description, or explanation of the phrase
"exercised dominion over" or of the phrase "deprived of possession."
See Carver v. Ketchum, 53 Idaho 595, 26P.2n 139; Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho
171, 118 P.2d 729; Adair v. Freeman, 92 Idaho 773, 451 P2d 519.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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IDJI 4.60 - Fraud - issues

INSTRUCTION NO.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

The defendant either knew the statement was false or was

unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement
was made.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the

statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;
7.

The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the

circumstances;
9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by

reliance on the false statement.
10.

The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and

the amount thereof.
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that the

elements of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence,
then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you fmd
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing
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propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then
your verdict should be for the defendant.

Comment:
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08.5.
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616,962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc.
v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805,892 P.2d 480 (1995).
See also, Witt v. Jones, 111 ldao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106
Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338
(1980); Smith v. King. 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d217 (1979); King v. McNeel, Inc., 94
Idaho 444,489 P.2d 1324.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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Defense to Fraud - statements or promises as to future events.

INSTRUCTION NO.

"An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events."
"[T]here is a general rule in [the] law of deceit that a representation consisting of [a]
promise or a statement as to a future event will not serve as [a] basis for fraud .... "
"[T]he representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern past or existing
material facts."
A "promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is
proven that the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it."

Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,615, 114 P.3d 974, 973 (2005). (Cites
omitted)

Given:
Modified:
Refused:
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Proposed verdict Form

COUNT ONE - BREACH OF CONTRACT
1. Regarding the contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit _ __,) did the parties intend
the money Mosen Equities provided, $50,000.00, to be a loan?
Yes
2.

-No

Regarding the contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit _ __,)

did the parties

intend the money Mosen Equities provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to
remain a loan pending Mosen Equities' "buy in" of an entity formed by
the parties? Yes _ _ - No _ _.
3.

Did the "buy in" referenced in Plaintiff's Exhibit _ _ occur?
Yes

-No

4. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
Yes
5.

-No

Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ __, modify the contract
(Exhibit __) and become part of that contract?
Yes

- No

6. Did ~e check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

7. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit__) and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No
1
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8. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _., modify the contract
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

9. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

10. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

11. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

12. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit_) and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

13. Has the Berry~ll & Company, Inc. breached the contract?
Yes

-No

14. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill &
Companies' breach? Yes _ _ - No _ _.
15. The amount of damages? $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that

propositions 1 and 2 have been proved, then you should answer these
questions "yes".

2
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If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
proposition 3, no "buy in" occurred, then you should answer this question
"no".

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
propositions 4 through 12 have been proved, then you should answer these
questions "yes".

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
propositions 4 through 12 have not been proved, then you should answer the
particular question "no".

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
propositions 13 and 14 occurred, then you should answer these questions
"yes", and answer question 15.

COUNT TWO-BREACH OF AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
1. Did an implied-in-fact contract exist between Mosell Equities and
Berryhill & Company, Inc.?

Yes

- No

2. Has the Berryhill & Company, Inc. breached the contract?
Yes

-No

3. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill &
Companies' breach? Yes _ _ - No _ _.
4. The amount of damages? $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of
the propositions has been proved, then you should answer the questions
"yes" and complete question 4. If you find from your consideration of all of

3
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the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you
should answer that question "no."

COUNT THREE - UNJUST ENRICHMENT
1. Under the circumstances, would it be unjust for the defendant to retain the
benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value?
Yes
-No
. -2. If you answered the preceding question ''yes," please identify the amount
of defendant's unjust enrichment. $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the

proposition has been proved, then you should answer the question "yes" and
complete question 2. If you find from your consideration of all of the
evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should
answer that question "no."

COUNT FOUR- CONVERSION
1. Did the Defendant take or keep Mosell Equities' furniture and fixtures without
a right to do so?
Yes
- No

2. If you answered the preceding question "yes," please identify the amount
ofMosell Equities' damages.$- - - - - - - - - - -

COUNT FIVE - FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT
1. Did John Berryhill state a fact to Mosell Equities?
Yes

-No

2. Was the statement false? Yes

- No

3. Was the statement material? Yes

- No

4
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4. Did John Berryhill know the statement was false or was he unaware of
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. Yes
-No
5. Mosell Equities did not know that the statement was false? Yes _ _ -

No
6. John Berryhill intended for Mosell Equities to rely upon the statement
and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? Yes _ _ - No

7. Mosell Equiti~s did rely upon the truth of the statement?
-No

Yes

8. Mosell Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances?
Yes

-No

9. Mosell Equities suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the
false statement? Yes

- No

10. The amount of damages: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of

the propositions has been proved, then you should answer questions 1 - 9
"yes" and complete question 10. If you find from your consideration of all of
the evidence that" any of these propositions has not been proved, then you
should answer that question "no."

5
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

DEFENDANTS'
SPECIAL VERDICT

)

BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIDLL III and
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their
proposed form of Special Verdict.
DATED this:). ~ o f August, 2010.

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants

DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7/~

I hereby certify that on this~ day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

__ Via Hand Delivery
~Via Facsimile: 939-7136
Via U.S. Mail

Daniel E. Williams
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

Plaintiff,

vs.

)

)

SPECIAL VERDICT

)

BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIDLL III and
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

ALLEGED BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT
Question No. 1: Was there a written contract between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC,
and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., which demonstrated a meeting of the minds between
the parties on all essential elements of the parties' agreement?
Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes[_]

No[_]

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 1
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If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 5. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 2: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., breach the contract?
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 2:

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 3: Was Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, damaged on account of the breach?
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 3:

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by Plaintiff Mosell Equities,
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach?
Answer to Question No. 4:

$_ _ _ _ _

If you answered Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 13.

ALLEGED BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
Question No. 5: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied contract, which
demonstrated a meeting of the minds between the parties of all essential elements of the parties'
agreement?
Answer to Question No.5:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 9. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 2
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Question No. 6: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., breach the implied contract?

Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 6:

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 7: Was Plaintiff Mosen Equities, LLC, damaged on account of the breach

of an implied contract?
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 7:

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 8: What is the amount of damages incurred by Plaintiff Mosen Equities,

LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, lnc.'s breach of an implied contract?
Answer to Question No. 8:

$_ _ _ __

If you answered Question No. 8, skip to Question No. 13.
ALLEGED UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Question No. 9: Was there a benefit conferred upon Defendant Berryhill & Company,

Inc., by the plaintiff?
Answer to Question No. 9:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 10: Was there appreciation by Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., of

such benefit?
Answer to Question No. 10:

Yes[_]

No[_]

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 3
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If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 11: Is it inequitable and unjust for Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.,
to retain the benefit without payment to the Plaintiff of the value of the benefit?
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 11:

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 12: What is the value of the benefit conferred upon Defendant Berryhill &
Company, Inc., by Plaintiff?
Answer to Question No. 12:

$_ _ _ __

Continue to Question No. 13.

ALLEGED CONVERSION
Question No. 13: Did Plaintiff Mosen Equities, LLC, prove that it owned or had a
superior right to materials in the possession of Berryhill & Company, Inc.?
Answer to Question No. 13:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 17. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 14: Did Plaintiff Mosen Equities, LLC, demand their return?
Answer to Question No. 14:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 17. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 4
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Question No. 15: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., refuse to deliver them?

Answer to Question No. 15:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 17. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 16: What is the value of the materials?

Answer to Question No. 16: $_ _ _ __
Continue to Question No. 17.
ALLEGED FRAUD

(Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, against Defendant John Berryhill)
Question No. 17: Did Defendant John Berryhill make a false statement of then-existing

fact to Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC?
Answer to Question No. 17:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 18: Was the statement material?

Answer to Question No. 18:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 19: Did Defendant John Berryhill know that the statement was false?

Answer to Question No. 19:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 5
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Question No. 20: Did Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, know that the statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 20:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 21: Did Defendant John Berryhill intend for the Plaintiff Mosell Equities,
LLC, to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No. 21:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 22: Did Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, rely upon the truth of the
statement?
Answer to Question No. 22:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 23: Was Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC' s reliance reasonable and
justifiable under all the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 23:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 24: Did Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC suffer damages proximately caused
by reliance on the false statement?
Answer to Question No. 24:

Yes[_]

No[_]

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 6
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ff you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 25: What is the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiff Mosen Equities,
LLC, proximately caused by Plaintiff's reliance of the false statement?
Answer to Question No. 25: $_ _ _ __
Continue to Question No. 26.

ALLEGED FRAUD
(Berryhill & Company, Inc., against Mosen Equities, LLC)

Question No. 26: Did Plaintiffs agent, Glenn Mosen, make a false statement of thenexisting fact to Berryhill & Company, Inc?
Answer to Question No. 26:

Yes[_]

No[_]

ff you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. ff you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 27: Was the statement material?
Answer to Question No. 27:

Yes[_]

No[_]

ff you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. ff you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 28: Did Glenn Mosen of behalf of Mosen Equities, LLC, know that the
statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 28:

Yes[_]

No[_]

ff you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. ff you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 7
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Question No. 29: Did John Berryhill on behalf of Berryhill & Company, Inc., know that
the statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 29:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 30: Did Glenn Mosell of Mosell Equities, LLC, intend for Berryhill &
Company, Inc., to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No. 30:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 31: Did Berryhill & Company, Inc., rely upon the truth of the statement?
Answer to Question No. 31:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 32: Was Berryhill & Company's reliance reasonable and justifiable under
all the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 32:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 33: Did Berryhill & Company, Inc., suffer damages proximately caused by
reliance on the false statement?
Answer to Question No. 33:

Yes[_]

No[_]

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 8
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If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 34: What is the amount of damages suffered by Berryhill & Company, Inc.,
proximately caused by Plaintiffs reliance of the false statement?
Answer to Question No. 34: $_ _ _ __
Now, sign the verdict form below.
DATED this _ _ day of September, 2010.

Foreperson

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 9
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DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

Plaintiff ,
vs.

)
)

DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)

BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIDLL III and
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their
Requested Jury Instructions, numbers 1 through 26, in addition to the customary IDJls.
DATED thisli~ f August, 2010.

OMAS, W~S&m
Attorney for Defendants
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CERT~E OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thi~ day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

__ Via Hand Delivery
~ a Facsimile: 939-7136
__ Via U.S. Mail

Daniel E. Williams
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.

IDJl2d 1.20.1.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2

The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
1.

A contract existed between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, and Defendant

Berryhill & Company, Inc.;
2.

The defendant breached the contract;

3.

The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and

4.

The amount of the damages.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions

required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affirmative
defenses raised by the defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been
proved, your verdict should be for the defendant.

IDJl2d 6.10.1.(modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3

A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do something that is
supported by consideration.
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four
elements. The four elements are:
1.

Competent parties;

2.

A lawful purpose;

3.

Valid consideration; and

4.

Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms.

It is not disputed that the following elements are present in the contract alleged in this
case: The parties were competent to enter into a contract, the alleged contract was for a lawful
purpose and there was valid consideration. The parties do dispute whether there was mutual
agreement between them to all essential terms

IDJ12d 6.01.1. (modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4

In order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds on all material
terms to the contract.

Panike & Sons Fanns, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 567 (Idaho 2009); Barry v. Pacific West
Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831, 103 P.3d 440,444 (2004).

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5

A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain
provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty.

Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983) (citations omitted)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6

In this case, Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., claims that all parties did not agree to
all essential terms of the contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of
the minds," and means that all parties to a contract must have understood and accepted all of the
essential terms of the contract.
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated to all
parties, understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties.

IDJI2d 6.05.1. (modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7

If the provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of those provisions is a
question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties. The determination of the parties'
intent is to be determined by looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the
document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of the
particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by
their conduct or dealings.

J.R. Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006): Univ. of Idaho Found.,
Inc. v. Civic Partners, Inc. (In re Univ. Placelldaho Water Ctr. Project), 146 Idaho 527, 536
(Idaho 2008)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED

COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8
In this case the defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., has asserted certain affinnative
defenses. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted.
Defendant has raised the affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and waiver.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions
required of the defendant has been proved, then your verdict should be for the defense. If you
find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions has not been proved,
then the defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this case.

IDJI2d 6.10.4. (modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9
The defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., has asserted the affirmative defense of
equitable estoppel.

This is a legal term which means the plaintiff may be prevented from

enforcing a contract or term of contract by reason of the plaintiffs own conduct.
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the defendant has the burden of proof on
each of the following propositions:
1.

The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the defendant;

2.

The plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts;

3.

The defendant did not know and could not discover the true facts;

4.

The defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the defendant's

prejudice.

IDJI2d 6.22.1. (modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct,
by words, or by acquiescence.

IDJI2d 6.24.1.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11

An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract
are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance by
the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. The
implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding.

Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994) (citing Clements v.
Jungert, 90 Idaho 143,153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584,587,
930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997).

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED

OTHER

001088

INSTRUCTION NO. 12
A 'course of dealing' is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular

transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
Idaho Code § 28-1-205( 1)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INS"rRUCTION NO. 13
In order to establish unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that there was: (1) a

benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof.

King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 910 (Idaho 2002), citing, Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v.
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999), citing, Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378,382,
941 P.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1997).

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14

The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual amount of the
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would be unjust for
one party to retain. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit
and of proving the amount of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. The value of
services rendered can be used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory
of unjust enrichment. Although damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, the
damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action based upon
unjust enrichment, must be proven to a reasonable certainty.

Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378, 389 (Idaho 2009), citing and quoting, Barry v.
Pacific West Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004), Blaser v. Cameron,
121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct. App. 1992), Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock
Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990), Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch,
101 Idaho 663,667,619 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1980)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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•
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
To prevail for unjust enrichment, plaintiff must show not simply that Berryhill &
Company, Inc., benefitted from the efforts of plaintiff; instead, it must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully.

Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); see also, Knight v.
Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1988) ("misleading act" or something similar necessary)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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•
INSTRUCTION NO. 16
To sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that the party against
whom recovery is sought either wrongfully secured or passively received a benefit that it would
be unconscionable for her to retain. However, a claim for unjust enrichment requires more than a
showing that the defendant may have benefitted in some way from the disputed conduct.
2008 Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3rd Cir.)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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•
INSTRUCTION NO. 17

Not every possession constitutes conversion. To prove conversion, the plaintiff must
show facts establishing that he owned or had a superior right to the materials in question, that he
demanded their return, and that defendant refused to deliver them. A conversion action cannot
be based on a mere breach of a contractual obligation.
Priel v. Heby, 2004 NY Slip Op 50820U, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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•
INSTRUCTION NO. 18

The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendant John Berryhill stated a fact to the plaintiff[s];

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the

statement was true at the time the statement was made.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it

in a manner reasonably contemplated;
7.

The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false

statement.
10.

The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have

been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on
this issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing
propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be
for the defendant

1
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IDJI2d 4.60. (modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED _ _ __
COVERED _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19

When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true.
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than
not true.

IDJI2d 1.20.2.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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•
INSTRUCTION NO. 20

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or
probable sequence, produced_ the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.

IDJ12d 2.30.1. (modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21
As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory in nature that relate
to future actions or upon the mere failure to perform a promise or an agreement to do something
in the future. The allegedly false representation must concern past or existing material facts.
DeVries v. DeLaval, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41599, 21-22 (D. Idaho 2006) (construing
Idaho law), citing, Pacific States Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Addison, 45 Idaho 270, 261 P. 683 (1927),
Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005); see also, In re Syntex
Corp. Secs. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) (Predictions proved to be wrong in hindsight
do not render the statements untrue when made)
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INS"rRUCTION NO. 22
The representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern past or existing
material facts. Representations concerning future events are usually not considered actionable.
A promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is proven that
the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it.

Magic Lantern Prods. v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805,807 (1995), overruled on other grounds,
Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466 (2001); First Sec. Bank of Idaho
v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 268, 805 P.2d 468,474 (1991).
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23
A plaintiff is not justified in relying upon a misrepresentation regarding a matter of law
that misrepresents only the legal consequences of facts, just as the plaintiff would not be justified
in relying upon any other representation of any other opinion.
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), Section 545 (2); Elliot Megdal & Assoc. v. Hawaii
Planning Mill, 814 F.Supp. 898 (D. Hawaii 1993)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24
For the plaintiff to recover against defendant for fraud, plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the plaintiff's loss resulted from plaintiffs justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action. The plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation if it caused the plaintiff to act in a way that plaintiff would otherwise not have
acted without this misrepresentation. The plaintiff's reliance is justified if the situation makes it
reasonable to accept the representation made, in light of the circumstances and the plaintiff's
intelligence, experience and knowledge.

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), Section 537; Slaymaker v. Westgate State Bank, 739 P.2d
444 (Kan. 1987)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

001102

INSTRUCTION NO. 25
'One who has special knowledge, experience and competence may not be permitted to
rely on statements for which the ordinary man might recover, and that one who has acquired
expert knowledge concerning the matter dealt with may be required to form his own judgment,
rather than talce the word of the defendant.'

W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 108, at 751 (5th ed. 1984), cited in,
Stanley Weiss Assocs., LLC v. Energy Mgmt., 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 72 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004).
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INSTRUCTION NO. 26

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

IDJl2d 9.00.
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF

)
)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

------~----------)

Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their Trial
Brief.
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FACTUAL SUMMARY
This case arises from a failed business relationship. Plaintiff was the developer of a
proposed development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be known as "Polo Cove."
According to the Plaintiff's sole owner and managing member, Glenn E. Mosell, he approached
John Berryhill initially about building a restaurant within the development:
In 2005 I - Mosell Equities secured a purchase of a vineyard on Homedale
Road, and then went under contract on several adjacent properties to that
vineyard. My vision to build a restaurant in the Idaho wine country on that site
prompted me to contact John Berryhill for the first time. He was actually my first
choice as the celebrity chef in town with the right flair, to anchor my wine country
restaurant idea. 1

Mosell first contacted Mr. Berryhill in the summer of 2005 (Mosell: 41). Asked about the
evolution of his relationship with Mr. Berryhill "relative to his restaurant and Polo Cove," Mosell
answered:
Again, John as a restaurateur, we looked to him as a consultant to design a wine
country restaurant; seating, layout. Worked with Sherry McKibben, architect; also
Andy Erstad and Ken Reed, architects. And we have now a restaurant designed
for Polo Cove.

***
I was tapping into his expertise, using him as a consultant to design a wine
country restaurant. That was the focus of our relationship. We discussed further
involvement in the Polo Cove project beyond just being a restaurateur. So there is
value that if a restaurant is built in a vineyard, the surrounding property's value is
enhanced. I introduced that concept to John, that he could then participate in
some of those profits beyond daily restaurant operation and cash flow.

Deposition of Glenn E. Mosell of February 5, 2008, at p. 39 in the action entitled
John Berryhill and Masell Equities, L.L.C., v. Broadway Park, Inc., and Michael G. Matzek,
Case No. CV OC 07-00987 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, In and For the County of Ada. Pertinent excerpts are attached to the Affidavit of Daniel E.
Williams Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, as Exhibit "A". Subsequent
references to this deposition testimony are cited to "Mosell" by page number.
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***
So we discussed ways of compensating John Berryhill for his talents, his culinary
talents, his name recognition, his personality and flair as a restaurateur. It was not
required that he build the restaurant himself or invest monies to participate in that
enhancement of value to real estate.
We then discussed during that time period, time allocation of his services. If I
take him from his catering and downtown restaurant efforts out to Polo Cove,
what would the compensation formula be; how much time would he have to
dedicate to Polo Cove versus his downtown restaurant endeavors? That was the
evolution of which it made sense for me to buy into Berryhill and Company so
that there was no competing activity. It's all blended. that Mosell business into
Berryhill. We talked about Moberry Ventures as that entity, and that entity would
operate a restaurant downtown; would operate a restaurant at Polo Cove. And
we'd operate catering businesses around the valley, services.
(Mosell: 41-43) (emphasis added).
The following exchange confirms Mosell' s intention of incorporating Berryhill &
Company, Inc., within the Polo Cove effort:
Q.

Well, let me ask you to please follow up on that, cause I think I understand
you correctly, that Mr. Berryhill had his name recognition and his flair and
his culinary talents to offer to Polo Cove, right?

A

Correct.

Q.

Although it doesn't sound like you contemplated his, Mr. Berryhill's, that is,
direct investment in Polo Cove; you wanted to compensate him somehow-

A

Correct.

Q.

-is that correct, for his time?

A

Correct.

Q.

And in order to eliminate any competition, as you put it, or tension between his
various activities, you undertook some sort of blending of operations; is that
right?
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A.

Exactly.

Q.

Please describe for me the contracts and legal agreements that memorialize that
blending, please, and that relationship.

A.

Trout Jones had put together documents for Maberry Ventures, Inc., that we never
finalized.

Q.

Why were they not finalized?

A.

Our focus was opening the restaurant downtown at the Plaza 121 during the
second half of 2006, and we just haven't gotten to finalization of that Maberry
entity. In lieu of my purchasing equity, I have loaned Berryhill and Company
$385,000.

Q.

Mr. Masell, you said in lieu of the purchase of equity you have loaned Berryhill
$385,000. Do you mean that as a permanent substitute or is that an interim?

A.

Interim substitute.

(Masell: 43-44) (emphasis added).
On approximately June 28, 2007, Plaintiff provided Berryhill & Company, Inc., with a
check for $50,000. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check, which is signed by John
Berryhill and Glenn Masell, there appears the following:
This is a loan from Masell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses
during our bookeeper transition. It will go into the general check register & be
used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co.
It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" of Maberry Venture Corp. Inc. 2
Subsequently, Masell Equities provided $405,000 in funds to Berryhill & Company, Inc. Asked
again about the terms of their arrangement, Glenn Masell testified on February 5, 2008: "We
have no contractual arrangement on Polo Cove. We have no contractual arrangement with
Berryhill and Company at this point. No contract exists" (Masell: 62).

2

Exhibit A to Amended Complaint filed September 14, 2009 (emphasis added).
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For roughly three years, Mr. Berryhill devoted substantial amounts of time to the Polo
Cove venture, meeting with architects, designers, potential vendors, vintners, hotel developers,
county commissioners and others about the proposed restaurant, hotel and other parts of the
developments. 3 Mr. Berryhill did so upon his understanding with Glenn Mosen, as Mosen
testified above, that Berryhill & Company, Inc. would participate in the Polo Cove profits beyond
operation of the restaurant. As part of their effort, Berryhill & Company, Inc., moved to
downtown Boise at the Plaza 121 location. Mr. Mosell encouraged the move, wanting to "splash
the pot," that together they had "big things" to do. Throughout the construction of the new
Berryhill & Company, Inc., restaurant, Mr. Mosen told Mr. Berryhill not to "cheap out," not to
worry about the cost of the buildout, saying "go big" and "do it sexy" (Berryhill: <JI 5). Mr.
Berryhill would not have agreed to the move downtown without Mosen' s encouragement and
promised financial support (Berryhill: <JI 6). A large portion of the funds provided by Mr. Mosen
went to the buildout of the new downtown space (Berryhill: <JI 7). Mr. Mosen signed a personal
guaranty with the landlord at Plaza 121, guaranteeing payment of the lease, including any
modification. 4
Mosell signed a letter of intent with the Plaza 121 landlord for additional space near the
restaurant for a Polo Cove showroom, although Mr. Berryhill warned him it was too big and
would significantly increase ongoing liabilities. Mosen responded that Mr. Berryhill was not

Affidavit of John Berryhill Re: Motion for Summary Judgment, <JI 3. Subsequent
references to this Affidavit are cited to "Berryhill" by paragraph number.
3

4

Exhibit A to Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial filed December

21, 2009.
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looking at "the big picture." Mr. Mosell could use the space for Polo Cove promotions during
the day and Berryhill & Company, Inc., could use it for banquets and receptions in the evening
(Berryhill: <JI 8). Although Mosell paid rent for this area, he did not cover the Polo Cove portion
of the buildout of the space. In late summer, 2008, Mosell discontinued paying rent altogether
(Berryhill: <JI 9). Berryhill & Company, Inc., is still paying rent on this additional space
(Berryhill: <JI 10). In answer to discovery requests, Berryhill & Company, Inc., has identified
approximately $927,415 in costs associated with move of the restaurant downtown, expansion
space including the Polo Cove showroom, and ongoing rent obligations (Berryhill: <JI 11).
On May 28, 2009, Plaintiff filed this action, initially alleging breach of oral contract and
other claims.

REMAINING CLAIMS
Defendants first address two claims not before the Court: (1) individual liability of John
and Amy Berryhill for the alleged loan; and (2) any ownership interest of Plaintiff in Berryhill &
Company, Inc. Defendant then reviews those claims remaining and at issue.
1.

No theory of individual liability remains on the alleged indebtedness.

Originally, at Count Five of its Complaint, Plaintiff sued John and Amy Berryhill
individually, along with Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., for unjust enrichment regarding
the alleged "loan" to Berryhill & Company, Inc. Ruling on Defendant's first motion to dismiss,
the Court found that Plaintiff had not even pled corporate veil piercing so as to impose individual
liability and the individual count was dismissed. 5 In its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff attempted

5

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed July

28, 2009.
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to impose individual liability on John Berryhill through its Count Six, in which it attempted to
plead corporate-veil piercing. Agreeing with Defendants' second motion to dismiss, the Court
again dismissed the corporate veil-piercing claim. 6
Plaintiff attempted a third time to amend and assert a corporate veil-piercing theory. 7 At
hearing, however, Plaintiff withdrew this motion upon learning that the Court would delay trial,
if leave to amend was granted, so that Defendants could bring a summary judgment motion on
this new claim.
Accordingly, the only individual theory of liability remaining is stated against John
Berryhill at Count Five of the Amended Complaint for alleged "fraud in the inducement."

2.

Plaintiff has affirmatively disclaimed any ownership interest in Defendant
Berryhill & Company, Inc.

At no time in these proceedings has Plaintiff asserted a claim for any kind of ownership
interest in Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., whether based on constructive partnership or
any other potential theory. In fact, Plaintiff has pled and admitted just the opposite: "However,
the parties never formed MOBERRY and Mosell Equities never acquired its 50% ownership
interest in Berryhill & Company" (Amended Complaint: <JI 10).
Accordingly, there is no legal or equitable issue as to ownership in Berryhill & Company,
Inc. Plaintiffs claims focus exclusively on the alleged "loan."

Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Defendants' Second Motion to
Dismiss and Motion to Strike Three Day Notice of Intent to Take Default filed December 4,
2009.
6

7

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint filed June 2, 2010.
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3.

Breach of written contract.

At summary judgment, the Court noted that "[c]ontract formation is generally a question
of fact to be determined by the trier of fact," citing, P.O. Ventures, Inc., v. Loucks Family

Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). 8 After analysis, the Court
stated that "the Court finds that the June 2008 agreement does constitute a valid contract;
however, its terms are ambiguous and its interpretation is a question of fact" (Summary
Judgment Decision: 8). It also stated that two checks out of the ten checks, those of October 9,
2007, and April 30, 2008, totaling $80,000, "are not contracts as a matter of law" (Summary
Judgment Decision: 9).

In conclusion, however, the Court specifically stated:
The question of whether the contract or contracts were breached hinges on
whether the trier of fact determines that there was a binding contract formed and
what a reasonable time for performance of the contract is. If the trier of fact
determines that there was a contract and that the reasonable time for performance
(repayment) has passed, then Berryhill & Co is in breach of the contracts.
There remains material questions of fact. The court therefore denies the
Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment as to Count One.
(Summary Judgment Decision: 9-10). Here, it appears that the Court has left the issue of
contract formation where it belongs - with the jury.
"If a breach of contract is alleged, the burden is upon the claimant to show 'the making of

the contract, an obligation assumed by defendants, and their breach or failure to meet such
obligation."' Reynolds v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 362, 365 (1988), quoting,

Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment, Motions to Strike, Motion to Amend Complaint, and Motion to Compel filed April
30, 2010, p. 7. Subsequent references to this decision are cited to "Summary Judgment
Decision," by page number.
8
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Thomas v. Cate, 78 Idaho 29, 31,296 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1956). "[A] contract must be complete,
definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in
themselves of being reduced to certainty." Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99 (Idaho 2002),

quoting Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983); see also,
Kidd Island Bay Water Users Coop. Ass'n v. Miller, 136 Idaho 571, 574 (Idaho 2001) (The terms
of a contract must be sufficiently definite and certain in order to be enforceable).
Idaho's contract law is no different from that of other jurisdictions:
'A contract is an agreement between two or more parties for the doing or not
doing of some specified thing.' O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1. 'In order that it may allege an
agreement, a petition must set forth a contract of such certainty and completeness
that either party may have a right of action upon it.' Peachtree Med. Bldg. v.
Keel, 107 Ga. App. 438,440 (130 S.E.2d 530) (1963). 'The requirement of
certainty extends not only to the subject matter and purpose of the contract, but
also to the parties, consideration, and even the time and place of performance
where these are essential. When a contract is substantially alleged, some details
might be supplied under the doctrines of reasonable time or reasonable
requirements. But indefiniteness in subject matter so extreme as not to present
anything upon which the contract may operate in a definite manner renders the
contract void ... .' (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Peachtree Med., supra at
441. Furthermore, "[t]he first requirement of the law relative to contracts is that
there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, and mutuality, and in order for
the contract to be valid the agreement must ordinarily be expressed plainly and
explicitly enough to show what the parties agreed upon. A contract cannot be
enforced in any form of action if its terms are incomplete or incomprehensible."
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bagwell-Hughes, Inc. v. McConnell, 224 Ga.
659, 661-662 (164 S.E.2d 229) (1968); see also Green v. Zaring, 222 Ga. 195
(149 S.E.2d 115) (1966); Patel v. Gingrey Assoc., 196 Ga. App. 203 (2) (395
S.E.2d 595) (1990).

Jackson v. Williams, 209 Ga. App. 640, 642-643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
Plaintiff relies on Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint as the alleged written contract at
issue in this case. Exhibit A is a handwritten note on a copy of a $50,000 check from Mosell
Equities to Berryhill & Company, Inc., indicating that "this" is a loan that "will be transitioned"

DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF, P. 9

001113

into a "buy in." The document is silent as to the parties' intent as to what happens if, for any
reason, the transition does not occur. Plaintiff pretends that it is clear that the $50,000 remains a
loan regardless of whether the "transition" occurs or not, but the note does not state anything of
the sort.
Thus, the element of definiteness is entirely lacking, demonstrating a lack of a meeting of
the minds of the parties. Defendant is entitled to have the trier of fact decide as a factual matter
whether there was an adequate meeting of the minds to form a bona fide contract. Defendants'
proposed jury instructions reflect this remaining dispute.

4.

Breach of implied-in-fact contract.

Although a contract may be implied by the conduct of the parties, nevertheless it is
"grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding." Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584,
587,930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). Where, as here, even the conduct of the parties demonstrated
that they had no agreement or tacit understanding as to what would occur if the "loan" was not
transitioned, an essential term is missing and there was no meeting of the minds implied by
conduct so as to constitute such an implied-in-fact contract. By Plaintiffs own earlier admission,
the "loan," if it can be called one, was meant as a temporary and "interim" step, not as a
permanent lender-debtor relationship.

5.

Unjust enrichment.

According to the Idaho Supreme Court,
in order to establish the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must
show that there was: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit
under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof.
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF, P. 10
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King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 910 (Idaho 2002), citing, Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v.
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88,982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999), citing, Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378,382,
941 P.2d 350,354 (Ct. App. 1997).
In King, the Court sustained a district court's grant of summary judgment on this theory,
explaining that it would not be inequitable for the defendants to retain any benefit, because the
plaintiff was represented by a real estate agent in the real property transaction at issue and could
not show that she justifiably relied on any alleged misrepresentations. Similarly, Plaintiff cannot
show any bona fide inequity based on its own failure to require appropriate documents of
indebtedness prior to advancing funds. Plaintiff cannot claim that its own business dealings with
Berryhill & Company, Inc., were inequitable, when its agent, Glenn Mosell, possessed the
superior financial experience and knowledge.
Moreover, not every benefit provided by a party, especially viewed in isolation, amounts
to unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001) ("An action for unjust enrichment does not lie simply because one party benefits
from the efforts of others; instead, 'it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully") (citation omitted).
Defendants' proposed jury instructions set forth this authority.
6.

Conversion.

Not every possession constitutes conversion. See, e.g., Priel v. Heby, 2004 NY Slip Op
50820U, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) ("To properly plead a cause of action for conversion, it is
incumbent upon plaintiff to allege facts establishing that he owned or had a superior right to the
materials in question, that he demanded their return, and that defendant refused to deliver them ..
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. . 'A conversion action cannot be predicated on an equitable interest or a mere breach of a
contractual obligation"') (citations omitted).
Plaintiff must prove a "superior" right, not merely a breach of contract, as Defendants'
proposed jury instruction explains.

7.

Fraud in the inducement.

At summary judgment, the Court found that the only alleged fraudulent statement made
by John Berryhill that was properly at issue was the statement "this is a loan ... " in Exhibit A to
the Amended Complaint (Summary Judgment Decision: 13). The Court found that there was "a
question of fact as to Berryhill's intent at the time the agreement was entered in to." Although
Defendants respectfully disagree with the Court's conclusions, they acknowledge that those
claims remain against John Berryhill individually and Berryhill & Company, Inc., as his
principal.

A.

John Berryhill made no false representation of fact.

Under clear Idaho authority,
Fraud requires: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7)
reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury.

Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., 141 Idaho 604,615 (2005), citing, Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222,
226, 46 P.3d 518, 522 (2002). The party alleging fraud must support the existence of each of the
elements of the cause of action for fraud by pleading with particularity the factual circumstances
constituting fraud. I.R.C.P. 9(b); Theriault v. A.H. Robins, 108 Idaho 303,307,698 P.2d 365,
369 (1985); Galaxy Outdoor Advertising v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 109 Idaho 692, 710 P.2d 602
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(1985); Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986). Furthermore, the party alleging an
action for fraud has the burden of proving all these elements at trial by clear and convincing
evidence. Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338 (1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho
331,597 P.2d 217 (1979); Gneiting v. Clement, 96 Idaho 348,528 P.2d 1283 (1974).
Obviously, a statement or representation of fact must be made that is false. The statement
Plaintiff complains about is not a recital or warranty by John Berryhill or Berryhill & Company,
Inc. The statement in Exhibit A that the $50,000 in funds was a "loan" that "will be transitioned"
into part of Mosell's buy-in to a new entity to be formed simply is not a representation of fact,
much less one that is false. A loan that "will be transitioned" is, quite simply, not a loan at all.
And the language set forth in Exhibit A is not a representation of fact, but, if anything, an
attempted legal characterization of the parties' intent.
Moreover, Exhibit A correctly and accurately set forth both of the parties' then-current
intent, as confirmed by the sworn testimony of Glenn Mosen himself:
Q.

Please describe for me the contracts and legal agreements that memorialize that
blending, please, and that relationship.

A.

Trout Jones had put together documents for Moberry Ventures, Inc., that we never
finalized.

Q.

Why were they not finalized?

A.

"Our focus was opening the downtown at the Plaza 121 during the second half of
2006, and we just haven't gotten to finalization of that Moberry entity. In lieu of
my purchasing equity, I have loaned Berryhill and Company $385,000.

Q.

Mr. Mosell, you said in lieu of the purchase of equity you have loaned Berryhill
$385,000. Do you mean that as a permanent substitute or is that an interim?

A.

Interim substitute.
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(Mosell: 44) (emphasis added). Here, Glenn Mosell confirms that the "loan" was a temporary
and interim substitute for a full agreement, rather than a permanent arrangement. Based on
Mosell' s own testimony, no statement in Exhibit A is false.
Even to whatever extent Exhibit A could be read to state anything false, any alleged
misstatements of opinion or of the law are not representations of fact and cannot serve as the
basis for a fraud claim.
The principle that fraud must rest on a misrepresentation of fact, and cannot be
supported by a misstatement of opinion, is based on the theory that 'everyone is
equally capable of determining the law, is presumed to know the law and is bound
to take notice of the law and, therefore, in legal contemplation, cannot be deceived
by representations concerning the law or permitted to say he or she has been
misled.' Williston on Contracts, Misstatements of Law, § 69: 10 (4th Ed.)(2004).
Equal Justice Found. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 412 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795 (S.D. Ohio
2005).

B.

Fraud cannot be based simply upon a failure to perform a contractual
duty.

Under Idaho law, as is generally the case, fraud cannot be based upon the failure to
perform a contractual promise.
As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory in nature that
relate to future actions or upon the mere failure to perform a promise or an
agreement to do something in the future. Pacific States Auto. Fin. Corp. v.
Addison, 45 Idaho 270, 261 P. 683 (1927). The allegedly false representation
must concern past or existing material facts. Maroun v. Wyre less Systems, Inc.,
141 Idaho 604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005); see also, In re Syntex Corp. Secs. Litig., 95
F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) (Predictions proved to be wrong in hindsight do not
render the statements untrue when made).
DeVries v. DeLaval, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41599, 21-22 (D. Idaho 2006) (construing
Idaho law). The reason for this general rule is obvious:
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Fraud is an intentional tort, the plaintiff claims to have been cheated. Put more
succinctly, there is a fundamental difference between 'a statement that is false
when made and a promise that becomes false only when the promisor later fails to
keep his word.' City of Richmond v. Madison Mgt. Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438,447
(4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, 53 (4th
Cir. 1988)). The law regards the former as a more serious wrong. Fraud, of
course, is easily and often claimed, but the many elements which must be proved
by the higher standard of "clear, satisfactory and convincing" evidence make fraud
more difficult to prove as it should be given the gravity of the allegation.
Emplrs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Collins &Aikman Floor Coverings, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7192,
55-56 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 2004). Or, as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained,
A Supreme Court of Virginia case, not cited by the parties or the district court,
nicely sets the distinction between a statement actionable as a breach of contract
and a statement actionable as a fraud. Colonial Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v.
Schneider, 228 Va. 671,325 S.E.2d 91(1985). Colonial Ford distinguishes
between a statement that is false when made and a promise that becomes false
only when the promisor later fails to keep his word. The former is fraud, the latter
is breach of contract. A promise to perform an act in the future is not, in a legal
sense, a representation as that term is used in the fraud context. Soble v. Herman,
175 Va. 489, 9 S.E.2d 459 (1940). The reason is obvious. Without that rule
almost every breach of contract could be claimed to be a fraud.
Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, 53 (4th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).

C.

Plaintiff does not sustain a claim for fraud in the inducement.

The sole exception to the line of authority set forth above occurs when a party makes a
contractual promise it has no present intention of keeping. As the Idaho Supreme Court
explained:
Generally, the representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern
past or existing material facts. Representations concerning future events are
usually not considered actionable. First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Webster, 119 Idaho
262,268, 805 P.2d 468,474 (1991). A promise or statement that an act will be
undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is proven that the speaker made the
promise without intending to keep it. Id. Therefore, CPP's representations as to
future events would be actionable only if Magic Lantern could show that CPP
made these representations without intending to honor them.
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF, P.15
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CPP presented evidence that CPP had intended to do business with Magic Lantern
as represented and that CPP abandoned the project only after the negotiations with
Magic Lantern did not produce an agreement. Magic Lantern did not produce any
evidence suggesting that at the time of the alleged representations CPP did not
intend to carry out the project and to include Magic Lantern as represented.
Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment dismissing
the fraud claim.
Magic Lantern Prods. v. Dolsot, 126 ldaho 805, 807 (1995), overruled on other grounds,
Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466 (2001).
Here, Plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that John Berryhill had a
present intention not to perform the alleged agreement set forth at Exhibit A to the Amended
Complaint. It cannot rely simply on the fact of non-payment.

D.

Plaintiff had no right to rely upon the alleged misrepresentations.

Even if Plaintiff could somehow conjure an actionable representation, it cannot sustain its
burden of demonstrating ''justifiable reliance" on such a representation. Plaintiff's sole owner
and managing member, Glenn Mosell, graduated from U.C. San Diego with a bachelor's degree
in economics (Mosell: 10). He obtained a Series Six securities license and worked for
Prudential-Bache, exploring a financial services stockbroker career (Mosell: 11). He also
obtained real estate licenses in California and Colorado (Mosell: 11). He worked as a sales
associate broker with Marcus and Millichap, a national firm dealing in investment sales (Mosell:
14). He then worked for Sperry Van Ness as an investment broker (Mosell: 15). He has worked
on many millions of dollars worth of transactions (Mosell: 19). He has also worked as a
commercial real estate developer (Mosell: 23).

DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF, P. 16
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As a sophisticated businessman, Mosell simply had no right to rely on the handwritten
statements set forth at Exhibit A. He is presumed to understand what a note is, if he really
intended a simple loan and nothing more. He could have required a note or some other
manifestation of the parties' intent prior to advancing funds. For a sophisticated businessman to
provide funds in the amounts at issue in reliance upon such a vague and flimsy basis as Exhibit A
is not in any sense justifiable.
Reasonable reliance is measured objectively, yet consideration is given to certain
subjective attributes of the individual, such as his or her sophistication. 'One who
has special knowledge, experience and competence may not be permitted to rely
on statements for which the ordinary man might recover, and that one who has
acquired expert knowledge concerning the matter dealt with may be required to
form his own judgment, rather than take the word of the defendant.' W. Page
Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts§ 108, at 751 (5th ed. 1984).

Stanley Weiss Assocs., LLC v. Energy Mgmt., 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 72 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004).
Thus, to the extent that anything at all represented by John Berryhill in Exhibit A is false,
Plaintiff will not be able to show that it reasonably had any right or justifiable reasons for relying
upon it.

8.

Fraud counterclaim.

Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., has stated a fraud counterclaim against Plaintiff.
Naturally, the authority cited above applies to the fraud counterclaim, as well as to Plaintiffs
own claim.
Specifically, Defendant claims that Mosell Equities represented that it owned substantial
real estate holdings in the proposed Polo Cove development, which was false. 9 Defendant also

Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial filed December 21, 2009, Cj[ 7.
Subsequent references to this filing are cited to "Counterclaim" by paragraph number.
9
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claims that Mosell Equities induced Berryhill & Company to add additional space to its existing
obligation to his landlord based on all of the representations made by Plaintiff regarding the joint
interest in Polo Cove (Counterclaim: <J[ 18). By insisting on calling the funds a "loan," while
simultaneously assuring Defendant that they would not remain such, Plaintiff induced Defendant
to accept the funds under false pretenses (Counterclaim: <J[ 22).
Because fraud depends on "all the circumstances," see, e.g., Fuchs v. Lloyd, 80 Idaho 114
(1958), Defendants are entitled to explore a wide-ranging series of subjects, including Glenn
Mosell's background and development experience, as well as his acquaintance with notes,
contracts and those subjects set forth in Defendants' Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
in Limine re: other litigakDATED this

J:..

day of September, 2010.
HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP

Darnel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants
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I hereby certify that on this
day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

_ _ Via Hand Delivery
i.----- Via Facsimile: 939-7136
Via U.S. Mail

Daniel E. Williams
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P. 0. Box 1776
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Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswillia.mslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho

)
)

corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL
WITNESS DISCLOSURES

)
Defendants.

~

FlcED

AIL"". -- -- ----

)

COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through counsel of record. and hereby supplements it
disclosure of witnesses as follows:
John Berryhill
Berryhill & Co. Restaurant
121 No. 9th St
Boise, ID 83702

(4 hours)

GlennMosell
2233 No. Aldercrest Pl
Eagle, ID 83616

(Likely cross examination)

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS DISCLOSURE, P. 1
001124

-

SEP. 3. 2010 2:33PM

NO. 9173

Ron M. Bitner, Ph.D.
Bitner Vineyards
16645 Plum Road
Caldwell, ID 83607

(1 hour)

Amy Dempsey
Riche Demfsey & Assoc.
205 No. 10 , Suite 300
Boise, ID 83 702

(1.5 hours)

Kim Gourley
Trout Jones Gledhill & Fuhrman
225No 9th St
Boise, ID 83702

(1 hour)

Steve Inch
Propel Communications Inc.
2265 So. Swallowtail Lane
Boise, ID 83706

(2hours)

James Tomlinson
Tomlinson & Associates, Inc.
205 No. 101h St.
Boise, ID 83702

(1 hour)

DATED this

3

P. 3

~
day of September, 2010.

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants
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NO. 9173
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C~'"9-~TE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this __ day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0, Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

__ Via Hand Delivery
VViaFacsimile: 939-7136
Via U.S. Mail

Daniel E. Williams
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & AS SOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

SEP O1 2(}10
By

~yfro,

Clerk

DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0909974

MOSELL EQUITIES' DISCLOSURE
OF TRIAL EXHIBITS

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and by and through its counsel of record and hereby provides
the Court with its disclosure of its Trial Exhibits the Plaintiff will present for admission at trial.

No

1

2
3
4

Description

Loan Agreement with first loan check
Check No. 5127 - June 28, 2007 "Loan"
"$50,000"
Check No. 5137 - July 30, 2007 "Loan"
"$25,000"
Check No. 5139-August 7, 2007 "Loan -

Stipulation
Foundation

Admission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Offered

Admitted
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5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

TI' s" "$25,000"
Check No. 5140 - August 16, 2007 "Loan #4"
"$25,000"
Check No. 5141 - August 16, 2007 "Loan #5"
"$25,000"
Check No. 5196 - October 9, 2007 "Kitchen
Equip Loan" "60,000"
Check No. 5201 - October 26, 2007 "Loan"
"100,000"
Check No. 5154 - December 4, 2007 "Loan"
"$25,000"
Check No. 5164 - December 19, 2007 "Loan"
"$50,000"
Check No. 5247-April 30, 2008 "Suite 101
TI' s" "20,000"
Check No. 5009 - September 21, 2005 John
Berryhill Consulting "$5000"
Check No. 5046 - May 9, 2006 John Berryhill
Consulting "$5000"
Check No. 5070 -August 7, 2006 John
Berryhill Consulting "$10000"
Check No. 5102 - February 13, 2007
Berryhill & Co Consulting "$5000"
Check No. 5112 - May 1, 2007 "General
Account" "$10000"
Check No. 5117 - May 29, 2007 " "
"$10000"
Berryhill's "BCO Development" Outline
"Vision"
Berryhill's Offer No. 1
Berryhill' s Offer No. 2
Berryhill's Offer No. 3
$50,000 Deposit Summary
Check from Berryhill & Co to John Berryhill
1-25-08 "$50,000"
Personal Guarantee for lease space
"Berryhill & Co. is moving back
DOWNTOWN" Flyer
Berryhill E-mail to Sam Gerberding May 14,
2007
Polo Cove Business Card - Berryhill
Berryhill Affidavit signed March 22, 2010
with Exhibits
Berryhill Affidavit signed April 7, 2010 with
Exhibits

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Boise Urban Liaison Article re Berryhill Move
Downtown
Mosell Comps
Berryhill Comps
Berryhill & Company, Inc. "Register Mosell
Equities LLC"
Kim Gourley Documents
Victoria Meier Documents
Victoria Meier 2008 Meeting Notes
Dempsey - Berryhill E-mail March 5, 2008
Mosell Berryhill E-mails String re
investment/divestment Sept/ Oct 2008
Epitome Bill for Furniture
Master site plan for Polo Cove
Vicki Meier bill
Sherry McKibben E-mail February 20, 2007 re
meeting with Berryhill re the restaurant at Polo
Cove
Restaurant Lease Summary
Polo Cove Executive Summary Dated
February 29, 2008
Polo Cove Executive Summary Dated June 18,
2008
BH&Co Transaction account - Polo Cove
space
Berryhill's Day Planner
Berryhill Deposition Transcript - Broadway
Park Litigation (excerpts)
Mosell Deposition Transcript - Broadway Park
Litigation (excerpts)
BH&Co Balance Sheet December 31, 2005
BH&Co Balance Sheet December 31, 2006
BH&Co Balance Sheet December 31, 2007
BH&Co Balance Sheet June 30, 2008
BH&Co Balance Sheet December 31, 2008
BH&Co Profit - loss 2005
BH&Co Profit - loss 2006
BH&Co Profit - loss 2007
BH&Co Profit - loss 2008
BH&Co Profit - loss 2009
BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of
Directors and Shareholders -2005
BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of
Directors and Shareholders -2006

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
xx
Defendants' "MMM"
X
X
Defendants' "BBB"
X
X
X

X

Defendants' "G"
X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

I
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62
63
64
65

66

67

68
69

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of
Directors and Shareholders -2007
BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of
Directors and Shareholders -2008
BH&Co Annual Meeting of the Board of
Directors and Shareholders -2009
Defendant's Answers To Plaintiffs First Set Of
Interrogatories And Requests For Production
Of Documents
Defendant's Supplemental Answers To
Plaintiffs First Set Of Interrogatories And
Requests For Production Of Documents
Defendants' Answers And Responses To
Plaintiffs Second Set Of Interrogatories And
Requests For Production Of Documents
Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs Third Set
Of Requests For Production Of Documents
Defendants' Responses And Answers To
Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For
Admissions, Third Set Of Interrogatories And
Fourth Set Of Requests For Production Of
Documents To Plaintiff
BH&Co Taxes 2004
BH&Co Taxes 2005
BH&Co Taxes 2006
BH&Co Taxes 2007
BH&Co Taxes 2008
Berryhill's deposition transcript in this case
Idaho Statesman - July 7, 2007 article
All Exhibits identified by the Defendants

X

X

X

X

X

X

I

I
I

X

X
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of September, 2010.
CLARK & AS SOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

~ - : -f\-U-L
Eric R. Clark

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of September, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy hand delivered to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 345-7894

ERIC R. CLARK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
Defendants' Exhibit List
Plaintiffs Attorney:

CASE NAME:
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Eric R. Clark
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Defendants.
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Presiding Judge:

Hon. Dennis E. Goff
Party Offering Exhibits:

Defendants, John E. Berryhill and Berryhill & Company, Inc.
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Email from Mosell to Beckman, Berrvhill, Bitner 7/l 0/07
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill 6/28/07
Email from Mosell to Foerstel, Berrvhill 6/28/07
Email from Mosell to Bitner, Berryhill 2/12/07
Email string from Mo sell to Angie Riff 2/7/07
Email from Mosell to Berryhill 2/23/07
Email from Mosell to McKibben 2/20/07
Email from Mosell to Berryhill l/ 12/07
Email from Mosell to Berryhill 12/28/06
Email from Mosell to Foerstel 11/10/06
Email from Mosell to Berryhill & McKibben 2/6/07
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill 11/3/07
Email from Mosell to Sherry (McKibben), Berryhill & Bitner 9/26/06
Email from Mosell to Berryhill l Oil 0/06
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill 8/30/06
Email from Mosell to Berryhill 7/20/06
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill 7/14/06
Email from Mosell to Berryhill l/31/06
Email from Mosell to Bitner, Berryhill, Kraus 2/10/06
Email from Mosell to Berrvhill l/31/06
Email from Mosell to Berryhill l/20/06
Email from Berryhill to Erstad, Mosell, Reed, McKibben (meeting recaps
and Polo Cove)
Berryhill & Co P &L Ledgers
Invoice from Berrvhill & Co to Polo Cove/Glenn Mosell l/l/08
Berryhill - Rent breakdown for Restaurant/Polo Cove Showroom
Memo to file from Victoria Meier l/22/08
WITHDRAWN
Employee Earnings Summarv l/06-12/09
Invoice from credit card re: Polo Cove trip (Mosells & Berryhills)
Polo Cove Executive Overview 5/6/08
Email from Berrvhill to Erstad, Mosell, Reed, McKibben l/28/06
Email from Berrvhill to McKibben 7/19/06
Ron Bitner Polo Cove Business Card
Emails

Letter from Tomlinson to Berrvhill 8/18/10
Tenant Improvement Plans (McKibben & Cooper) 11/29/07
Concepts and Illustrations of Polo Cove (10/1/05, 2/20/06, 11/30/07)
Berrvhill Quickbooks Transaction Detail Reports
Polo Cove Executive Overview 6/18/08
Polo Cove Executive Overview 2/29/08
WITHDRAWN
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Web Site Designs (Foerstel)
Spreadsheets with Polo Cove Offers and earnest money (prepared by Cathy
Smith/Prudential Jensen)
Narrative by Lakey submitted to Canyon County P&Z
Report on Potential Market Demand for a Proposed Hotel to be located in
the Snake River Wine Valley, Idaho (Prenared by PKF Consulting 12/5/05)
Polo Cove Executive Overview 3/10/08
Polo Cove Executive Overview 3/12/08
Email from Masell to Berryhill 9/3/08
Emails from Amy Dempsey to Berryhill 3/5/08
Email from K Gourley re: MoBerrv Corporation
Copy of $50,000 check number 5127 with note written by John Berryhill
Copy of$50,000 check number 5127 (memo-loan)
Copy of $25,000 check number 5137 (memo-loan)
Copy of $25,000 check number 5139 (memo - loan Tis)
Coov of$25,000 check number 5140 (memo-Loan #4)
Copy of$25,000 check number 5141 (memo-Loan #5)
Copy of $60,000 check number 5196 (memo-Kitchen equip
Copy of $100,000 check number 5201 (memo-Loan)
Copy of$25,000 check number 5154 (memo-Loan)
Copy of$50,000 check number 5164 (memo-Loan)
Copy of $20,000 check number 5247 (memo-Suite 101 Tis)
Plaintiff's Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial
Executive Overview
Sunnyslope, Id Google Map
Berryhill Logo

Pending further discussions between counsel.

~~

DATED this ____j_ day of September, 2010.
OMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP

r:

Attorney for Defendants
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Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

~ a Hand Delivery
X
via Facsimile
___ via U.S. Mail
___ via Email

Daniel E. Williams
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

TRIAL BENCH BRIEF:
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S
PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENT

Defendants-Counter Claimants.

Judge Goff

******
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its
undersigned counsel, and requests that this Court allow the admission of extrinsic evidence of
Defendant John Berryhill's prior deposition testimony from the Broadway Park Case.

TRIAL BENCH BRIEF: ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
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Berryhill now contends the "buy in" agreement involved a cash component, and some
"interest" in Polo Cove. Mosell Equities denies the additional term and contends the correct
terms are stated succinctly in the document drafted by tax attorney Victoria Meier. (P.35)

ARGUMENT
Mosell Equities contends that the Court should admit the excerpts of Berryhill' s prior
testimony (P.48) as the statements appear to contradict Berryhill's contention now that the "buy
in" involved terms other than cash for equity. Rule 613, IRE, specifically allows for the
admission of extrinsic evidence to establish a prior inconsistent statement if the declarant is a
party-opponent as defined by the hearsay rule.

Rule 613. Prior statements of witnesses.
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness
concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the
statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time,
but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless
the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the
opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the
interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions
of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801 {d){2).
During Berryhill's deposition in January 2008, after meeting with Attorney Victoria
Meier, but before she finishe'd drafting the "buy in" documents, Berryhill testified regarding the
terms of Mosell Equities' "buy in."

77
9
Q. So what are the approximate total amounts of
10 those payments?
11
A. Little under half million dollars.
12
Q. For ease of discussion I'm going to call it
13 500,000; but I'm noting that you said it's slightly
14 under.
TRIAL BENCH BRIEF: ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
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15

-

A. Okay.

16
O. What did Mosell Equities get in exchange for
17 this half 'a million dollars?
18
[Berryhilll A. Fifty percent of Berryhill and Company.
19
O. So today Mosell Equities owns fifty percent of
20 Berryhill and Company?

21
A. There's actually -- No. That paperwork is
22 being drawn up.
23

0. But that's your understanding?

24

[Berryhill] A. Yes.

25

Q. So you're having somebody do the paperwork?

78

1

A. Yes.

Berryhill's testimony clearly states cash for equity, and nothing more. If Berryhill is
going to testify to any other terms, which based on his Counsel's opening statement is his intent,
Mosell Equities is entitled to admission of its Exhibit 48, the relevant excerpts of Berryhill' s
Broadway Park deposition testimony.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of September, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff

TRIAL BENCH BRIEF: ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT-3

001138

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of September, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy hand delivered to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK

TRIAL BENCH BRIEF: ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT - 4

001139

•

SEP. 13. 2010 2:30PM

,.

P. 7/11

NO.------~C. Q
A.M. _ _ _
Fl_.LE M

SEP~11 ·3 2010'
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By KATHY BIEHL
DEPUTY

DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9 th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Case No. CV OC 0909974
Plaintiff,

vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation, JOHN E.
BERRYHILL ill and AMY
BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

AFF1DAVIT OF SERVICE
OF SUBPOENA

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada

)

I, CHASE RODGERS, a resident of Idaho, over the age of eighteen (18) years, and not a
party to this action, served a Subpoena on Kimbell Gourley at 3:40 o'clock p.m. on the 10th day

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1

001140

-

SEP. 13. 201) 2:3HM

NO.9195

P. 8/11

of September, 2010, at the following address: 225 No 9th Street, Suite 820, Boise, Idaho, by
personally handing a copy to Kimbell Gourley.

Chase Rodgers

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13 th day of September, 20 I 0.

Residing at Meridian,
My commission expires: 5/15/13

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA- 2

001141

NO. 9195

SEP. 13. 2010 2:31PM

P. 9/11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was seived on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 3

~ - via Hand Delivery
X via Facsimile
_ _ via U.S. Mail
- - via Email

001142

N0.9195

SEP. 13. 2010 2:31PM

P. 10/11

•

DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, Wll.,LIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345..7g94
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,
Plaintiff ,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974
SUBPOENA

)

vs.

)
)

BERRYlllLL & CO:MPANY,INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL ill and
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)

)
)

Defendants.

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO:

)

KIM GOURLEY

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear in Court at the place, date and time

specified below to testify in the above case:

SUBPOENA, P. 1

001143

N0. 919 5

SEP. 13. 2010 2:31PM

P. 11111

•

DATE:

September 14, 2010.

TIME:

2:00 p.m.

PLACE: Ada County Courthouse
Courtroom 510
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above,
you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum
'

of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

,

--V--

i ·, ~

DATED this~ day of September, 2010.
THOMAS,

\
l

WIWAMS.& PARK, UP

4

._ ) C ~ ): /I//

J~

Danie] E. Williams
Attorneys for Defendants

2.

l:··· . ~~

SUBPOENA, P. 2
001144

-

SEP. 13. 2010 2:32PM

.

NO.

9196

P. 2/6

SEP. r1 3 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, C1ert<

DANIEL E. WILLIA.'1S QSB 3920)

By KATHY BIEHL

THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP

OEPl.:JTY

9th

121 N.
St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswill.iamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURIB JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,

Case No. CV OC 0909974
Plaintiff,

vs.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation, JOHN E.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
OF SUBPOENA

BERRYHil.L ID and AMY
BERRYHILL, indiYidually, and as

husband and wife,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)
I, CHASE RODGERS, a resident ofldaho, over the age of cighteen (18) years, and not a
party to this actjon, served a Subpoena on Ron Bitner at 11 :00 o'clock a.m. on the 11 lh day of

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1

001145

SEP. 13. 2010 2:32PM

-

NO. 9196

P. 3/6

September, 2010, at the following address: 16645 Plum Rd., Caldwell, Idaho, by personally
handing a oopy to Ron Bitner.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13 th day of September, 2010.

Residing at Meridian, ID
My commission expires: 5/15/13

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA- 2

001146

-

SEP. 13. 2010 2:32PM

NO. 9196

P. 4/6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504

Eagle, ID 83616

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA-3

_ _ via Hand Delivery
X via Facsimile
_ _ via U.S. Mail
- - via Email

001147

SEP. 13. 2010 2: 32PM
•

-

•

N0.9196

P. 5/6

DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,

Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

Plaintiff ,

)

SUBPOENA

)

vs.

)
)

BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIDLL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

THE STATE OF ~AHO TO:

)

RON BITNER

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear in Court at the place, date and time
specified below to testify in the above case:

SUBPOENA, P. 1

001148

•

SEP. 13. 2010 2:33PM
•

DATE:

September 14, 2010.

TIME:

2:30 p.m.

NO. 9196

P. 6/6

PLACE: Ada County Courthouse
Courtroom 510
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702

You are fwther notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above,
you may be held in contempt of court and th.at the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum
of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this

subpoena.

DATED this

L.1_~ of September, 2010.
· THOMAS, WIILIAMS & PARK, Ll.P

...

Daniel E. Williams
Attorneys for Defendants

SUBPOENA, P. 2

001149

-

SEP.13. 2010 2:27PM

NO. 9194

. ""·'

Fll£0

P

2/11

~

w ••.••- - -Pr,,,,
SEPJl 3 2010
J. OAVlD NAVARRO, Clerk

DANIEL E. WD.,LIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345- 7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

- - -.__ 8y KATHY BIEHL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited~
Case No. CV OC 0909974
Plaintiff,
vs.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation, JOHN E.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
OF SUBPOENA

BERRYHILL III and AMY
BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.

County of Ada

)

I, SHERRIE WYATT. a resident ofldaho, overthe age of eighteen (18) years, and not a
party to this action, served a Subpoena on Steve Inch at 3 :00 o'clock p.m. on the 10th day of

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1

001150

SEP. 13. 2010 2:27PM

•

-

N0.9194

P. 3/11

th

September, 2010, at the following address: 121 No. 9 St., Suite 300, Boise, Idaho, by

personally handing a copy to Steve Inch.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13t1i day of September, 2010.

Residing at 1se, ID
My commission expires: //-

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 2

7-CL--

001151

SEP. 13. 201~ 2:27PM

N0.9'194

P. 4/11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 3

_ _ via Hand Delivery
X via Facsimile
_ _ via U.S. Mail
_ _ viaEmail

001152

SEP, 13. 201 0 2: 27J M

NO. 9194

P. 5/11

DANIELE. "WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
raOMAS, W'aLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894

danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

Plaintiff ,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

SUBPOENA

)

vs.

)
)

BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and

)
)

AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as

)

husband and wife,

)
)

Defendants.

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: STEVE INCH
YOU ARE HEREBY C01\1MANDED to appear in Court at the place, date and time
specified below to testify in the above case:

SUBPOENA, P. 1

001153

N0.9194

SE~. 13. 2010 2: 28PM

DATE:

September 14, 2010.

TIME:

10:30 a.m.

P

6/11

PLACE: Ada County Courthouse
Courtroom 510

200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above,

you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum
of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

DATED this

.

~

l[--aay of September, 2010.
THOMAS, WII..LIAMS &PARK,LLP

Daniel E. Williams

'

Attomeys for Defendants

SUBPOENA, P. 2

001154

-

-

S~P. 13. 2010 2:28PM

-

N0.9194

P. 7/11

DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300

P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff,

vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation, JOHN E.
BERRYHILL III and AMY
BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

OF SUBPOENA

Defendants.

STATEOFIDAHO )
County of Ada

) ss.
)

I, SHERRIE WYATI, a resident ofldaho, over the age of eighteen (18) years, and not a
party to this action, served a Subpoena on Amy Dempsey at l 0:00 o'clock a.m. on the 13 ui day of

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1

001155

SEP. 13. 2010 2:28PM

NO. 9194

P. 8/11

September, 2010, at the following address: 121 No. 9th St., Suite 300, Boise, Idaho, by

personally handing a copy to Amy Dempsey.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me th1s 13 th day of September, 2010.

Resid"
t Boise, ID
My commission expires: r/J-7- ,/2.
~

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 2

001156

N0.9194

S,EP. 13. 2010 2:28PM

P. 9/11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ins1I'llment was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys

P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 3

_ _ via Hand Delivery
X via Facsimile
_ _ via U.S, Mail
via Email

--

001157

•

.

SEP. 13. 2010 2:28PM

NO. 9194

P. 10/11

DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345~7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,
Plaintiff ,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974
SUBPOENA

)
)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho

)

corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: AMY DEMPSEY

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear in Court at the place, date and time
specified below to testify in the above case:

SUBPOENA, P. 1
001158

SEP. 13. 2010 2:29PM
~

•

DATE:

September 14, 2010.

TIME:

1:15 p.rn.

N0.9194

P. 11/1'

PLACE: Ada County Courthouse

Courtroom 510
200 W. Front Street

Boise, ID 83702
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above,
you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum

of $ 100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena

~

DATED this ~ day of September, 2010.
ROMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LI.P

Attorneys for Defendants

SUBPOENA, P. 2
001159

•

SEP.13.2010 2:29PM

.

-

im. 9195

P. 2/11

NO. _ _---;::;:-::;:--=--A.M,_.----..JP.M
FILED _ _ _ __

2

SEPJl3 20fll.)
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk'

121 N. 9th St, Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

-

By KATHY BIEHi.
DEPUTY
-- -

-

. ·------ --·-·-

)
_

_

_-

1

"'-·· _,..._._.......]

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DJSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,

Case No. CV OC 0909974
Plaintiff,
VS.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation, JOHN E.
BERRYHILL Ill and AMY
BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

OF SUBPOENA

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )

) ss.
County of Ada

)

I, CHASE RODGERS, a resident ofldaho, over the age of eighteen (18) years, and not a
party to this action, served a Subpoena on James Tomlinson at 4:10 o'clock p.rn. on the 10th day

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 1

001160

NO. 919 5

SEP. 13. 2010 2:29PM

P. 3/ 11

of September, 2010, at the following address: 205 No. Tenth Street, 2nd Floor, Boise, Idaho, by

personally handing a copy to James Tomlinson.

ChaseRodg
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13lh day of September, 2010.

~filJ];p
~y
PUBLIC FcittiDAHO
Residing at Meridian, ID
My commission expires: 5/15/13

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 2

001161

SEP. 13. 2010 2:30PM

•

NO. 9195

P. 4/11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated. below:
_ _ via Hand Delivery
X via Facsimile
_ _ via U.S. Mail

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

--

via Email

c!:awimff5lt
eme. yatt

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF SUBPOENA - 3

001162

SEP. 13. 2010 2:30~M

.

-

•

1~0.9195

~

5/11

DANIELE. 'WaLIAMS (ISB 3920)
moMAS, WILLIAMS & p ARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345~7800
Fax: (208) 345~7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,

)

Liability Company,

)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)
)
)

SUBPOENA

Plaintiff ,

vs.

)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYIIlLL, indhidually, and as
husband and wife,

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: JAMES TOMLINSON

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear in Comt at the place, date and time
specified below to testify in the above case:

SUBPOENA, P. 1
001163

-

•

SEP. 13. 2010 2:30PM
•

DAIB:

September 14, 2010.

TIME:

3:00 p.m.

NO. 9195

P. 6/11

PLACE: Ada County Courthouse
Counroom 510
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above,
you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved pmty may recover from you the sum
of $ 100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.
DATED this

v

lh.a~y of September, 2010.
THOMAS, WII..llAMS & PARK, UP

\

. () <;7'~
. t:-

B \v.,.____,/

.. aniel E. Williams
Attorneys for Defendants

SUBPOENA, P. 2

001164

•

f~
A."'--··---"M---NO,

AUG 3 1 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
t3y ~-Et-j

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOC IATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

NO.
A.M

~tj.t}m%t
.Ml
__

L..:.CX_.__'J_ _

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT
FORM

Judge Goff

Defendants-Counter Claimants.

******
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosel! Equities, LLC, by and through its
undersigned counsel, and hereby provides its Draft Jury Instructions and Proposed Verdict Form.

PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM - 1

001165

-

•

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 20 I 0.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via hand delivery to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box I 776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK

PLAINTIFF'S DRAFT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM - 2

001166

-

•

IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence
INSTRUCTION NO.

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a
proposition, or use the expression "if you fmd" or "if you decide," I
mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true
than not true.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001167

•
IDJI 1.20.2 - Burden of proof - clear and convincing evidence
INSTRUCTION NO.

When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by
clear and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is
highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden
than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than
not true.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001168

IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories

INSTRUCTION NO.
On plaintiffs' claim of breach of contract against the defendant,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;

2. The defendant breached the contract;
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.
The Court has previously determined that
w:eseuted as PJaiptiff's:-F;amiblt~ constitutes a valid contract. The
Court has also ruled that aUhough the docuroeut repnseets e valid

&f-t"'8..C1ln,..,-¾'~,

-~

contF~ the terms~re ambiguous~antl there~ is for you the Jury
to decide what the parties intended.ow/
The

f

~ ~~

reviousl ruled that the ·u

up<J

~

these documents are separate from and created afte
- - -,

if the parties intended that th

Exhibits _

through __

ended the parties contract presented as

Exhibit
lowing questions on the jury verdict form:
1. Regard· g the contract (Pia· · s Exhibit

_J

_Jfid the

Mosell Equities provi~
$

,000.00, to be a loan?

001169

2.

•

Regarding the co tract (Plaintiff's Exhibit

) did the

parties intend the mo ey Mosen Equities provided
$50,000.00 to be a loan t remain a loan pending Mosen

laintiff's Exhibit

3. Did the "buy in" referenced
occur?

4. Did the check presented as Exhi
contract (Exhibit __J and become
5.

_ _ __, modify the
rt of that contract?

Did the check presented a Exhibit _ _ __, modify the
contract (Exhibit __J and b come part of that contract?

6. Did the check presented as E

ibit

___

_,

modify the

contract (Exhibit
7. Did the check presen

- - - ~ modify the

contract (Exhibit __J an become part of that contract?

8.

ibit

___

_,

modify the

contract (Exhibit __J nd become part of that contract?
9. Did the check presented

Exhibit _ _ __, modify the

contract (Exhibit __J and be ome part of that contract?
10. Did the check presente

as Exhibit _ _ __, modify the

contract (Exhibit __J and ecome part of that contract?
11. Did the check presented as E

ibit _ _ __, modify the

contract (Exhibit__) and b ~ e part of that contract?

001170
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12. Did the check presente
contract (Exhibit

as Exhibit _ _ _ _,. modify the

) a d become part of that contract?
ny, Inc. breached the contract?

Yes

-No

14. Has Mosell Equi ·es been damaged as a result of Berryhill &
Yes

-No

15. The amount of dama es? $- - - - - - - - - - - If you find from your

of all the evidence that

propositions 1 and 2 have bee proved, then you should answer these
questions "yes".
If you fmd

of all the evidence that

proposition 3, no "buy in" occurre , then you should answer this
question "no".
If you fmd

of all the evidence that

propositions 4 through 12 have been proved then you should answer
these questions "yes".

If you find from your consideration o all the evidence that
propositions 4 through 12 have not

then you should

answer the particular question "no".
If you fmd from your consideration
propositions 13 and 14 occurred, then
questions "yes", and answer question 15.

001171
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•

Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001172

•

-

IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories
~INSTRUCTION

~ i n tiffs'

-f

NO._ _

im of implied-in-fact contract against the

defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1. The circw;nstances imply a request by the defendant for performance by
plaintiff; and
2. The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to compensate the
plaintiff for such performance; and
3. The plaintiff performed as requested.

You will be asked the ti lowing questions on the jury verdict
form:
1. Did an implied-in-fact con act exist between Mosell Equities
and Berryhill & Company, I c.?

Yes

-No

2. Has the Berryhill & Company, nc. breached the contract?
Yes

-No - -

3. Has Mosell Equities been damaged s a result of Berryhill &
Companies' breach? Yes _ _ - No-+-4. The amount of damages? $_ _ _ ___,_ _ _ _ __
If you fmd from your consideration of all the vidence that each

of the propositions has been proved, then you sh

answer the

questions "yes" and complete question 4. If you ti

from your

consideration of all of the evidence that any of these propositi ns has not
been proved, then you should answer that question "no."

001173

•
Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001174

•
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories

INSTRUCTION NO.
On plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrichment against the defendant,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following
propositions:
1. The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant;
2. The defendant accepted the benefit; and
3. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain
the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value.

The Cou

as ruled that Mosell Equities had proven

propositions 1 and 2. Cons

uently, you will only be asked the following

questions on the jury verdict fo
1. Under the circumstan es, would it be unjust for the defendant to
retain the benefit with t compensating the plaintiff for its value?
-No
Yes

2. If you answered the prece ing question ''yes," please identify
the amount of defendant's njust enrichment.
$

-----------+-

If you find from your conside tion of all the evidence that the
proposition has been proved, then you hould answer the question"yes"
and complete question 2. If you find f om your consideration of all of
the evidence that any of these proposi ons has not been proved, then
you should answer that question "no."

Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which

001175

•
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001176

•

•

IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories
INSTRUCTION NO._ _
On plaintiffs' claim of conversion against the defendant, the
plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. That the defendant, _t,ook and~1s kept Mosell Equities'
furniture and fixture~ithout a right to do so;

~

The nature and extent of the damages to Mosell Equities and
the amount thereof.

You will be asked th following questions on the jury verdict

"

form:
1. Did the Defendant take r keep Mosell Equities' furniture and
fixtures without a right do so?
Yes
-No

2. If you answered the precedin question "yes," please identify
the amount of Mosell Equities damages.
$

-----------

If you find from your consideration o

proposition has .been proved, then you should

nswer the

question

"yes" and complete question 2. If you find from yo r consideration of
all of the evidence that any of these propositions has
then you should answer that question "no."

Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrog tories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.
Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001177

•
IDJI 1.41.2 - Charging instruction, plaintiffs case, verdict on special interrogatories

INSTRUCTION NO.
On Mosell Equities' claim of fraud against John Berryhill and
Berryhill & Company, Inc., Mosell Equities has the burden of proof on
each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1. That John Berryhill stated a fact to Mosell Equities;
2. The statement was false;
3. The statement was material;
4. The John Berryhill either knew the statement was false or was
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement
was made.
5. Mosen Equities did not know that the statement was false;
6. John Berryhill intended for Mosen Equities to rely upon the
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;
7. Mosen Equities did rely upon the truth of the statement;
8. Mosen Equities'

reliance was reasonable under all the

circumstances;
9. Mosen Equities suffered damages proximately caused by
reliance on the false statement.

{iii: The natu~e and extent of the damages to Mosen Equities, and the

---

/ amount thereof.
you will be asked the fi lowing questions on the jury verdict

form:
1. Did John Berryhill state a f: t to Mosell Equities?

001178

•
Yes

•
-No - -

2. Was the state ent false? Yes
3. Was the statem

-No - -No - -

t material? Yes

4. Did John Berryhi know the statement was false or was he
unaware of whethe the statement was true at the time the
statement was made. Yes

-No

--

5. Mosen Equities did n t know that the statement was false?
Yes

-No - -

6. John Berryhill intended

r Mosen Equities to rely upon the

statement and act

it in a manner reasonably

contemplated? Yes _ _ - No _ _.

7. Mosen Equities did rely upo the truth of the statement?
Yes

-No

8. Mosen Equities' reliance
circumstances? Yes

under all the

- No
caused by

9. Mosen Equities suffered damages

-No - -

reliance on the false statement? Yes

10. The amount of damages: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _,,___ __
If you find from your consideration of all thJ;Y'evidence that each
/

/

of the propositions has been proved, then you ~ould answer questions
1 - 9 "yes" and complete question

0. If you find from your

consideration of all of the evidence th t any of these propositions has not
been proved, then you should answer that question "no."

001179

•

•

Comment:
This instruction is the foundation for a verdict on special interrogatories. A
charging instruction such as this should be given for each discrete claim or cause of
action covered by a special interrogatory on the verdict form. The introductory sentence
may be modified as necessary to specifically refer to each claim or cause of action which
is covered by the charging instruction and the special verdict interrogatory to which it
relates.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001180

•

•

IDJI 6.08.1 - Interpretation of contracts - intention of parties

Note: The court must first decide whether determination of the intent of the parties is
properly a jury issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should
the court determine that issue is properly before the jury, the following instruction may
be appropriate:

INSTRUCTION NO.

The terms of the contract are in dispute1 as- ta the followinr

'

Whether the parties intended the funds Mosell Equ· es provided
were loaned funds?
If the parties intended the funds to be oaned, whether the

parties intended the funds Mosell Equities D ovided would transition
into Mosen or Mosell Equities' buy in of Berryhill & Company, Inc. or
some other entity created by Mosell and Berryhill?
If the parties intended the fonds Mosell Equities provided were
I

loaned funds, and the parties intended the funds Mosell Equities
I

provided would transition into. MoselJ or Mosell Equities' buy in of
Berryhill & Company, Inc. or some other entity created by Mosell and

I
Berryhill, did the buy in oct;~r?
.

'

If the buy in dicynot occur, do the funds remain as Joans to

/

Berryhill & Compan~'Jnc.?
I

If BerryhilV& Company, Inc. denies the funds it accepted were

loaned funds,
Company, I

nd refuses to repay the loaned funds, is Berryhill &
. in breach of the parties' contract?

001181
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•

You must determine what was intended by the parties~

,

as,....

nee,

~ f?;;,ntract must be const

a as a whole, including all

of the circumstances giving rise to it, to · e consistent meaning to every

i}(,,<,

part of

A:'

L/

f : . . n ~ ~ be giv n its ordinary meaning, unless you

find from the evidence that a spec· I meaning was intendeiJ

,J:-

0._y communicat ons, conduct or dealings between the

contracting parties showing w at they intended and how they construed
the doubtful language ma be considered, provided that such may not
completely change the
with the remainder of

reement or construe one term inconsistently
e termsJ

y

should

be

construed

to avoid

any

contradiction or ab urditi~
\Persons w thin a specialized field are deemed to have contracted
with reference

any generally known and customarily accepted

language in tha field, unless you find from the evidence that this was
not intended..

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001182

•

•

IDJI 6.08.2 - Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract
INSTRUCTION NO.

You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the
contract offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties
occurring before execution of the written agreement, which is
inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement.
While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to
clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to completely
change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or
parts.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001183

•
IDJI 6.08.3 - Interpretation of contract - ambiguity resolved against drafter

INSTRUCTION NO.
Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the
true intent of the parties cannot be ascertained by any other evidence,
the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the contract against the
party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

1
-·-

001184

IDJI 6.08.4 - Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact

INSTRUCTION NO.
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the
consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been
made.

Comments:
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979)

Offered:
Given:
Refused:

001185

•

•

IDJI 6.08.5 - Interpretation of contract - materiality

INSTRUCTION NO.

"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if
(a) a reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or
nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in
question, or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in
determining the choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person
would so consider.

Comments:
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, referring to Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Sections 538(2).)

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001186

•

•

IDJI 6.09.1 -Amendments to contracts

INSTRUCTION NO.
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the
parties. This requires all of the elements of any other contract.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001187

•
IDJI 6.10.1 - Breach of bilateral contract - general case - no affirmative defenses
INSTRUCTION NO.

The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions:
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;

2. The defendant breached the contract;
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.
from your consideration of all the evidence that each
of the propositions re

ired of the plaintiff has been proved, then you

must consider the issue o

e affirmative defenses raised by the

defendant, and explained in the nex · struction. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any f the propositions in this
instruction has . not been proved, your verdic

should be for the

defendant.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001188

•

•

IDJI 6.11 - Material breach
INSTRUCTION NO.

A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the
contract.

Offered:
Given:
Refused:

001189
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IDJI 6.13 - Performance of contract - substantial performance
INSTRUCTION NO.

When I say that a party must have "substantially performed"
the contract or that "substantial performance" of the contract is
required, I mean that the important and essential benefits called for by
the terms of the contract have been delivered or performed. A contract
may be substantially performed even though there may have been some
deviations or omissions from the performance called for by the precise
language of the contract.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001190

•
IDJI 6.14.1 - Time for performance of a contract
INSTRUCTION NO.

Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the
law will imply a requirement that it be performed within a reasonable
time, as is determined by the subject matter of the contract, the
situation of the parties, and the nature of the performance required. In
such case, it is for the jury to determine what a reasonable time would
be under the circumstances, given all of the evidence in the case.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001191

•

IDJI 6.41.1 - Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted

INSTRUCTION NO.
There is no dispute in this case that John Berryhill was the agent
of the principal, Berryhill & Company, Inc., at the time of the
transaction described by the evidence. Therefore, Berryhill &
Company, Inc., the principal, is responsible for any act of John
Berryhill, the agent, within the scope of the agent's authority.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001192

•
IDJI 6.43.2 - Ratification

INSTRUCTION NO.
If an agent acts outside the scope of authority, a principal may

still become bound by the agent's actions if the principal ratifies the
agent's actions. Ratification may be express or implied.

Implied

ratification requires:
1.

Knowledge on the part of the principal of the material

facts connected with the transaction; and
2.

Word or conduct on the part of the principal indicating

an intention to adopt the acts of the agent;

Comments:
See Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47, 54 (1992); Twin Falls
Livestock v. Mid-century Ins., 117 Idaho 176, 182-183 (1998).

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

~11.
001193

•
IDJI 9.03 - Damages for breach of contract- general format
INSTRUCTION NO.

If the jury decide~e plaintiff is entitled to recover from the

ow its e,ld_\~ &(lo,€6J:t f>dv ~(u,d ~
defendant,~he jury must determini the amoubt of money that will
reasonable and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the following
elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the
defendant's breach of contract:
Special Dambg.::r. The the value of the money that Mosell
Equities provided to Berryhill & Company, Inc.~ pies aeeumulatmg

isier~

~

lY;ou

Wbethr any of these elements of damage has been proved is for
to det-f ine.

Given:

001194

--

•

Modif ied:_/
Refused:

001195

•

STATUTORY INTEREST

INSTRUCTION NO.

LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST. When there is no express contract in writing fixing a
different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the
hundred by the year on money lent.

Idaho Code Section 28-22-104.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001196

IDJI 6.07 .1- Equitable theories - implied in facts contract

INSTRUCTION NO.
An implied-in-fact contract is a contract where the terms and
existence of the contract are demonstrated by the conduct of the parties,
with the request of one party and the performance by the other often
being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. To
fmd an implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of
the parties to make a contract can be inferred from their conduct. An
implied-in-fact contract is given the same legal effect as any other
contract.
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff has the
burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The circumstances imply a request by the defendant for

performance by plaintiff; and
2.

The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to

compensate the plaintiff for such performance; and
3.

The plaintiff performed as requested.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001197

IDJI 6.07.2 - Unjust enrichment - equitable theories
INSTRUCTION NO.
Even though there is no agreement between the parties, under
certain circumstances where a party has been unjustly enriched by the
actions of another the law will require that party to compensate the
other for the unjust gain. To recover under this theory, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving each of the following:
1.

The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant;

2.

T~e defendant accepted the benefit; and

3.

Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the

defendant to retain the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its
value.

Comment:
For the elements of unjust enrichment, see Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 567
P.2d 1 (1977); Common Builder, Inc. v. Rice, 126 Idaho 616, 888 P.2d 790 (App. 1995).

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001198

IDJI 4.50 - Conversion -- issues

,Q .

INSTRU~TION.NO. _ _

rut~~~

~ e plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions:

1.

kept plaintiffs furniture
That the defendant took aniJas
-..

~\-u:tur~thout a right to do so;

~

The nature and extent of the damages to plaintiff and the

amount thereof.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
of these propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for
the plaintiff; but, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then your verdict
should be for the defendant.
Comment:
Those conversions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code are not necessarily
covered by this form. The Committee recommends that in cases covered by that Code,
this form be used but that, in addition, the relevant portion of the appropriate Code
section be read or paraphrased as a definition, description, or explanation of the phrase
"exercised dominion over" or of the phrase "deprived of possession."
See Carver v. Ketchum, 53 Idaho 595, 26P.2n 139; Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho
171, 118 P.2d 729; Adairv. Freeman, 92 Idaho 773,451 P2d 519.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001199

IDJI 4.60 / ~ issues

L~~ \~>-~~ w

INSTRUCTION NO. - -

~'fbe plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following

propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

The defend ant either knew the statement was false or was

unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement
was made.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the

statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;
7.

The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the

circumstances;
9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by

reliance on the false statement.

r-w·

The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and

~mount thereof.
If you find from your consideration of aU the evidence that the

elements of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence,
then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you find
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing

001200

propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then
your verdict should be for the defendant.

Comment:
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08.5.
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616,962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc.
v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995).
See also, Witt v. Jones, 111 ldao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106
Idaho 700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Fawv. Greenwood, IOI Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338
(1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); King v. McNeel, Inc., 94
Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324.

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001201

Defense to Fraud - statements or promises as to future events.

INSTRUCTION NO.

"An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events."
"[T]here is a general rule in [the] law of deceit that a representation consisting of [a]
promise or a statement as to a future event will not serve as [a] basis for fraud .... "
"[T]he representation forming the basis of a claim for fraud must concern past or existing
material facts."
A "promise or statement that an act will be undertaken, however, is actionable, if it is
proven that the speaker made the promise without intending to keep it."

Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,615, 114 P.3d 974,973 (2005). (Cites
omitted)

Given:
Modified:
Refused:

001202
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Proposed verdict Form

TONE - BREACH OF CONTRACT

1. Regarding the cont act (Plaintiff's Exhibit _ __,) did the parties intend
the money Mosell E uities provided, $50,000.00, to be a loan?
Yes
2.

-No - - - +

Regarding the contr t (Plaintiffs Exhibit _ __,)

did the parties

intend the money Mos 1 Equities provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to
remain a loan pending

sell Equities' "buy in" of an entity formed by

the parties? Yes _ _ - o
3.

Did the "buy in" reference in Plaintiff's Exhibit
Yes

occur?

-No

4. Did the check presented as E

_ _ _ _, modify the contract

(Exhibit_) and become p
Yes
5.

-No

Did the check presented as E

_ _ _ _, modify the contract

(Exhibit_) and become part o
Yes

- No

6. Did the check presented as Exhib t _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit___) and become part of th contract?
Yes

-No

7. Did the check presented as Exhibit

---+---'

modify the contract

(Exhibit_) and become part of that con
Yes

-No
1

001203

8. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract?
-No

Yes

9. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

10. Did the check presented as Exhibit

- - - -,

modify the contract

(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

11. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _, modify the contract
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

12. Did the check presented as Exhibit _ _ _ _ , modify the contract
(Exhibit __J and become part of that contract?
Yes

-No

13. Has the Berry!rill & Company, Inc. breached the contract?
Yes

-No

14. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill &
Companies' breach? Yes _ _ - No _ _.
15. The amount of damages? $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
propositions 1 and 2 have been proved, then you should answer these
questions "yes".

2
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.

If you fi'nd from your consideration of all the evidence that
proposition 3, no "buy in" occurred, then you should answer this question
"no".
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
propositions 4 through 12 have been proved, then you should answer these
questions "yes".
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
propositions 4 through 12 have not been proved, then you should answer the
particular question "no".
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
propositions 13 and 14 occurred, then you should answer these questions
"yes", and answer question 15.

COUNT TWO - BREACH OF AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
1. Did an implied-in-fact contract exist between Mosell Equities and
Berryhill & Company, Inc.?

Yes

- No

2. Has the Berryhill & Company, Inc. breached the contract?
Yes

-No

3. Has Mosell Equities been damaged as a result of Berryhill &
Companies' breach? Yes _ _ - No _ _.
4. The amount of damages? $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of
the propositions has been proved, then you should answer the questions
"yes" and complete question 4. If you find from your consideration of all of

3
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•

the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you
should answer that question "no."
COUNT IBREE - UNJUST ENRICHMENT
I. Under the circumstances, would it be unjust for the defendant to retain the
benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value?
Yes
- No
2. If you answered the preceding question "yes," please identify the amount
of defendant's unjust enrichment. $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the

proposition has been proved, then you should answer the question "yes" and
complete question 2. If you find from your consideration of all of the
evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should
answer that question "no."

COUNT FOUR - CONVERSION
I. Did the Defendant take or keep Mosell Equities' furniture and fixtures without
a right to do so?
Yes
- No
2. If you answered the preceding question "yes," please identify the amount
of Mosell Equities' damages.$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

COUNT FIVE - FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT
I . Did John Berryhill state a fact to Mosell Equities?
Yes

-No

2. Was the statement false? Yes

- No

3. Was the statement material? Yes

- No

4
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4. Did John Berryhill know the statement was false or was he unaware of
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. Yes
-No
5. Mosell Equities did not know that the statement was false? Yes _ _ No
6. John Berryhill intended for Mosell Equities to rely upon the statement
and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated? Yes _ _ - No

7. Mosell Equitiys did rely upon the truth of the statement?
-No

Yes

8. Mosell Equities' reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances?
Yes

-No

9. Mosell Equities suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the
false statement? Yes

- No

10. The amount of damages: $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of
the propositions has been proved, then you should answer questions 1 - 9
"yes" and complete question 10. If you find from your consideration of all of
the evidence that' any of these propositions has not been proved, then you
should answer that question "no."

5
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DANIELE, WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: {208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)

BERRYIULL & COMPANY, INC.,an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYIIlLL ID and
AMY BERRYHILL, Individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their
Requested Jury Instructions, numbers 1 through 26, in addition to the customary IDJis.

7(~

DATED this ,.2..1... day of August, 2010.

mel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, P. 1
001208
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CERT~ OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h i ~ day of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
EricR Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

__ Via Hand Delivery
~ a Facsimile: 939-7136
__ Via U.S. Mail

-

Daniel E. Williams

DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, P. 2
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than

not true.

IDJI2d 1.20.1.

GIVEN-:@-_....,_.._ __

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2

U,

~l

~lamtiff has the burden o prbving each of the following propositions:
1.

A contract existed between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, and Defendant

Berryhill & Company, Inc.;

2.

The defendant breached the contract;

3.

The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and

4.

The amount of the damages.
ou find from your conside tion of all the evidence that each of t

t inst

tion. If you · d from your

ns in this i ~ n has not been

IDJl2d 6. 10.1.(modified)

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED ,ljlll#i,i::,,---COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do something that is
supported by consideration.
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four
elements. The four elements are:
1.

Competent parties;

2.

A lawful purpose;

3.

Valid consideration; and

4.

Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms.

It is not disputed that the following elements are present in the contract alleged in this
case: The parties were competent to enter into a contract, the alleged contract was for a lawful
purpose and there was valid consideration. The parties do dispute whether there was mutual
agreement between them to all essential terms

IPJl2d 6.01. 1 (modified)

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED

OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4

In order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds on all material
terms to the contract.

Panike ~ Vns Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 567 (Idaho 2009); Barry v. Pacific West
Constr,,r., 140 Idaho 827, 831, 103 P.3d 440,444 (2004).

GIVEN

_/Jy~--

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5
A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain
provisions which are capable in_themselves of being reduced to certainty.

Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983) (citations omitted)

ff

GIVEN
REFUSED.---MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6
In this case, Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., claims that all parties did not agree to
all essential terms of the contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of
the minds," and means that all parties to a contract must have understood and accepted all of the
essential terms of the contract.
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated to all
parties, understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties.

IDJI2d 6.05.1. (modified)

GIVEN
REFusEo

Moo1F1eo

e,m,m,,,,! :fAH~, ~ ~~ ~
1(\1~ ~ \ ~ in,1.-.&3, ta___.----,
~ ----- u · ·o···--'~ ~

COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7
If the provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of those provisions is a
question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties. The determination of the parties'
intent is to be determined by looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the
document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of the
particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by
their conduct or dealings.

J.R. Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006): Univ. of Idaho Found.,
Inc. v. Civic Partners, Inc. (In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project), 146 Idaho 527, 536
(Idaho 2008)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED

COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8
In this case the defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., has asserted certain affirmative
defenses. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted.
Defendant has raised the affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and waiver.
If you fin from your consideratio of all the evidence tha each of the propo · ions
required of

defendant has been pr ed, then your verdict s

e. If you

our consideration of a the evidence that any of e propositions has not been proved,
then

e defendant has not

ved the affirmative defe e in this case.

IDJl2d 6.10.4. (modified)

GIVEN
tf'Jt-REFUSED-~---MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9
The defeflElam. Berryhill & Company, Inc., has assuted the affirmative defense-of

~uitable estoppe~'Fms is a legal term which means the plaintiff may be prevented from

~

enforcing a contract or term of contract by reason of the plaintiff's own conduct.
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the defendant has the burden of proof on
each of the following ·propositions:
1.

The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the defendant;

2.

The plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts;

3.

The defendant did not know and could not discover the true facts;

4.

The defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the defendant's

prejudice.

IDJI2d 6.22.1. (modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED ~
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10

Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct.

by words, or by acquiescence.

IDJI2d 6.24.1.

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11
An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract

are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance by
the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. The
implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding.
Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994) (citing Clements v.

Jungert, 90 Idaho 143,153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584,587,
930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997).

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION N0.12

A 'course of dealing' is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
Idaho Code§ 28-1-205(1)

GIVEN
REFUSED

MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13

In order to establish unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that there was: (1) a
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof.
King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 910 (Idaho 2002), citing, Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v.
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88,982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999), citing, Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378,382,
941 P.2d 350,354 (Ct. App. 1997).

L

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14

The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual amount of the
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would be unjust for
one party to retain. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit
and of proving the amount of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. The value of
services rendered can be used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory
of unjust enrichment. Although damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, the
damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action based upon
unjust enrichment, must be proven to a reasonable certainty.

Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378, 389 (Idaho 2009), citing and quoting, Barry v.
Pacific West Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004), Blaser v. Cameron,
121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct. App. 1992), Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock
Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 863,866 (1990), Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch,
101 Idaho 663,667,619 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1980)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15
To prevail for unjust enrichment, plaintiff must show not simply that Berryhill &
Company, Inc., benefitted from the efforts of plaintiff; instead, it must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully.

Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); see also, Knight v.
Post, 748 P.Zd 1097, 1101 (Utah 1988) ("misleading act" or something similar necessary)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 16

To sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that the party against
whom recovery is sought either wrongfully secured or passively rec~ived a benefit that it would
be unconscionable for9,tetain. However, a claim for unjust enrichment requires more than a

showing that the defendant may have benefitted in some way from the disputed conduct.
2008 Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3rd Cir.)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED

COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17

Not every possession constitutes conversion. To prove conversion, the plaintiff must
show facts establishing that he owned or had a sup~rior right to the materials in question, that he
demanded their return, and that defendant refused to deliver them. A conversion action cannot
be based on a mere breach of a contractual obligation.

Priel v. Heby, 2004 NY Slip Op 50820U, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18

~f(L,~IJ,r/,}~JUu~~ ~Q~

""fpie plaintiff ha/ tl,e b~rd~n of proving each of the following' propositions by clear and

convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendant John Berryhill stated a fact to the plaintiff[s];

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the

statement was true at the time the statement was made.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it

in a manner reasonably contemplated;
7.

The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The plaintifrs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false

statement.

t~i.

~llfOy.ou Tode nfraotumreyaonurd ecxotensni·tdoerfathti·e damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof.

<I ~

~

610

been proved by

of all the evidence that the eleme ts of fraud have
ear and convincing evidence, ili

this issue. If you · d from your consideration of

our verdict should be for

e plaintiff on

all th

roved by clear and convincing evidence,

en your verdict ·should be

for the defendant
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IDJl2d 4.60. (modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true.
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than
not true.

IDJI2d 1.20.2.

GIVEN
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25

'One who has special knowledge, experience and competence may not be permitted to
rely on statements for which the ordinary man might recover, and that one who has acquired
expert knowledge concerning the matter dealt with may be required to form his own judgment,
rather than take the word of the defendant.'

W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 108, at 751 (5th ed. 1984), cited in,
Stanley Weiss Assocs., LLC v. Energy Mgmt., 2004 R.l. Super. LEXIS 72 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004).
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INSTRUCTION NO. 26

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

IDJI2d 9.00.
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DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswflliamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)
)

)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

Case No. CV OC 0909974
DEFENDANTS'
SPECIAL VERDICT

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III hereby submit their
proposed form of Special Verdict.

·c/~

DATED this..)(
__ day of August, 2010.

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants
DEFENDANrS' SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 1

001232

09/~2/2010 09:09 FAX

-

llJ 0027 /0034

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h i ~ of August, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P, 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

__ Via Hand Delivery
~Via Facsimile: 939-7136
__ Via U.S. Mail

'

DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

Plaintiff ,

vs.

)
)

SPECIAL VERDICT

)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL Ill and
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:·

... :- -~ ..... - BREACH
.
M!Mil:ID
OF Y-A~N~CT
, LJ.-,,,
~ AitJ "'-"
tl-'t aYU flyr
Question No. 1: Was there ~contract between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC,
and Defendant Berryhill. & Company, lnc.rwhic;h d1m:w111t1ated a wecth,g oflbe minds bet,;,e.m
t:Jie patties OR all esseBtial elements of tbe parties' agreemeflt?
Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes[_]

No[_]

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 1
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If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 5. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 2: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., breach the contract?
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 2:

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No.

No[_._]

If If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 3: Was Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, damaged on account of the breach?
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 3:

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 1,. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by Plaintiff Mosen Equities,
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.' s breach?
Answer to Question No. 4:

$_ _ _ __

If you answered Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 1$.

AM I: llf> BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
'I
7

Question No. 5: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied contract, which

dP.p;;ionstrated a ffleeliftg ef the 1ninds betweefl too partiei of all essential elentehts of the pm ties"

agreeroemz
Answer to Question No.5:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 9. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 2
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Question No. 6: Did Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., breach the implied contract?
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 6:

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No.

No[_]

14"

If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 7: Was Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, damaged on account of the breach
of an implied contract?
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 7:

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No.

No[_]

1j. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 8: What is the amount of damages incurred by Plaintiff Mosell Equities,
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach of an implied contract?
Answer to Question No. 8:

$_ _ _ _

If you answered Question No. 8, skip to Question No.

tf

1}tJ~~=S~TENR~~11
Inc.,

Question No. 9: Was thei:e a b ~ upon Defundant Berryhill &.-9~mpany,
/'
,...-"""""' ~ tu- ~ f'l1- ~ -~ 'fl; . ~ ~~ l
Yes[_]

Answer to Question No. 9: .

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this que ion, skip to Question No. 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next questi

.

Question No.10: Was there appreciati

by Defendant Berryhill & Company, fuc., of

such benefit?
Answer to Question~

No[_]

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 3
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H you answered "No" to this questn, skip to Question No, 13. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next quest~n.

to retain the benefit without payment to the Plaintiff o
Answer to Question No. 11:

No[_J

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question

o. 13. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.

I!

-us-r

Question No~: What is the value of th~enefit conferred upon Defendant Berryhill &
Company, Inc., by Plaintiff?

/{;)

Answer to Question Noy $_ _ _ __

Continue to Question

No/j.
~-;!'

____M§f,E81!iD CONVERSION

Question No.

if: Did Plaitttiff Mosen Equities, U.C; prove that i

&dpCliOt right1e mft«ials

iR the possession of Borryhill & Company, I n c . ~ ~
~~~~~/~v· I

Answer to Question No. 13:

Yes[_]

No[_)

',

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. YI. If you answered this

. (3

question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 14: Did laintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, demand eir return?
uestion No. 14:

Yes[_]

d "No" to this question, skip to Questio

o[_]

o. 17. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 4
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Question No. 1S: Did Defe clant Berryhill & Compan , Inc., refuse to deliver them?
No[_]
If you answered "No" o this question, skip to

estion No. 17. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue t the nextquestion.
V

Question No.

}6: What is the valu~f the materials?

Answer to Question No.
Continue to Question No. ~-

f:

$_____ ·

~

.-~\UD
(~tiff Mos,cWEquities, LLC, against Defendant John Berryhill1

+iff

Question No.

'

~ Did Defendant John Berryhill ~ :;'ii:!.~\ i ~ ~.I}ea,illliB!I

Mosen Equities, lLC?

Answer to Question No. 1~

Yes[_]

No [_J

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No@lf you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 18: Was the statement material?
Yes[_]

[_]

If you answered "No" t this question, skip to Question o. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to th next question.

Question No. 19: Di Defendant John Berry · know that the statement was false?
Answer to

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this questio , skip to Question No. 26. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next q

SPECIAL VERDICT. P. 5
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If you answered ''No" to , s question, skip to Questio~ If you answered this
question "Yes," continue
Question

the next question.

l

/

N°YWh•t is the amount of damages suffered

l.LC, proximately caused hy Plaintiff's reliance o~ the

by Plaintiff Masell Equities,

wJit~t? ·· ·

i:

Jt/,

Answer to Question No.JS: $_ _ _ __

Continue to Question Nolf.

~

ii

~RAUD

n

(Be!:ryAHl & Company, me., against Mosen Equttles, LLC}-

ia~~t- fj;Lcu£

f~

l"--

Question No..,26: Did Plaintiff's agent, Glenn Mosell, ll'lftl~ a e st:a menc of then-

is

.... existiog '61ot te Berryhill & Company, Inc?
Answer to Question

1/

N<;:)6:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this
is

question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 27': Was the s

ent material?
Yes[_]

If you answered "No" to
question "Yes," continue to

le

No[_]

is question, sign the verdict form.

next question.
Glenn Masell of behalf of Mosell Equities

, know that the

is

statement was false?
Answer

au

Yes[_]

If you answere "No" to this question, sign the verdict

If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.
SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 7
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If you answered "No" to this q u e ~ e verdict form. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to th~estion.

Question No.

lk

'j4: What is the amount of damages suffered by Berryhill & Company, Inc.,

proximately caused by Plaintiff's reliance cithe fal=ierrt?

Answer to Question No!µ. $_ _ _ __
Now, sign the verdict fonn below.
DATED this __ day of September, 2010.

Foreperson

SPECIAL VERDICT, P. 9
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIALPo.ISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTtttJF ADA

FiLED

1.P

',st

P.M.

SEP 15 2010
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company

)

Plaintiff,

J. DAVID NAVARRO, c:erk

)
)

By RiC NELSON

Case No. CV OC 0909974

DEPUTY

)
)

vs.

)
)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and JOHN E.
BERRYHILL, individually,

)
).
)
)

Defendants.
)
___________
)

ORIGINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Attached hereto are the originals of the instructions given to the jury in the
above-captioned case.

001241

I -

INSTRUCTION NO.

_J_A-_

These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is

your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try
to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence.

If an

attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial,
I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or
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speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
If there are occasions during the trial where an objection is made after an answer is given
or the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instruct that the answer or remark be
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds,
during your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as
though you had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in
your deliberations in this case.

2
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such
convincing force as it may carry.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

-~·g~A. . . .

There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.
2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case

with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the
case, you must report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and

have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gam a greater

understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

7.

You must not conduct your own independent research regarding any of the matters

presented in trial.
8.

You must not search the internet for additional information regarding any of the

matters presented during this trial, or regarding any of the parties or witnesses involved in this
trial.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

The corporation and company involved in this case are entitled to the same fair and
unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. You should decide
this case with the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

~l.p. . . .A_
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During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

-..-I_

Ladies and Gentlemen, all the evidence has been presented in this case. I am now going
to read you instructions on the law that you are to follow in reaching a decision during your
deliberations. I will not read again the instructions I gave you at the beginning of the trial; if you
have any questions about those instructions please review them during your deliberations. After
I finish reading the instructions, the attorneys will make their closing remarks, and you will be
escorted to the jury room to begin your deliberations.
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INSTRUCTION NO. - - - -

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

3-'

On the breach of an express contract claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of
the following propositions:
1.

A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;

2.

The defendant breached the contract;

3.

The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and

4.

The amount of the damages.
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INSTRUCTION NO. __

An express contract is an oral or written agreement between two or more parties to do or

not do something that is supported by consideration.
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four
elements. The four elements are:
1.

Competent parties;

2.

A lawful purpose;

3.

Valid consideration; and

4.

Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms.

It is not disputed that the following elements are present in the contract alleged in this

case: The parties were competent to enter into a contract, the alleged contract was for a lawful
purpose and there was valid consideration. The parties do dispute whether there was mutual
agreement between them to all essential terms.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

5

In this case, the defendant alleges that all parties did not agree to all essential terms of the

contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of the minds," and means
that all parties to a contract must have understood and accepted all of the essential terms of the
contract.
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated to all
parties, understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

__k_

A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So
long as all the required elements are present, it makes no difference whether the agreement is in
writing.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

_J_

Ordinarily, a contract results when negotiations are complete and all essential terms have
been agreed upon. This is true even though the parties expect to put their agreement in writing.
However, if the parties have agreed not to be bound until their agreement is reduced to writing,
no contract results until this is done.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

_1_____

An express contract may consist of an offer by one party that is accepted by another

party.
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the party making the

offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed.
An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the party to whom the offer was directed

that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the offer.
To complete the express contract, the acceptance must be absolute and unqualified. If the
response to the offer changes the terms of the offer in any manner, it is a counter offer but not an
acceptance.
The acceptance is not complete until it has been communicated to the party making the
offer.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

J_

•

Silence does not operate as acceptance of an offer unless
(1)

The silent party accepts services from the offering party, after a reasonable

opportunity to reject, with knowledge that the offering party expects compensation; or
(2)

Because of the past dealings of the parties, it is reasonable that the silent party

should notify the offering party that the silent party does not accept; or
(3)

The offering party has notified the silent party that the offer could be accepted by

silence, and the silent party does intend to accept the offer by silence.
If you find any of these circumstances exist, silence is an acceptance of the offer.
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INSTRUCTION NO. ____._/_(}_
An express contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the parties. This

requires all of the elements of any other express contract.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

--I-'I_

•

The terms of the contract are in dispute.
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contract in this
case. In making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following:
1.

The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances

giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it.
2.

Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence

that a special meaning was intended.
3.

Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties

showing what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered,
provided that such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently
with the remainder of the terms.
4.

The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities.

Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to any
generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find from the
evidence that this was not intended.
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,
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A 'course of dealing' is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
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You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any
witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement,
which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. While you may
consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider
such testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in
such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts.
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INS"rRUCTION NO. - - - -

Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the true intent of the parties
cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the
contract against the party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language.
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INSTRUCTION NO. --When a contract expresses no specific time for its performance, the law implies that it is
to be performed within a reasonable time, as determined by the subject matter of the contract, the
situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. If you find a contract
exists in this case, you are to determine what a reasonable time would be for the performance of
this contract under these circumstances.
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The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to act
for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within the
agent's scope of authority.
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INSTRUCTION NO. __
/

An agency relationship exists where one, called the "principal," has authorized another,
called the "agent," to act on behalf of the principal.
Agency requires the consent of the principal, which consent may be expressed or implied.
The term "principal" includes employers, and the term "agent" includes employees. When an
agent represents more than one principal, the agent is termed a "dual agent."
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Ji

If you do not find a written or oral express contract, Plaintiff has claimed, in the

alternative, an implied-in-fact contract. An implied-in-fact contract is a contract where the terms
and existence of the contract are demonstrated by the conduct of the parties, with the request of
one party and the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending
the performance. To find an implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of the
parties to make a contract can be inferred from their conduct. An implied-in-fact contract is
given the same legal effect as any other contract.
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of
the following propositions:
1.

The circumstances imply a request by the defendant for performance by plaintiff;

2.

The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to compensate the plaintiff

and

for such performance; and
3.

The plaintiff performed as requested.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

__.)_q_

In addition, if you do not find an express contract or an implied-in-fact contract,
plaintiff has claimed, in the alternative, unjust enrichment. On plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment
against the defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant;

2.

The defendant accepted the benefit; and

3.

Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit
without compensating the plaintiff for its value.

4.

The amount that would be unjust for the defendant to retain.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

2,.{)

The Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. This is a
legal term which means the plaintiff may be prevented from enforcing a contract or term of
contract by reason of the plaintiffs own conduct.
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the defendant has the burden of proof on
each of the following propositions:
1.

The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the defendant;

2.

The plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts;

3.

The defendant did not know and could not discover the true facts;

4.

The defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the defendant's

prejudice.
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•
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A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the consideration of the contract,
or without which it would not have been made.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

P-J-

The Defendants have also asserted the affirmative defense of waiver. The Defendants
have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

Plaintiff knew it had a right, and

2.

Plaintiff voluntarily relinquished the right.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

23

On plaintiff's claim for conversion, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the
following propositions:
1.

That the defendants kept plaintiff's property without a right to do so;

2.

The nature and extent of the damages to plaintiff and the amount thereof.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

_Jfj_

On plaintiffs Fraud claim against defendants, the plaintiff has the burden of proving

each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it in
a manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false
statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

J.[°

When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true.
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than
not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. - - - "Materiality'' refers to the importance of the representation in determining the party's
course of action. A representation is material if (a) a reasonable person would attach importance
to its existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in question,
or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is likely to
regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action, whether or not a reasonable
person would so consider.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

i-~ A-

When I use the expression "proximately caused," I mean a cause which, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the complained damage, and but for that cause the damage would
not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in
bringing about the damage. It is not a proximate cause if the damage likely would have occurred
anyway.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

2!j__

On defendant's Fraud claim against plaintiff, the defendant has the burden of proving

each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That the plaintiff stated a fact to the defendant;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

The plaintiff either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

The defendant did not know that the statement was false;

6.

The plaintiff intended for the defendant to rely upon the statement and act upon it in
a manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

The defendant did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

The defendant's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

The defendant suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false
statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to the defendant, and the amount thereof.
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INSTRUCrlON NO. __._/:_({;_
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be
awarded you may not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the
method of determining the amount of the damage award.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

2!i_

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to
whether the plaintiff or defendant is entitled to damages.
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INSTRUC1"10N NO.

'3:S?

If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants on the plaintiff's
claim of express contract or implied-in-fact contract, the jury must determine the amount of
money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved by the
evidence to have resulted from the defendants' breach of contract.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

-1:_L

The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual amount of the
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would be unjust for
one party to retain. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit
and of proving the amount of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. The value of
services rendered can be used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory
of unjust enrichment. Although damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, the
damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action based upon
unjust enrichment, must be proven to a reasonable certainty.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Jd

If the jury decides that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants on the

theory of conversion, the jury may consider the following damages:
The fair market value of the property kept.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

$g

When I use the term "value" or the phrase "fair market value" or "actual cash value" in
these instructions as to any item of property, I mean the amount of money that a willing buyer
would pay and a willing seller would accept for the item in question in an open marketplace, in
the item's condition as it existed immediately prior to the occurrence in question.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

J!j_

If the jury decides in favor of either or both parties on their respective claim of fraud, the

jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the party
for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the other party's fraud.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

,3 5'

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a Presiding Juror, who will
preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions
on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have it initialed and signed. It is not necessary that the same
nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your Presiding Juror alone will sign it;
but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the
verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, who
will then return you into open court.
The verdict is self-explanatory but I will read it to you as part of these instructions:

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Question No. 1: Was there an express contract between PlaintiffMosell Equities, LLC,

and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached?
Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes[_] No [_J

Juror initials

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 3. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
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Question No. 2: What is the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly

compensate PlaintiffMosell Equities, LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, lnc.'s
breach?
Answer to Question No. 2:

$_ _ _ __

Juror initials

If you answered Question No. 2, do not answer Question Numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6, but

answer question No. 7.

BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
Question No. 3: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied-in-fact contract

which was breached?
Yes [_J No L_J

Answer to Question No.3:
Juror initials

If you answered ''No" to this question, skip to Question No. 5. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by PlaintiffMosell Equities,

LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach of an implied-in-fact contract?
Answer to Question No. 4:

$_ _ _ __

Juror initials

If you answered Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 7.
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UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Question No. 5: Did PlaintiffMosell Equities confer a benefit upon Defendant Berryhill
& Company, Inc., which would be unjust for Berryhill & Company, Inc. to retain without
payment?
Yes[_] No [_J

Answer to Question No. 5:
Juror initials

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 6: What is the value of the unjust benefit conferred upon Defendant
Berryhill & Company, Inc., by Plaintiff?
Answer to Question No. 10:

$_ _ _ __

Juror initials

Continue to Question No. 7.

CONVERSION
Question No. 7: Did Plaintiff Berryhill & Company, Inc. convert property to its own use
which is owned by Mosell Equities?
Answer to Question No. 7:

Yes [_J No [_J

Juror initials

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 9. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 8: What is the value of the property converted?
Answer to Question No. 8:

$- - - - -
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Juror initials

Continue to Question No. 9.

DEFENDANT'S FRAUD
Question No. 9: Did Defendant John Berryhill and Berryhill & Company, Inc., commit
fraud on Mosen Equities, LLC?
Answer to Question No. 9:

Yes [_J No [_J

Juror initials

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 10: What is the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiff Mosen Equities,
LLC, proximately caused by Plaintiffs reliance on Defendants' fraud?
Answer to Question No. 10: $- - - - Juror initials

Continue to Question No. 11.

PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD
Question No. 11: Did Plaintiffs agent, Glenn Mosen, commit fraud on Berryhill &
Company, Inc?
Answer to Question No. 11:

Yes [_J No [_]

Juror initials
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If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 12: What is the amount of damages suffered by Berryhill & Company,

Inc., proximately caused by Defendants' reliance on Plaintiffs fraud?
Answer to Question No. 12: $_ _ _ __
Juror initials
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INSTRUCTION NO.

3 (P

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send
a note signed by one or more of you to the Bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me
by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.
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I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
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As I have already instructed you, on retiring to the jury room, select one of your number
as a Presiding Juror, who will conduct your deliberations in a fair and orderly fashion.
The bailiff will escort you to the jury deliberation room, with my instrucitons, exhibits
admitted and verdict form.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, who
will then return you into open court.
Dated this / ~ p t e m b e r , 2010.
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You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you
to reach a verdict. You must consider the instructions as a whole, not picking out one
and disregarding others. The order in which the instructions are given has no
significance as to their relative importance. Whether some of the instructions will apply
will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction
which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not exist. You must not
conclude from the fact that an instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any
opinion as to the facts.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL Dis1i1ct OF THEpi~=ta.5-~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA

SEP 1 5 2010

J. DAVID i'-!/\VARRO, C!3rk
By R:C N~LSON

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, me., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III,
individually,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

D[fUTY

Case No. CV OC 0909974

SPECIAL VERDICT

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

BREACH OF CONTRACT
Question No. 1: Was there an express contract between PlaintiffMosell Equities, LLC,
and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached?
Answer to Question No. 1:
Juror initials

Yes [_J No

LXJ

~

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 3. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 2: What is the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly
compensate PlaintiffMosell Equities, LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s
breach?
Answer to Question No. 2:

$- - - - -
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:

Juror initials

If you answered Question No. 2, do not answer Question Numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6, but
answer question No. 7.

BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
Question No. 3: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied-in-fact contract
which was breached?
Yes [_J No [_){]

Answer to Question No.3:

fSkf)

Juror initials ~ -

~

~-

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 5. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by PlaintiffMosell Equities,
LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach of an implied-in-fact contract?
Answer to Question No. 4:

$- - - - -

Juror initials

If you answered Question No. 4, skip to Question No. 7.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Question No. 5: Did Plaintiff Mosen Equities confer a benefit upon Defendant Berryhill
& Company, Inc., which would be unjust for Berryhill & Company, Inc. to retain without
payment?
Answer to Question No. 5:

Yes[_] No

[,X.]
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Juror initials

Jill

~~

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 6: What is the value of the unjust benefit conferred upon Defendant

Berryhill & Company, Inc., by Plaintiff?
Answer to Question No. 10:

$- - - - -

Juror initials

Continue to Question No. 7.

CONVERSION
Question No. 7: Did Plaintiff Berryhill & Company, Inc. convert property to its own use

which is owned by Mosell Equities?
Answer to Question No. 7:

Yes[~_] No [_J

Juror initials ~

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 9. If you answered this

question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 8: What is the value of the property converted?

Answer to Question No. 8:
Juror initials

$

~O I l, .}?S-

ti

Continue to Question No. 9.
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DEFENDANT'S FRAUD
Question No. 9: Did Defendant John Berryhill and Berryhill & Company, Inc., commit
fraud on Mosell Equities, LLC?
Answer to Question No. 9:

Juror initials

Yes[_J No[j(J

~

If you answered "No" to this question, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No. 10: What is the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiff Mosen Equities,
LLC, proximately caused by Plaintiffs reliance on Defendants' fraud?
Answer to Question No. 10: $_ _ _ __
Juror initials

Continue to Question No. 11.

PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD
Question No. 11: Did Plaintiffs agent, Glenn Mosell, commit fraud on Berryhill &
Company, Inc?
Answer to Question No. 11:

Yes [_] No

L)(J

0.Jf"((f(

Juror initials

~

If you answered "No" to this question, sign the verdict form. If you answered this
question "Yes," continue to the next question.
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Question No. 12: What is the amount of damages suffered by Berryhill & Company,

Inc., proximately caused by Defendants' reliance on Plaintiffs fraud?
Answer to Question No. 12: $_ _ _ __
Juror initials

Now, sign the verdict form below.
~
DATED this~
clay of September, 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
vs.
BERRYHILL& COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE: OTHER LITIGATION

Judge Goff

Defendants-Counter Claimants.

******
COMES NOW the Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Mosell Equities, LLC, by and through its
undersigned counsel, and requests that this Court exclude testimony or documents relating to any
prior or continuing legal matter or litigation to which Glenn Mosell, a non-party, may have been
involved.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER
LITIGATION - 1
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ARGUMENT

During the deposition of Glenn Mosell, the Defendants inquired about prior or
contemporaneous legal matters or litigation involving Glenn Mosell. The Plaintiff believes the
Defendants may try to introduce evidence of legal conflicts or litigation involving Mr. Mosell
regarding real estate or prior business dealings with other parties not involved in this case.
The Plaintiff, Mosell Equities, and Defendant John Berryhill, were involved in litigation
as co-plaintiffs in John Berryhill, and Mosell Equities, LLC., v. Broadway Park, Inc., and

Michael G. Matzek, Ada County Case No. CV OC 07-00987, and the proceedings in that case are
relevant to the issues raised in this case. However, Glenn Mosell personally was not a party to
the Broadway Park case.
Any legal proceedings involving Mr. Mosell personally, or Plaintiff Mosell Equities,
other than the Broadway Park case, are irrelevant to these proceedings and therefore should be
excluded according to Rule 402, IRE. Moreover, even if such evidence is somehow relevant,
any probative value would be outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, or the potential to
confuse or mislead the jury, and therefore should be excluded according to Rule 403, IRE.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER
LITIGATION - 2
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FROM: 2-9-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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PAGE: 003 OF 003

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of August, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to:
Daniel E. Williams
TIIOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LlMINE TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE: OTHER
LITIGATION - 3
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 090997 4

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Defendants-Counter Claimants.
Judge Goff

COMES NOW the PlaintiffMosell Equities and provides the Court with its
memorandum in support of motion for JNOV and new trial.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - I
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fortunately, aggrieved parties are not without recourse when a jury fails to follow the
Court's instructions, when it appears the jury purposefully ignored evidence, and when the jury
subsequently renders a verdict that borders on the ridiculous. Neither party believed Mosell
Equities intended to simply give Berryhill & Company, Inc. over $400,000.00 without any
consideration, yet, that apparently is what the jury determined.
After four days of trial, the jury returned its verdict finding no express contract existed
which had been breached, no implied-in-fact contract existed which had been breached, and that
neither party had defrauded the other party. The jury also determined that although Berryhill &
Company received $405,000.00 the delivery of which was premised on Berryhill's promise of
the sale of half of the business, and the promise the money would remain a loan pending the
"buy in," that it was not unjust that Berryhill kept every penny and Mosell Equities received
nothing in consideration. The jury also awarded Mosell Equities a mere 20% of its claim for
conversion.
Mosell Equities now requests that the Court set aside the jury's verdict that no express
contract existed which had been breached, set aside the jury's verdict that no implied-in-fact
contract existed which had been breached, and set aside the jury's verdict on Mosell Equities'
unjust enrichment and conversion claims. Mosell Equities also requests in the alternative that
the Court grant a new trial.

II. MOSELL EQUITIES IS ENTITLED TO JNOV
A. STANDARD APPLICABLE TO JNOV ISSUE
"In determining whether a district court should have granted a j.n.o.v. motion, this Court
employs the same standard the district court used in ruling on the motion." Coombs v.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 2
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Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, _, 219 P.3d 453,460 (2009). A district court will deny a j.n.o.v.
motion "if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable
minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury." Bates v. Seldin, 146
Idaho 772, 774, 203 P.3d 702, 704 (2009). Thus, a verdict will be upheld when it is
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc.,
131 Idaho 242, 247, 953 P.2d 992, 997 (1998). _." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,
567, 97 P.3d 428, 434 .(2004) (quoting Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736,
518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974)).
In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the district court may not weigh the
evidence, attempt to judge the credibility of the witnesses, or compare its factual findings
with those of the jury. Bates, 146 Idaho at 774-75, 203 P.3d at 704-05. Instead, "[a] trial
court reviews the facts as if the moving party admitted any adverse facts and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Id. at 775, 203 P.3d at 705.

High Valley Concrete v. Sargent, Idaho Supreme Court Doc. No 35313 (July 8, 2010) Pg. 5-6.

B. THE JURY DISREGARDED THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
When considering whether to grant or deny a motion for JNOV, as identified above in the
High Valley Concrete case, "if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that

reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury," the Court must
deny the motion. However, the Court must take into consideration the criteria stated in the jury
Instruction when making its ruling. As an example, while Instruction No. 13 allows the jurors
latitude in their deliberations, it specifically prohibits the jury from deciding the case in a manner
contrary to the instruction.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by
any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the
written agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of
the written agreement. While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if
necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to
completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in
such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or
parts. (Emphasis added)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 3

001302

If the Instructions prohibit such evidence, then clearly that evidence cannot be use when
deliberating and deciding a JNOV motion. As an example, if Berryhill testifies "loan" really
means "equity," but the term "equity" "is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the
written agreement," then the Court would be prohibited from using Berryhill's self-serving
testimony as "substantial evidence" when considering this motion. The Court would also be
prohibited from using Berryhill' s testimony that "loan" really meant "equity" as substantial
evidence if "equity" does not fit "with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts." As Mosell
Equities argued at trial, if "equity" really meant "equity," as Berryhill claims, then the language
in Exhibit 1, "It will be transitioned ... " would be superfluous and unnecessary. Obliviously, you
do not need to "transition" equity if equity already is equity.

C. MOSELL EQUITIES PROVED AN EXPRESS CONTRACT.
The jury answered the "express contract" questions on the verdict form as follows:
Question No. 1: Was there an express contract between Plaintiff Mosell Equities,
LLC, and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached? Answer:
"No."
Question No. 2: What is the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly
compensate Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill &
Company, Inc.'s breach? No response.
A finding however that no express contract existed or that no express contract was
breached is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
The parties stipulated to the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibits 1-11, 1 Berryhill' s
handwritten note and each of the loan checks Mosell delivered at Berryhill' s request and
based on Berryhill's promise he was selling one-half of his business to Mosell Equities.

1 Mosell Equities has attached copies of the admitted exhibits for the Court's convenience.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 4
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Loan Agreement with first loan check
Check No. 5127 -June 28, 2007 "Loan" "$50,000"
Check No. 5137 -July 30, 2007 "Loan" "$25,000"
Check No. 5139 -August 7, 2007 "Loan - Tl's" "$25,000"
Check No. 5140 - August 16, 2007 "Loan #4" "$25,000"
Check No. 5141 -August 16, 2007 "Loan #5" "$25,000"
Check No. 5196- October 9, 2007 "Kitchen Equip Loan" "60,000"
Check No. 5201 - October 26, 2007 "Loan" "100,000"
Check No. 5154-December 4, 2007 "Loan" "$25,000"
Check No. 5164 - December 19, 2007 "Loan" "$50,000"
Check No. 5247 -April 30, 2008 "Suite 101 Tl's" "20,000"

Jury Instruction No. 8 addressed the requirements to create and "express contract."
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
An express contract may consist of an offer by one party that is accepted
by another party.
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the party
making the offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed.
An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the party to whom the offer
was directed that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the offer.
To complete the express contract, the acceptance must be absolute and
unqualified. If the response to the offer changes the terms of the offer in any
manner, it is a counter offer but not an acceptance.
The acceptance is not complete until it has been communicated to the
party making the offer.

Mosen Equities proved offer and acceptance. Glenn Mosen testified he delivered 10
checks to Berryhill, and had done so at at Berryhill's request. Thereafter, the evidence was
uncontraverted that Berryhill or his company endorsed the checks, and that Berryhill accounted
for the checks as loans to his company. Berryhill also confirmed receiving the first check as a
"loan," as Berryhill wrote "this is a loan" on Exhibit 1, in reference to a $50,000 check he
acknowledged receiving from Mosen Equities (Ex. 2.).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 5
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D. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SUFFICIENT QUANTITY AND PROBATIVE
VALUE THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION
THAT "LOAN" REALLY MEANT "EQUITY."

As discussed above, if the jury instructions prohibit the consideration of testimony, then
that testimony cannot be used to defeat a motion for JNOV.
In Instruction No. 11, the Court instructed the jury the contract existed, but the terms
were in dispute. Mosell con~ended "loan" meant loan, and Berryhill contended "loan" really
meant something else. At trial, Berryhill testified that he wrote loan, but actually meant
"equity." The issue before the jury then was to determine the parties' intent -"loan" or "equity."
INSTRUCTION NO. 11
The terms of the contract are in dispute.
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the
contract in this case. In making this determination you should consider, from the
evidence, the following:

1. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances
giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it.
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the
evidence that a special meaning was intended.
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties
showing what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may
be considered, provided that such may not completely change the agreement or
construe one term inconsistently with the remainder of the terms.
4. The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities.
Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to
any generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you
find from the evidence that this was not intended.
First, regarding criterion 1, throughout the pre-trial process, Berryhill contended the
parties had never reached an agreement regarding the terms of the "buy in." However, at trial, he
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 6
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testified he believed the parttes had reached an agreement and the terms were identified in
Exhibit 21. That testimony appeared to contradict his deposition testimony where Berryhill
claimed that Deposition Exhibit 10, which was Trial Exhibit 21, did not reflect the parties' intent
and failed for the same reason he refused to sign the Meier's document.
At trial, Mosell Equities argued that if the parties had agreed to the Terms in Exhibit 21,
which was drafted in April 2007, then Exhibit 1 was unnecessary. If the parties had agreed to the
terms in Exhibit 21, Mosell Equities would have been "buying in" when it made its payments to
Berryhill beginning in June 2007, so there would have been no need identify any "transition."
Moreover, assuming the parties desired to somehow confirm the money Mosell started
paying in June 2007 was part of the "buy in," then Exhibit 1 would have simply said "this money
is part of the buy in," and any mention of the term "loan" or "transition" would have been
pointless. The mere fact that Exhibit 1 exists, contradicts Berryhill's claim "loan" really meant
"equity."
Regarding criterion 2, at trial, Mosell Equities argued that the term "loan" has an
"ordinary meaning." Mosell also supported that argument with undisputed evidence that
Berryhill himself used the term in Exhibit 1; that Berryhill instructed his General Manager to
account for the money as loans; and that Berryhill' s own attorney created "buy in" documents,
after a lengthy meeting with Berryhill, (Ex. 35.) which clearly and unambiguously refer to
Mosell Equities' money as loans to Berryhill & Company, Inc. that were being transitioned to
stock ownership. Mosell Eqµities also proved that Berryhill used the term "loan" when
conferring with his CPA. (Ex. 37.)
Moreover, Mo sell testified in the Broadway Park case that he believed the funds were

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 7
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and remained a loan to Berryhill & Company pending the "buy in," confirmed that testimony in
this case, and testified that Berryhill was present during Mosell's deposition and did not dispute
Mosell's testimony.
Pg. 61.
20 Q. Well, with respect to the 385,000 that you've
21 already loaned B'erryhill, is he paying interest on that?
22 Or what are the terms of that loan?
23 A. No details, no formal note has been put
24 together. Right now if I decided not to be a part of
25 Berryhill and Company, we could separate and I could say
Pg. 62.
1 "Give me back $385,000 and we'll go our separate ways."
2 Right now we're moving forward with that
3 understanding. The same could be said about Polo Cove.
And:
Pg.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

63.
Q. Mr. Mosell, is it your understanding today
that if -- you have the absolute right to walk away from
the restaurant, demand your 385,000 back?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes. That would not relieve me of my
obligation on cosigning of that space, though.
Q. So is it your iutent today to go forward with
the purchase of fifty percent of the Berryhill
operations?
A. That is my intent, yes.
Q. But you have the absolute right to walk away
from that intent if you chose to?
A. Yes.

Regarding criterion 3, the same evidence supporting criterion 2 apply. Additionally,
Glenn Mosell wrote "loan" prominently on 9 checks totaling $385,000.00 each of which he
delivered to and was accepted by Berryhill.
Finally, regarding criterion 4 oflnstruction No. 11, Mosell Equities argued that in Exhibit
1, if you replaced the term "loan" with "equity" the statement would be nonsensical because if
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 8
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Mosell Equities' money was equity, it would be unnecessary to later "transition" the money to a
"buy in." Purchasing "equity" is buying interest in the company, so there would be no reason to
transition "equity" to "equity."
Mosell Equities also argued that no reasonable person would agree to pay in "equity"
when the terms of the "buy in" were unresolved, as what the party was actually purchasing was
unidentified. Construing the contract as Berryhill presented - that he gets to keep all monies
paid as "equity" if the "buy in" did not occur, Mosell Equities argued created an absurdity. No
reasonable person would have agreed to those terms.
The Court then identified in Instruction No. 13, the limits of the jury's consideration of
contradictory terms.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by
any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the
written agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of
the written agreement. While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if
necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to
completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in
such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or
parts. (Emphasis added.)
Based on the evidence, which must be considered in light of the criteria identified in
Instruction Nos. 11 and 13, the jury's verdict is not supported by substantial and competent
evidence. To find no express contract existed and the parties did not intend the Mosell Equities
funds to be a loan, subject to change only upon completion of a future and potential "buy in"
ignores the plain meaning of the term "loan" and the parties' conduct in relation to Exhibit 1 and
the checks. Eight checks were marked "loan" and Berryhill accounted for all 10 of the checks as
loans to his company. (Ex. 52, 53, 55.) Additionally, Joy Luedtke, Berryhill's General

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
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Manager and bookkeeper, testified Berryhill personally directed her to account for these funds as
loans to Berryhill & Company.
Both Instruction Nos. 11 and 13 prohibit consideration of Berryhill's self-serving
testimony that "loan" really means "equity." Consequently, as there was no evidence to
corroborate Berryhill's testimony that "loan" really meant "equity," there is no substantial
evidence or any evidence to support an interpretation of Exhibit 1 or the parties subsequent
conduct to support a conclusion the contract was NOT for a loan.
Considering the evidence presented when analyzed with the criteria stated in the relevant
jury instructions, there is no evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable
minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. The only reasonable
interpretation is an expressed contract existed and that the 9 checks marked loan were loans,
consistent with Exhibit 1, and as accounted for by Berryhill & Company, Inc.
E. MOSELL EQUITIES PROVED BERRYHILL BREACHED THE EXPRESS
CONTRACT.
Assuming for the sake of argument, the jury found an express contract existed, but
responded "no" to the "which was breached" language of Question 1, there is no evidence of
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar
conclusion. Mosell Equities presented testimony that it made demand on Berryhill to either
consummate the "buy in" or pay back the loan. On cross examination, to impeach Berryhill's
contention that Mosell Equities had "run away" and that Mosell Equities had never requested its
funds, Mosell Equities presented evidence of Berryhill' s prior inconstant statement that Berryhill
through counsel denied the loans existed. "First and foremost, the funds described in your letter

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
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and claimed by Mr. Mosell qr Mosell Equities did not constitute a loan to John Berryhill or
Berryhill & CO., Inc."
Applying the standard required for establishing entitlement to judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, there is no "evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds
could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury." The Court therefore must set aside
the verdict on this issue and grant Mosell Equities' Motion for JNOV.

F. MOSELL EQUITIES PROVED AN IMPLIED IN FACT CONTRACT EXISTED - AT
LEAST 8 OF THEM
Mosell Equities also pursued a claim for an implied-in-fact contract in the alternative to
its express contract claim. Mosell Equities believed that if for some reason the jury could not
understand the complexities of the express contract jury instructions, the checks Mosell Equities
presented to Berryhill & Company, Inc. and the parties' conduct related to the delivery of those
checks (including Ex. 1.) and thereafter created an implied-in-fact contract. Mosell Equities has
contended throughout this litigation that the facts establish BOTH an express contract and an
implied-in-fact contract and the facts presented at trial corroborated and substantiate that
contention.
As discussed above, there is a question as to whether or not the jury found an implied-infact contract, but also found there was no breach.
Question No. 3: Did the conduct of the parties give rise to an implied-in-fact
contract which was breached? Answer: "No."
Question No. 4: What is the amount of damages incurred by PlaintiffMosell
Equities, LLC, as a result of Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.'s breach of an
implied-in-fact contract? No response.
Again, however, a finding that no implied-in-fact contract existed or no such contract was
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breached, is not supported by substantial and competent evidence
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
If you do not find a written or oral express contract, Plaintiff has claimed, in the
alternative, an implied-in-fact contract. An implied-in-fact contract is a contract
where the terms and existence of the contract are demonstrated by the conduct of
the parties, with the request of one party and the performance by the other often
being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. To find an
implied-in-fact contract, the facts must be such that the intent of the parties to
make a contract can be inferred from their conduct. An implied-in-fact contract is
given the same legal effect as any other contract.
To establish an implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on
each of the following propositions:
I.
The circumstances imply a request by the defendant for
performance by plaintiff; and
2.
The circumstances imply a promise by the defendant to
compensate the plaintiff for such performance; and
3.
The plaintiff performed as requested.
Glenn Mosell testified that he drafted and delivered each check to Berryhill & Company,
at John Berryhill' s request, and that Mosell prominently indicated "loan" on 9 of the 10 checks
delivered. (Mosell testified he did not use the term loan as he delivered the last check (Ex. 11.)
after hearing Berryhill's testimony in January 2008 that the deal was done - Mosell already
bought in.) Thereafter, Berryhill accounted for each check as a loan to his company- right up to
the day of trial.
Thus, Mosell's uncontradicted testimony that Berryhill requested the money established
criterion 1. That Mosell writing "loan" on each check, Berryhill accepting the checks as
presented, and then Berryhill accounting for the received funds as loans, satisfied criterion 2.
And, finally, it was uncontraverted that Mosell Equities provided the requested money, satisfying
criterion 3.
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As noted above, however, despite this uncontradicted evidence, this jury could not find
an implied-in-fact contract. Applying the JNOV standard discussed extensively above, there
simply is no "evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could
have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury." Mosell Equities is therefore entitled to
relief from the jury's verdict on this issue.

G. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
BERRYHILL'S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This defense may apply only if the jury were to find an express or implied-in-fact
contract existed. Consequently, the jury would have had to have marked either Verdict Question
1 or 3 as "yes," but then indicated either "0" or an amount less than Mosell Equities requested
for damages. If the jury found no express or implied-in-fact contract existed, then this defense is
not applicable.
Assuming the Defendants are contending the misrepresentation was Mosell' s alleged
statement "we have to call it something," the only evidence presented was Berryhill's selfserving testimony. However, there is no substantial or competent evidence that Berryhill
reasonably and detrimentally. relied on the alleged statement.
INSTRUCTION NO. 20
The Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. This
is a legal term which means the plaintiff may be prevented from enforcing a
contract or term of contract by reason of the plaintiffs own conduct.
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the defendant has the burden of
proof on each of the following propositions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the defendant;
The plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts;
The defendant did not know and could not discover the true facts;
The defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the
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defendant's prejudice.
The undisputed facts are Berryhill used the term "loan" on Exhibit 1, Mosell placed the
term "loan" prominently on 8 checks totaling $385,000.00, Berryhill then accepted these checks
and accounted for the funds as loans to his company on the company financial records. Berryhill
also referred to the funds as loans in communications with his CPA and attorneys.
Based on these facts alone and as it is the Defendants' duty to establish a factual basis to
support each element of the defense, the defense fails as Berryhill presented no evidence of
detrimental reliance. Even assuming Mosell made the statement "we have to call it something,"
Berryhill considered and processed the funds as loans - and that evidence is undisputed.
H. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF NO MEETING OF THE MINDS
This defense would appear to apply only as a defense to an express contract claim. In the
context of the implied-in-fact claim, the parties' intent is presumed from their conduct. In other
words, if the facts establish an implied-in-fact contract exists, those facts would also refute a no
meeting of the minds defense.
Moreover, as discussed above, Berryhill's self-serving testimony that he believed "loan"
really meant "equity" is refuted and contradicted by the mountain of evidence, including
Berryhill's own statements and his conduct, that Berryhill really meant and understood Mosell
Equities was making a loan to Berryhill that "will be transitioned" if and only if the parties
finalized the "buy in."
Finally, assuming the jury determined there was no "meeting of the minds" to create an
express contract, then the proper remedy is rescission. The contract Berryhill seeks to avoid was
executory - Mosell Equities had performed and delivered over $400,000.00 to Berryhill. If this
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defense applies, the Court must return the parties to pre-contracting positions. The Court
therefore must order Berryhill to return these funds if the jury concluded this defense applied.
I. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE JURY'S VERDICT ON MOSELL EQUITIES' CLAIM FOR UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
There is no dispute that if an express or implied-in-fact contract exists, as an equitable
remedy, unjust enrichment would not apply. Consequently, assuming the jury determined no
express or implied-in-fact contract existed, and the Court determines the jury erred, the unjust
enrichment claim is moot.
For the sake of argument, assuming no contracts exist, the undisputed facts indicate
Mosell Equities delivered money to Berryhill based on Berryhill's promise that he was selling
one-half of his company. Glenn Mosell testified unequivocally he did not intend the $405,000 to
be a gift to Berryhill & Company, and he delivered the money based on Berryhill's offer to sell
and promise the funds delivered remained a loan until the "buy in" was complete. Mosell's
testimony was undisputed.
Neither party disagrees that each party desired in June 2007 to consummate the "buy in"
and finalize the business relationship. Jim Tomlinson and Joy Luedtke testified they both
believed, after observing Mosell and Berryhill interact, that Mosell actually was an owner in
Berryhill & Company in 2008. Even Berryhill testified in the Broadway Park case the deal was
done, the attorneys just had to draft the paperwork
Pg.
12
13
14
15
16

77.
Q. For ease of discussion I'm going to call it
500,000; but I'm noting that you said it's slightly
under.
A. Okay.
Q. What did Mosell Equities get in exchange for
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17 this half a million dollars?
18 A. Fifty percent of Berryhill and Company.
In response, Berryhill claimed that he would have never moved the restaurant downtown
or moved his catering business and offices downtown without Mosell's promise regarding "Polo
Cove." However, despite repeated cross-examination questions, Berryhill was unable to identify
a single statement regarding Polo Cove that Berryhill contended Mosell stated that was false or
misleading. Berryhill conceded he had testified in the Broadway Park case in January 2008 after he had received $385,000.00 from Mosell, that Berryhill understood that Polo Cove was an
"ameba" and ever changing.· Berryhill thus conceded he understood that Polo Cove was a
speculative venture.
Pg.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

227.
Q. I'm sorry. What does that mean? I'm sorry,
what do you mean, "put out to venture"? What does that
mean?
A. People that we venture with in a development;
hotelier that wants to be a part of the project,
investors that want to be a part of the project. The
project is an amoeba. It's ever changing. Every

Berryhill also testified that Mosell never guaranteed the success of Polo Cove and
conceded Bob Tauton's credible opinion was accurate, Polo Cove's failure resulted from the
economy and collapse of the real estate market over which Mosell had no control.
Berryhill testified that he understood that Mosell was relying on Berryhill's expertise and
experience as a restaurateur, and that he had made a similar statement in the Broadway Park
case. Berryhill also testified he "ran the numbers" - as he always did, and determined both the
move downtown and expansion were economically feasible, based on Berryhill's, not Mosell's
projections. Berryhill also testified he did not consider any potential income from Polo Cove in
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his projections.
Despite these undisputed facts, it appeared at trial that Berryhill was blaming Mosell for
his financial predicament and was trying to establish "damages" to offset the $405,000.00 he
knew he owed Mosell Equities. Berryhill presented testimony that his company was
$150,000.00 in debt to the landlord for the "expansion" space, but acknowledged his company's
owner's equity was negative $250,000.00 because of money he had personally taken out of the
company. (Ex. 52, 53, 54.) In other words, the company lacked money to pay the landlord,
because Berryhill had removed that money, not because of anything Mosell Equities had done.
If the undisputed facts establish Berryhill took the money out of his company, rather than paying

the rent, why is Berryhill entitled to equity?
Berryhill also contended that Mosell Equities owed Berryhill & Company rent for the
"Polo Cove" space of approximately $16,000.00. In response, Mosell testified he had paid for
the build out of the space and another $20,000 plus in rent. Mosell also testified that in the
summer of 2008 when it appeared he was going to have to scale down the Polo Cove efforts, he
contacted Berryhill and offered to help sublease the space. Mosell testified Berryhill refused to
sublease, and Jim Tomlinson testified that Berryhill is using the space as a "lounge" and has not
attempted to sublease the space in recent history.
Moreover, Berryhill confirmed there was no sublease signed between Mosell Equities
and Berryhill & Company regarding the 1200 sq. ft. "Polo Cove" space. Consequently, by law
the lease was for 30 days, and no longer.
Assuming that Berryhill has established any damages to offset the amount he received
from Mosell Equities, that amount was minimal.
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Additionally, Berryhill attempted to establish that Mosell was using Berryhill's "good
name" and "branding" to add value to Polo Cove, and attempted to offer expert opinion
testimony of that alleged "value" through Steve Inch. However, the Court properly sustained
Mosell's objections as Inch was never disclosed as an expert witness. Consequently, although
Berryhill claimed Mosell used his name and he should be compensated, Berryhill failed in his
burden to establish a dollar figure of his alleged damages. Moreover, Mosell claimed he was
promoting Berryhill & Company, which owned the "Berryhill" brand, at Polo Cove because
Mosell believed he was buying in or already owned half of the company - as Berryhill confirmed
in his testimony in the Broadway Park case.
Additionally, Mosell Equities paid Berryhill $25,000.00 in consulting fees (Ex. 12, 13,
14, 15.) through the summer of 2007. Thereafter Berryhill was not involved in Polo Cove, as he
testified in the Broadway Park case.
7 A. I've been in focus on opening a new
8 restaurant, so I've pushed back from focusing on Polo
9 Cove. For the last six months2 I haven't even been going
10 to the Polo Cove meetings because -- And I'm -- and I'm
11 an important part of Polo Cove. But I've had a
12 different focus; to make a restaurant successful in a
13 new location. So any answer that I'm going to give in
14 relation to a recent time line, who's coming in, the
15 changes, et cetera, might steer you from the closest
16 truth or the truth that you would get much better from
17 my partner, Glenn Mosell, who you are deposing next
18 week.
Mosell also paid Berryhill another $20,000.00 which went into the Berryhill &
Company's "General Account." (Ex. 16, 17.)

Berryhill testimony was taken in January 2008.
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Mosell established h~ had provided $405,000 to Berryhill based on Berryhill's promise to
Mo sell sell one-half of Berryhill' s company. Even for the sake of argument, if Berryhill had
established damages entitling him to an equitable offset from this $405,000 figure, there was no
legal or factual basis for the jury to determine - assuming they addressed the unjust enrichment
issue, that Berryhill was entitled to an offset of the entire $405,000.00.
The Defendants conceded this fact during closing argument. Clearly, Berryhill's analogy
of this case to a "divorce" indicated that Berryhill knew he was not entitled to a free lunch. The
clear intent was to knock as much money off of the $405,000.00 as he could to reduce the
amount of money he conceded he owed Mosell Equities.
The jury's verdict finding that Berryhill was not unjustly enriched to any degree,
although having received $405,000 to build out his restaurant, from which he continues to make
money, is a travesty. There simply is no evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that
reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion - that it is equitable for Berryhill to
keep over $400,000 under the circumstances and Mosell Equities received nothing. Mosell
Equities is therefore entitled to JNOV on this issue.
J. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE JURY'S VERDICT ON MOSELL EQUITIES' CONVERSION CLAIM

During trial Mosell testified he purchased the relevant property; furniture, tables and
chairs, and a cement bar, and stated the prices he paid. Mosell testified the value of the property
was what he had paid for it. Berryhill did not contradict this testimony nor offered any evidence
the value of the property was anything other than Mosell's opinion.
"For more than eighty-five years, this Court has followed the rule that the owner of
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property is a competent witness concerning its value." Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo
Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 43, 896 P.2d 949,951 (1995), citing Howes v. Curtis, 104 Idaho
563, 568, 661 P.2d 729, 734 (1983); Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625, 632-33, 99 P. 108, 110
(1908).
Notwithstanding Mosell's uncontradicted testimony, however, the jury awarded Mosell
Equities a mere 20% of the amount claimed. Again, there simply is no evidence of sufficient
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion.
Mosell Equities is therefore also entitled to JNOV on this issue.

III. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In the alternative, Mosell Equities requests that this Court grant its Motion for New Trial.
Mosell Equities contends there are grounds for new trial according to Rule 59(a), 6, IRCP.
Rule 59(a). New trial - Amendment of judgment - Grounds
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against the law.
A. STANDARD FOR NEW TRIAL
Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), a district court may grant a new trial based on the ground
of "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision." I.R.C.P.
59(a)(6). "A trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground if, after making
his or her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the
evidence, the judge determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear
weight of the evidence." Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Machinery Corp., 142 Idaho
244,248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005) (citing Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,568,
97 P.3d 428,435 (2004)). Any motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of
the evidence must "set forth the factual grounds therefore with particularity."
I.R.C.P. (59)(a)(7). (Emphasis added)
Johannsen v. Utter beck, 196 P .3d 341, 348, 146 Idaho 423, 430 (2008).

When considering whether to grant a new trial, the Court essentially sits as a 13 th juror.
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B. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE PARTIES HAD
AN EXPRESSED CONTRACT FOR A LOAN AND BERRYHILL BREACHED
Mosell Equities incorporates its previous arguments in this portion of its memorandum.
To summarize the evidence briefly, Mosell testified Berryhill drafted Exhibit 1 because the
parties had not reached terms of the "buy in," and Mosell did not want to simply give Berryhill
over $400,000.00 without some security.
Both Mosell and Berryhill testified that in June 2007, when Mosell Equities
presented the first check (Copied on Ex. 1, and in evidence as Ex. 2) they fully intended
the "buy in" to occur.
Berryhill testified during his deposition in January 2008 in the Broadway Park
litigation, that he believed Mosell owned half of Berryhill & Company - that the "buy in"
referenced in Exhibit 1 had occurred, which was cash for half interest in Berryhill &
Company, Inc.
Pg.77
12 Q. For ease of discussion I'm going to call it
13 500,000; but I'm noting that you said it's slightly
14 under.
15 A. Okay.
16 Q. What did Mosell Equities get in exchange for
17 this half a million dollars?
18 A. Fifty percent of Berryhill and Company.
19 Q. So today Mosell Equities owns fifty percent of
20 Berryhill and Company?
21 A. There's actually -- No. That paperwork is
22 being drawn up ..
23 Q. But that's your understanding?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. So you're having somebody do the paperwork?
Pg.78.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. So he's -- or Mosell Equities is going to be a
3 fifty percent shareholder?
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4 A. Yes.
Mosell testified that he presented checks (Ex. 2-11) at Berryhill' s request, signed the
checks, and annotated "loan" prominently on the front of 8 of the checks. Mosell then delivered
the checks to Berryhill. Berryhill did not deny receiving the checks, which totaled $405,000.00.
Of those checks, $385,000.00 worth were marked with "loan."
Thereafter, there is no dispute that Berryhill & Company accounted for these moneys
received from Mosell Equities as loans on the Berryhill & Company "Quickbooks" accounts and
in its financial statements. (Ex. 33, 52, 53, and 54.) Berryhill's attorneys; Gourley and Meier
drafted documents that identified Mosell Equities' contribution to the "buy in" was cash. (Ex.
34, and 35 - relevant documents from these exhibits attached) And Meier's documents, created
after a lengthy meeting with Berryhill, clearly and unequivocally refer to Mosell Equities' money
as "loans." As part of the "buy in" documents, Meier even drafted a "Loan Release" document
for Mosell to sign.
Moreover, Joy Luedtke testified that Berryhill told her that when Mosell wanted either to
consummate the "buy in" so he could take his stock and sell it or he wanted his money repaid,
Berryhill did not deny at that time Berryhill & Company did not owe the money to Mosell
Equities. To the contrary, Luedtke testified that Berryhill reviewed the business financial
resources to determine whether or not he had the financial resources to pay Mosell Equities back.
Finally, it was undisputed that all of the money Mosell Equities delivered was used to pay
liabilities for Berryhill & Company and $50,000 went directly into Berryhill's pocket. (Ex. 23.)
When considering whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial, the Court may also
consider the credibility of the witnesses. Mosell Equities asserts that when comparing
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Berryhill's testimony in light of the written evidence, in light of his conduct upon receiving the
money, and when considering his testimony in the Broadway Park case, Berryhill's testimony
during the trial was less than credible.
First, Berryhill refused to answer simple and direct questions, and was evasive
throughout his testimony.
Then, in contradiction to his deposition testimony, Berryhill testified that he believed the
parties were moving forward and had agreed to the terms he proposed in Exhibit 21. However,
he denied Exhibit 21 was the final contract in his deposition in this case and testified Exhibit 21
was not complete for the same reason he testified the Gourley and Meier documents were
incomplete.
Berryhill's testimony in this case also contradicted his testimony in the Broadway Park
case where he stated the deal was cash for half of his company - with no additional terms.
Finally, when pressed to explain his interpretation of "loan," a term he used in Exhibit 1,
if he really meant another meaning, Berryhill testified he meant "equity." However, as argued
above, the term "equity" contradicted the unambiguous terms in Exhibit 1 and Berryhill's own
financial records. Contrary to Berryhill's testimony he intended Mosell Equities money as
"equity," Berryhill never accounted for these funds as "equity." To the contrary, at Berryhill's
direction, his general manager accounted for the funds as loans.
Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial on its breach of express contract claim as the
jury's verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence presented at trial.
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C. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AN IMPLIED-INFACT CONTRACT AND A BREACH.
Again, as argued previously the evidence at trial indicated Mosell delivered 10 checks to
Berryhill after Berryhill requested the money. Mosell marked 9 of the 10 checks with the
unambiguous term "loan" on the front. Berryhill never questioned the annotation on the checks,
and thereafter accounted for the funds as loans.
Additionally, as noted above, Instruction No. 18 addressed the criteria to establish an
implied-in-fact contract, and Mosell Equities satisfied each criterion. Mosell's uncontradicted
testimony that Berryhill requested the money established criterion 1. Mosell writing "loan" on
each check, Berryhill accepting the checks as presented, and then Berryhill accounting for the
received funds as loans, satisfied criterion 2. And, finally, Mosell Equities provided the
requested money, satisfying criterion 3.
Considering the clear weight of the evidence presented at trial it was error for the jury to
conclude Mosell Equities had not proven an implied-in-fact contract existed establishing that as
Mosell Equities had presented funds, that the parties agreed the funds would remain a loan until
they consummated the "buy in" which never occurred, and that consequently the funds remained
a loan.
D. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED BERRYHILL &
COMPANY WAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY $405,000.00.
Again, Berryhill's "divorce" analogy is a tacit admission that Berryhill understood he
was not entitled to a free lunch. It literally shocks the conscience considering the evidence, that
11 people could conclude Berryhill was entitled to keep $405,000.00 which he obtained by first
representing he was offering"half ownership in his company, and then representing that until he
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and Mosell worked out the exact terms of the buy in, Berryhill would consider the Mosell Equity
funds as loans pending the "buy in."
At trial, while Berryhill attempted to vilify Mosell, and apparently that was a successful
tactic, the clear weight of the evidence established Berryhill was unjustly enriched. Most of
Berryhill's evidence centered on the parties relationship regarding a project - Polo Cove, but
Berryhill could not articulate a single false statement Mosell allegedly made regarding that
project. Berryhill conceded Mosell did not guarantee the success at Polo Cove, or that Mosell
provided any financial information regarding Polo Cove that Berryhill used when calculating the
financial viability of moving the restaurant downtown or for the expansion. Berryhill also
conceded that Bob Taunton's assessment was accurate, that Polo Cove failed due to the real
estate market, and not do to anything that Mosell did or could have done differently.
Berryhill attempted to establish he suffered damages in an attempt to claim an equitable
offset to Mosell Equities' $405,000 claim for damages. However, as argued above, assuming
Berryhill was entitled to an offset for any amount, there was no evidence to establish Berryhill
was entitled to an equitable offset of over $400,000.00.
While this issue appe.ars moot as there clearly was an express and implied-in-fact
contractual relationship, the clear weight of the evidence does not support the jury's finding on
this claim and should also be set aside.
E. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED BERRYHILL &
COMPANY CONVERTED MOSELL EQUITIES' PROPERTY AND THE
UNDISPUTED VALUE WAS OVER $10,000.00.
Mosell makes the same argument on this issue as he did above. Mosell was competent to
testify as to the value of his property, that testimony was undisputed, and consequently, the clear
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weight of the undisputed evidence establishes Berryhill converted Mosell Equities' property and
the value exceeded $10,000.00. As the clear weight of the evidence confirms Mosell Equities
was entitled to the $10,000.00 it claims was converted, Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial
on this issue.

IV. CONCLUSION
Mosell Equities very respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for JNOV as
there is not substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict on any claim or
defense.
In the alternative, Mosell Equities very respectfully requests the Court grant its Motion
for New Trial as the jury's verdict was not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence
presented at trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of September, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of September, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via the manner indicated to:

The Honorable Dennis Goff
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

To chambers via e-mail and US Mail
Via facsimile transmission and e-mail

ERIC R. CLARK
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John Berryhill
Subject:
Start Date:
Due Date:
Priority:

JB,Glenn Mosell-Berrytiill's/MBlnc/Polo Cove
Thursday, July 14, 2005
Thursday, March 01, 2007
High

Status:
Percent Complete :

50%

In Progress

Total Work:
Actual Work :

0 hours

Owner:

John Berryhill

O hours

John Berryhill's responsabilities:
Berryhill & Co. - daily duties common to running a company as it's president. owner and executive chef, weekly cafe specials.
recipe design. cooking class research and development and teaching, working in the kitchen at times. team leader and front man
for the company. tasting-choosing-writing-editing my wine and restaurant menus. continually revising gtg and catering menus,
marketing and advertising including our website, plan short and long term development strategies (like gtg development in places
like Eagle. Nampa. and Tamarack). working on my cookbook (which I really need to finish). etc, etc, etc.
MoBerry Corporation - working with Glenn. dealing with this lawsuit against Mike Matzek. focusing on the move downtown (how
we will fit in the Estrella space, the ti of seats that make the most sense, design and setup of two kitchens. dining, banquet room
and offices . working on what happens to the current Berryhill space. working on Glenn's involvement with Berryhill and the buy in.
etc.
Polo Cove - working wilh Glenn. being a front man for the resort phase, coordinating the design/architectual team on the resort
phase buildings (mainly Berryhill's Restaurant and Collages Inn), coordinating the website design and development with Tom
Foerstel, developing the hospitality concept at polo cove which includes food-beverage-catering, event and concierge services.
research and development design of the Berryhill's Restaurant there . designing the menu style as executive chef, etc. etc . and
everything else that will potentially come my way as this starts to unfold ..

John Berryhill's Compensation and Glenn Mosell's Berryhill Buy In :
1} We will work out the details of Glenn's Berryhill & Co . buy in amounts with our attorney Kim Gourley :
a) MoBerry. a c-corp. is formed by Glenn and I, as a 50¾/50% partnership
b} I bring 100¾ of BCO stock (1000 shares) to the table valued at $387,000.00
c) Glenn matches my 100¾ with $387,000.00 cash
$187,000 to wipe out BCO debt
$75,000 to ti's for downtown location and the move
Distribution tbd:
$125,000 to me ($50,000.00 cash payment I $75,000.00 into the Plaza 121 Building equity)

2) I will stay an employee of BCO. and will continue to receive my salary plus perks as it's president-ceo
3) Profits from BCO will be filtered through to MoBerry Corporation (we will have to decide what to do with them. ie: split up and
pocket or re-invest. and al what economic %,etc).

4} Polo Cove will continue to be billed accordingly for it's account (ie: lunch meetings, etc). and will be paid to BCO by Mosel/
Equities(?). unless a change is made· later.
5) I will still be compensated for my work and time spent on Polo Cove projects .

B&Co000359
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Berryhill & Company Inc

2/20/2009 2:27 PM

Register: Mosell Equities LLC
From 07/01/2005 through 02/2012009
Soncd by: Date. Type. Number/Ref

Dare

Number

06/28/2007

5 127

Payee

Memo

Account
· -- ····

- -·· ------ ·

Increase C
--··· ·· . . -----

Decrease

--- --·

--- -·

Balance
-· -·- - -- ---·-·

Mosell Equities LLC

Bank of America -8919

Loan for BCO ...

50,000.00

07/31/2007

Mosell Equities LLC

Bank of America -8919

loan

25,000.00

75.000.00

08/08/2007

Mosell EA)uitics LLC

BANK OF THE CASC. ..

Loan Tis

25,000.00

100,000.00

BANK OF THE CASC. .

loan #5, loan/14

50.000.00

150.000.00

I 0/9

Mosell Equities LLC

BANK OF THE CASC..

kitchen equipm ...

60,00000

210,000.00

Mosel! Equities LLC

BANK OF THE CASC..

100.000.00

3 I0,000.00

5154

Mosell Equities LLC

BANK OF THE CASC...

loan

25,000.00

335,000.00

BANK OF THE CASC. ..

Check to John f ..

50.000.00

385,000.00

08116/2007
I0/09/2007
10/29/2007
12/04/2007
12/28/2007

50,000.00

B&Co000462
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http://webmai !.att.oet'.n-US/o/w m'4 93 EA 591OOOC57F3000033 ...

:rom: Kimbell D. Gourley

~

~-at&t
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:

"Kimbell 0 . Gourley" < kgourley@idalaw.com >
< mosell@att.net>, < John@Berryhillandco.com >
RE: MoBerry
Tuesday, October 16, 2007 12:04 :09 PM

Glenn and John:
Attached are the articles of incorporation, bylaws, inrtial corporate resolutions, stock certificates, stock
ledger, a bill of transfer for John to transfer 90% or 180 shares of Berryhill & Co to the new corporation as his
capital contribution, a bill of transfer for John to transfer 10% or 20 shares of Berryhill & Co to the new
corporation as a separate purchase and sale agreement, and a generic bill of transfer . The two of you had
discussed preparation of a redemption agreement between stockholders or putting in some version of a
buy/sell clause the bylaws. «arts_inc_profit.pdf» «Minutes - shareholders and directors - first
consent.doc>> <<Bylaws .doc>> << Stock Certificate Table xis>> <<stock certificate 1.doc»
<<stock certificate 2.doc>> << Bill of transfer - mosell equities to moberry doc» <<Bill of transfer - berryhill
90% to moberry .doc>> << Bill of transfer - berryhill to moberry .doc>> « Buy-Sell Clause.doc> >
----Oajnal Message--Kmbel D. Gour'ey

From:

Sent:

Tuesday, Octob€r 16, 2007 7: 41 AM

To:

mose~att.net

Cc:

John@Berryhiandco.com

Subject:

MoBerry

Glenn:
I am sorry I missed your phone call. I will get you drafts of the articles of incorporation, bylaws,
initial corporate resolutions. and stock certificates . As you know we never finalized the documents but I
dictated drafts and then had some handwritten revisions. All of this was put on hold last March but I will
have Sherry finish my revisions and get the drafts to you. I recall that you had discussed inserting some
language into the bylaws or executing a buy/sell agreement relating to buying each other out if certain
events occurred. A buy/sell agreement has not yet been prepared Take care Kim
Kimbell D. Gourley
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, PA
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820
PO Box1097
Boise, Idaho 83701
208-331-1170
208-331-1529 (fax)
kgourley@idalaw .com

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION:
The information contained in this e-ma il
> message i s intended only for the pers o nal and c onfidential u se o f the
> designated r e cipient named above . If the reader of this message is
> n o t the int e nded re c ipient o r a n agent responsible for d e livering it t o
> the intended re c ipient, you are hereby notified that you have re c ei v ed

of2

12/9/2008 10:07 AM
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:rom: Kimbell D. Gourley

-

http://webmailatt.ne./en-US/o/wm/493EA59 I000C57F3000033 ...

> this document in e rr o r, and that any revieH, dissemination, distribution
or
> copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received
> this commun i cat ion in e rr o r, please n o tify u s immed i ately at
> jg@idalaw. c om and delete the original mess age.

Attachment
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment
Attachment

of2

1: arts inc profit.pdf (application/octet-stream)
2: Minutes - shareholders and directors - first consent.doc (application/msword)
3: Bylaws.doc (application/msword)
4: Stock Certificate Table.xis (application/vnd.ms-excel)
5: stock certificate l.doc (application/msword)
6: stock certificate 2.doc (application/msword)
7: Bill of transfer - mosell equities to moberry.doc (application/msword)
8: Bill of transfer - berryhill 90% to moberry.doc (application/msword)
9: Bill of transfer - berryhill to moberry .doc (application/msword)
10: Buy-Sell Clause.doc (application/msword)
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It is further deemed advisable that the offer, sale and issue of such shares be
effectuated in such a manner that qualified stockholders may receive the benefits of
Section 1244 of the Internal Revenue codes; and
There is not now any outstanding offering or portion thereof of the Corporation to
sell or issue any of its stock ; and
This Corporation is a small business corporation as defined in Section 1244(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue codes;

RESOLVED, that the officers of this Corporation, and each of them, are hereby
authorized and directed to offer for sale an issue of up to shares of the common
stock of the Corporation in a total dollar amount of not more than One Thousand
dollars ($1,000 .00) per share. The shares shall be issued as follows:
John Berryhill
. Mose/I Equities , L.L.C.

387 shares
387 shares

This sum is to be paid by the in-kind transfer of
180 shares of stock in Berryhill & Co., Inc.
Cash

PURCHASE OF STOCK
RESOLVED, the Corporation shall pay to John Berryhill the sum of $50 ,000 .00
to purchase his remaining 10% (20 shares) of Berryhill & Co., lnc.'s outstanding shares
of stock.
UTILIZATION OF CASH RESERVES
RESOLVED, the Corporation shall make a loan or capital contribution to Berryhill
& Co ., Inc. in the approximate sum of $262,000 .00, which funds are to be utilized by
Berryhill & Co .. Inc for th·e following:

a)

payment of Berryhill & Co ., Inc. loan obligation owed to _ _ in the
approximate sum of $187 ,000.00;

b)

payment in the approximate sum of $50,000.00 for tenant improvements
located at Berryhill & Co ., lnc.'s new restaurant site at 121 N. 9 th Street,
Boise, Idaho;

c)

the approximate sum of $25,000.00 to be used to pay for moving
expenses incurred to relocate Berryhill & Co ., lnc.'s restaurant to its new
th
location at 121 N. 9 Street, Boise, Idaho.

CONSENT OF SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS IN LIEU OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING - Page 3
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EBERLE, BERLiN, KADING, TURNBOW, MCKLVEEN

& JONES,

CHARTERED
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
BOISE PLAZA
1111 WEST JEFFERSON STREET, SUITE 530
POST OFFICE BOX 1368
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

TELEPHONE
(208) 344-SSJS

f'ACSIMILE
(208) J44..S542

L. VICTORlA MEIER
E-MAIL: vmeler@<berlt.com

February 27, 2008

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
John Berryhill, President
Berryhill & Company, Inc.
121 North 9th Street, Suite 102
Boise, Idaho 83702
Glenn E. Mosell
Post Office Box 1694
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Re:

Stock Purchase Agreement

Dear John & Glenn:
Please find enclosed the following documents reflecting the proposed stock purchase by
Glen :
( 1)
(2)
(3)
( 4)

Special Meeting of the Board of Di.rectors and Shareholders of Benyhill &
Company, Inc.
Stock Purchase Agreement
Satisfaction of Loan
Copy of the Stock Certificate No. 3.

Please review these documents carefully to ensure that the documents meet \vith your
approval. If they do, please contact me and I will arrange to have final copies sent to you for
original signature. If you have any comments or changes contact me to discuss.
Additionally, if you have not done so already, please review the existing Bylaws and
Restrictive Purchase and Redemption Agreement of the Company. Neither document has been
executed. However, in the interest of saving costs and provided they meet with your approval, I can
prepare a one-page agreement, stating that the two of you intend to be bound by these two
agreements.

001349
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~ctoria Meier

LYM
cc: A Dempsey
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BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC.

DRAFT

SPECIAL MEETING OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS
Effective the December 31, 2007
The undersigned, being Secretary of BERRYHILL & COMPANY, [NC., an Idaho
corporation (the "Company"), by this instrument evidences the actions and resolutions undertaken
at the special meeting of the Board of Directors and Shareholders of the Company. Present was
the so le Shareholder and the Directors who waived notice of the meeting.

WHEREAS, the Company has borrowed Four Hundred Thousand Dollars from G lenn E .
Mosel I for the funding of the relocation of the Company's restaurant to a new location and for the
ca pital improvements to be made to the restaurant and banquet rooms .
WHEREAS, Glenn E. Mosel! desires to acq uire an interest in the Company in exchange
for , and as repayment of, the amount lent to the Company.
WHEREAS, the Directors and the Sole Shareholder believe ii is in the best interest of
the Company to iss ue Glenn E. Mose ll two hundred (200) shares of the common capital stock of
the Company as repayment of the amount lent to the Company.
RESOLVED, that upon receipt of the Satisfaction of Loan evidencing that the
Company's obligation to Mosel! has been paid, the Directors are hereby authorized to issue two
hundred (200) shares of the one dollar ($1) par value common capital stock of the Company to
Mosel!.
RESOLVED, that the Officers of the Company are authorized and directed to ex ecute
any agreements and doc uments in connection with the issuance of the two hundred (200) shares
of the Company's common capita l stock.
There being no unattended business to come before the meeting , the meeting was
adjourned.
DATED effective as of the 31" day of December, 2007 .

By:
Its:

Amy Berryhill
Secretary

Special Meeting of the Board or Directors and Shareholders (2007)
00161367.000
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STOCK PURCHASE AGREEl\1ENT
THIS STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (hereinafter "Agreemem") is made and entered into
effective the _ _day o f - - - - - ~ 2007, by and between BERRYHILL & COMPANY,
INC., an Idaho corporation (the "Corporation"), and GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man dealing with
his separate property ("Mosel!").

WIT NE S S ETH:
WHEREAS. John Berryhill (the "Shareholder") is the sole shareholder and record owner of two
hu.ndred (200) shares, $1.00 par value, of the issued and outstanding common capital stock of BERRYfffi.L
& COMPANY, INC., an Tdaho corporation (hereinafter the "Corporation"). John Berryhill's shares represent
one hundred percent (100%) of the issued and outstanding common capital stock of the Corporarion and are
evidenced by Certificates No. I and No. 2.
WHEREAS, during the calendar year of 2007, Mose ll loaned rhe Corporation Four Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($400,000) to fund the relocation of the Corporation's restaurant and for capital
improvements needed for the Corporation· s restaurant and banquet rooms (the "Loan") .
WHEREAS , the Corporation des ires to issue two hundred (200) shares of the Corporarion's
common capital stock to Mosel! as repayment of the Loan . Mose l! desires to accept the two hundred
(200) shares of the Corporation's common capital stock as repayment of the Loan and to have the Loan
reclass ified on the Corporation's books and records as a capital contribution from Mosel!.
WHEREAS, after the execution of this Agreement, Mosell and the Shareholder will each own
fifty percent (50%) of the common capiral stock of the Corporarion.
WHEREAS, rhe Directors of the Corporation and the Shareholder have agreed that it is in the
best interest of the Corporation to authorize and to admit Mose l! as a shareholder of the Corporation and
to reclassify the Loan as a capital contribution from Mosel! as payment for the two hundred (200) shares
pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agree ments contained herein ,
Corporation , Shareholder, and Mosell agree as follows:

l.
Issuance of Stock. The Corporation shall issue two hundred (200) shares of the common
capital stock of the Corporation (the "Shares") in the name of Glenn E. Mosell evidenced by Certificate
No. 3.
2.
Subscription Price.
Thousand Dollars ($400,000).

The subscription pnce for the Shares shall be Four Hundred

3.
Payment of Subscription Price. Mosel! shall pay the Subscription Price by canceling
the Loan and thereafter authorizing the Corporation to reclassify the Loan on the Corporation's books and
records as a capital contribution from Mosel! to the Corporation.

STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT- 1 00161118.<XX>
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DRAFT

SATISFACTION OF LOAN

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man
dealing with hi s sole and separate property, does hereby certify and declare that the certain Loan
in the original amount of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000) made and entered into by

BERRYJilLL & COJ\1PANY,

an Idaho corporation, as "borrower", to

GLENN E. MOSELL,

as "lender", is fully paid, satisfied and dis charged.
DATED : _

_

_

_

, 200_.
Glenn E. Masell

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

) ss.
)

On this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ __ _ , 2008, before me, the undersigned, a notary
public in and for said slate, personaJ!y appeared GLENN E. MOSELL, known or identified lo me to
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged lo me that he
executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day
and year first above written.

Notary Public for fdaho
My Commission Expires: _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __

SATISFACTION OF LOAN - 0ocoo161369 .000
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(including attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the
purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting,
marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.
>
>
>

>The information contai"ned in this transmission is from the office of Riche, Dempsey &
Associates, Chtd. and is confidential and intended only for the use of the individual or
entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, the reader
is hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication
is strictly prohibited . If you have received this transmission in error, please notify me
immediately by calling (208) 338-1040 and return the original to me at the address
indicated above. Thank you.
>
>

>
>From : John Berryhill [mailto:john{@,berryhillandco.com]
>Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 8:20 AM
>To: Amy Dempsey
>Subject: Re: Meeting next week?
>
>
>
>Amy,
> I guess Glenn can't do this Thursday at all. Do you have any other time this Friday other
than lOam? If not let's go with next Friday.
>
>
>----- Original Message ---->From : Amy Dempsey <amv(a),taxguvs.cc>
>To: John Berryhill
>Cc: Glenn Mosell <mosell(@mac.com>; Glenn Mosell <mose1l@,att.net>
>Sent: Wed Mar 05 06:06:24 2008
>Subject: RE: Meeting next week?
>
>Hi John?
>
>
>
>No problem! As far as a 10 am meeting I have Thursday the 6th available or Friday the
14th. If your main concern is setting up the partnership in 2007 vs. 2008 I do not think it
will make much difference. If you chose to continue to set it up in 2007 then Glenn
would receive a K-1 from Berryhill, if you chose to set the buy-in in 2008 then we would
just leave the monies Glenn donated in 2007 on the books as a loan and then reclass the
loan amounts that are associated with the buy-in to his capital account in 2008.
>

MEOCD70l8
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Berryhill & Company Inc

1:37 PM

Balance Sheet

04/27HO

As of December 31, 2007

Accrual Basls

De1:31,07
ASSETS

Current Assets
Checking/Savings
BANK OF THE CASCADES - 4069
Koy Checking - 2932
TIPPING PETTY CASH 2008
T otaJ

c hecklnglSavlnas

117,799.18
7,446.58

2.000.00
127,245.76

Acc«lntsRecetvable
A=ints R&celvable

9,623.92

Total Accounts Recelvable

To1aJ Current Assets

9,623.92
136,869.68

Flxod Assets
Leasehold Improvements
lnven!X>ry on Hand
Wine
Liquor
Food

117,397.72
9,818.51
3,271 .69
21,703.56

34,793.76

Total Inventory on Hand
Equlpmont
Furniture and Axturo,;
Vohlcles
Accumulated DopreclaUon- Equip

204,081 .86
163,058.68
14,800.64
-297.950.47
236,182..39

Total Fixod Assets

373,052.07

TOTAL ASSETS

UABlllTIES & EQUITY
Llablllties
Current liablr.tles
Accounts Payable
Accounts Payable

TT,979.84

Total Accounts Pay.able

77,979.84

Other Current UablllUc-s

KoyBank L-0-C #1001 (SOK)
Loan -Amy Berryhill
Sales Tax Payable
Payroll Liabilities
Federal Wlthholdlng
FICA Company
FICA Employoo
RJTA Fed Unemploymcn1
Garnishment -Ada County Sheriff
MEDI Company
MEDI Employee
St.a1o Wrthholdlng
State Unemployment -SUTA

25,000.00
33.52520
13.667.64

-138.00
-70.25
-70.25
-9.07

397.76
-16.43

-16.43
-70.00
-13.63
-6.30

Total Payroll Uabllities

22,280.18

BHC Gift Cards
Total other Current Uabllltles

94,466.72
172,446.56

Total Current Liabilities
Long Term Liabilltias
Contingent liabillties
Moself Equities LLC
Total Contingent Llabllltles
KeyBank Commercial Loan--0001
City of Boise SEWER - Broadway
Keylease -Kltchen Equlp-725
Total long Term LiabiliUes

385,000.00
38.5,000.00
9,119.67
5,632.36
14,516.60

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

~-z_

414,268.63
Page 1
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Berryhill & Company Inc

1:37 PM

Balance Sheet

04/ZT/10
Accrual Basis

As of ~ b e r 31, 2007
Dec 31, 07

588,715.19

Total Liablllties
Equity
CommonStocit
Owners Draw
Retained Earnings
Nettneome

200.00
-5.089.81
-130.033.33
-78,739.98

Total Equity

-213,663.12
373,062.07

TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY

Page2
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3:36 PM

-

Berryhill & Company Inc

07/01/08

Balance Sheet

Accrual Basis

As of June 30, 2008
Jun 30, 08
ASSETS
Current Assets
Checking/Savings
BANK OF THE CASCADES - 4069
Key Checking - 2932
TIPPING PETTY CASH 2008

72,722.33

2,740.46
3,374.69

Total Checking/Savings

78,837.48

Accounts Receivable
House Account
Accounts Receivable

113.18
17,107.78

Total Accounts Receivable

17,220.96

Other Current Assets
Undeposited Funds

27.65

Total Other Current Assets

27.65

Total Cun-en! Assets
Fixed Assets
Leasehold Improvements
Inventory on Hand
Equipment
Furniture and Fixtures
Vehicles
Accumulated Depreciation- Equip
Total Fixed Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES & EQUITY
Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable
Accounts Payable
Total Accounts Payable

96,086.09
228,311 .71
32 ,158.12
204,081 .86
174,131.43
14,80064
-297 ,950 .4 7
355,533.2 9

451,619.38

17,361 .91
17,361 91

Other Current Liabilities
BOTC - LINE OF CREDIT
Direct Deposit Liabilities
KeyBank L-0-C #1001 (50K)
Loan -Amy Berryhill
Sales Tax Payable
Payroll Liabilities
Reservation Fees & Deposits
BHC Gift Cards
Trade Accounts

122,299.67
17.67
25 ,000.00
33.466 22
9,886.38
0.00
500.00
21,574.47
1,198.16

Total Other Current Liabilities

213,942 .5 7

Total Current Liabilities

231,304.48

Long Tenn Liabilities
BOTC SBA loan
Mosel! Equities LLC
KeyBank Commercial Loan-0001
City of Boise SEWER - Broadway
City of Boise SEWER - Downtown

100,000 00
385,000.00
5,794 .5 1
5,208 .11
9 ,039 .12

Total Long Tenn Liabilities

505 ,041 .74

Total Liabilities

736,346.22

Equity
BerryHill Equity
Mosel! Equity

-50,000.00
20,000.00

Common Stock
Owners Draw
Retained·Earnings
Net Income

200.00
-5,089.81
-208,673.41
-41,163 .62

Pag(l 1
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3:36 PM

Berryhill & Company Inc

07/01/08

Balance Sheet

4ccrual -Basis

As of June 30, 2008

•
Jun 30, 08

Total Equity
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY

-284 ,726 .84

451,619.38

001359
Page:2

•

•
Berryhill & Company Inc

1:38 PM

Balance Sheet

04IZ7/10

As of December 31, 2008

Ac=ualBasls

Dec 31, 08

ASSEni
Current Assets
Checking/Saving

BANK OF THE CASCADES - 4069
Key Checking • 2932

TIPPING PETTY CASH 2008
Total Ch&ddngl'Savlngs

66,933.62
1,942.16
1,852.71
70,728.49

Accountl; RecelvBble

House Account
101 Melinda Kim
105 Lemp's Apott,eca,y
102Stlull.e5

179.33
300.51
36.84

Total House Accotlnt

516.68

Accounts Receivable

85,090.61

Total Accounts Receivable

65,607.29
136,335.78

Total Current Assets
FJxedAz;sets

l...ea6ehold Improvements
lrnrentoty on Hand
Wine

202,003.90
3,947.48
2,928.83
3,622.15

Liquor
Food

Total Inventory on Hand
Equipment
Fumllure and Foctures
Vehicles

10,498.46
205,858.00
178.866.50
14,800.64

Accumulated Depraciallon- Equip

-359.275.97
252,751 .53

Tobi Fixed Assets

389,087.31

TOTAL ASSETS
LIABIUTIES & EQUITY
Liabilities

Current Uabllllles
AccountsPayabkl
Accounts Payable
Total Accounts Payable
Other Current Liabllitles
BOTC - LINE OF CREDIT
Direct Deposit Uabllllles
Loan -Amy Berryhfll

Sales Tax Payable
Payroll Llabilltles
Federal Wrthholdlng
ACA Company
ACA Employee
ftJTA Fed Unemployment
MEDI Company
MEDl Employee
State Wrlhholdlng
State Unemployment -SUTA
ID-Workforce Dev Fund
Payroll Llabllllies - Other

Tola! Payroll Uabilltles
Resel'Vlllion files & Deposits

BHC Gift Carm,

Trade Account&

Total Other Current liabilities
Total Current Uabllltles

69,807.08
69,807.08
149.261.73
-6,344.69
23,525.20
13,608.13
-2.474.38
-2,3TT.TT
-2.JTT.TT
-305.85
-556.08
-556.08
-1,423.90
-296.71
-8.92
-356.63

-10,734 .09
2,000.00
23.966.03
2,264.25
198,546.57
268,353.65
Page 1
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•

•
BerryhiU & Company Inc

1:36PM

Balance Sheet

041Zl'/10

As of December 31, 2008

AccrUalBnls

DK31,08
Long Tenn Uabllltles
Conllngeflt Uabllltles

MoseB Equities UC
Total Contingent Llabllllles

BOTC SSA Loan
Key8ankCOlllfflef'Ciall.oan-too1
City of Boise SEWER· Broadway
Cit, of Boise sewER - J)owntawn
Total Long Tenn Llabllilles

Tol8I Liabilities

385,000.00
385,000.00
92,703.13
2,340.36
5,123.28
8,315..40

493.482.15
761,835.80

Equity
BerryHIIIEqulty
Draws

-50.000.00

Total 8erryHIII Equity

eom-S1Dck

-50,000.00

200.00

Retained Earnings
Netlncome

-213.327.98

-109,620.51

Total Equity

-372.748.49

TOTAL UABIUTIES & EQUITY

389,087.31

PageZ
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FROM: 208-939-7136 CLARK __ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

TO: 2876919
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSElL EQUillES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Plaintiff,
vs.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as ·
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

NOTICE OF HEARING RE:
MOSELL EQUillES' MOTION FOR
JNOV, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Defendants.

TO:

ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Wednesday, October 6, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., or as

soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Plaintiff will call up for hearing MOSElL EQUillES'
MOTION FOR JNOV, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL before the
Honorable Dennis Goff, District Judge, at the Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho.

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
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9/21/2010 12:27 PM

FROM: -39-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

T-876919

PAGE: 002 OF 002

j

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITfED this 21st day of September, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of September, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 345-7894

ERIC R. CLARK

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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ORIGINAL

"'Wf

ANO.-

WA.M----,

SEP 2 9 20II
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

ByLAMES
DIPUTV

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)

)

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

Plaintiff,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

)
)
)

Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John Berryhill, by and through their counsel
of record, hereby submit their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the alternative, Motion for New Trial.
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 1
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INTRODUCTION
In its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (NOV) or for new trial, Plaintiff

states the correct standards that this Court must apply in considering the two motions. Contrary
to these standards, however, Plaintiff then goes on to draw all inferences in its own favor, rather
than abide by the requirements of those standards. For instance, Plaintiff complains throughout
its argument that certain parts of John Berryhill's testimony was "self-serving" and thus
somehow should not be considered. 1 This Court may not repeat, however, Plaintiff's mistake.
Defendants' evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence were of sufficient
quality and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that
of the mostly unanimous jury. The rules simply do not allow the Court to substitute its own
weighing of the evidence for that of the jury, as Plaintiff requests. Even under the new trial
standard, the jury's verdict may only be disturbed if it is contrary to the "clear weight of the
evidence," which it is not.
ARGUMENT

I.

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict must be
denied.
A.

The applicable standard.

According to the most recent Idaho Supreme Court decision on the issue,

See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial, pp. 4, 10, 13, 14.
Subsequent reference to this filing are cited to "Plaintiff's Memorandum" by page number.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 2
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-

-

A district court will deny aj.n.o.v. motion 'if there is evidence of
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a
similar conclusion to that of the jury.' Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 774, 203
P.3d 702, 704 (2009). Thus, a verdict will be upheld when it is supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc., 131
Idaho 242,247,953 P.2d 992,997 (1998). Substantial evidence is evidence of
'such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could
conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper.' Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho
561,567, 97 P.3d 428,434 (2004) (quoting Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95
Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974)).
In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the district court may not
weigh the evidence, attempt to judge the credibility of the witnesses, or compare
its factual findings with those of the jury. Bates,146 Idaho at 774-75, 203 P.3d at
704-05. Instead, '[a] trial court reviews the facts as if the moving party admitted
any adverse facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.' Id. at 77 5, 203 P.3d at 705.
High Valley Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent, 234 P.3d 747, 751 (2010) (emphasis added). In this

case, for example, the Idaho Supreme Court found, as a matter of law, that a fiduciary duty did
not exist between the parties. Based on that legal conclusion, the jury's factual finding of a
breach of fiduciary duty could not be based on substantial and competent evidence. 234 P.3d at
753. Here, there is no similar legal flaw.
In Coombs v. Curnow, 219 P.3d 453, 460-61 (2009), on the other hand, the Idaho
Supreme Court emphasized the strict standard applicable to such motions:
An order granting aj.n.o.v. is appropriate when 'the facts are undisputed' and
'there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could
have reached'--namely, that the moving party should prevail. O'Neil v.
Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472,480, 733 P.2d 693, 701 (1986). On the other hand, a
verdict will be upheld when it is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Jeremiah, 131 Idaho at 247, 953 P.2d at 997. Substantial evidence is evidence of
'such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could
conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper.' Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho
561,567, 97 P.3d 428,434 (2004). Evidence may be substantial even though it is
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 3
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contradicted. Watson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 658, 827
P.2d 656, 671 (1992).

***
Under Idaho law, in moving for aj.n.o.v., the moving party admits the truth of all
of the non-moving party's evidence. Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,478, 797
P.2d 1322, 1326 (1990).
(emphasis added)
Although Plaintiff makes a passing nod to this authority regarding the applicable
standard, it then ignores it completely.

B.

Plaintiff does not meet the standard for judgment NOV.

Even in its Introduction, Plaintiff begins its campaign of ignoring the applicable standard
for a Judgment Nothwithstanding the Verdict. Plaintiff contends:
The jury also determined that although Berryhill & Company received
$405,000.00 the delivery of which was premised on Berryhill' s promise of the
sale of half of the business, and the promise the money would remain a loan
pending the "buy in," that it was not unjust that Berryhill kept every penny and
Masell Equities received nothing in consideration.
(emphasis added)
(Plaintiff's Memorandum: 2). Here, Plaintiff not only fails to draw inferences in favor of
Defendants, as is required, but draws them in favor of itself. Plaintiff misrepresents the very
language of the document it contended formed the express contract, for Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 did
not state that "the money would remain a loan pending the 'buy in;' rather, it stated that it was a
"loan" that "will be transitioned." There is no language of the money "remaining" a loan
"pending" the buy-in. Plaintiff attempts to rewrite the document to suit its own purposes, which
this Court may not do.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
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Defendants presented substantial evidence that, at the very least, John Berryhill did not
consider the funds to constitute a bona fide loan. The term "loan" came from Plaintiff's
principal, Glenn Mosell, who explained that "we have to call it something" and that it was not
really a loan. Thus, the funds at issue were temporarily placed on the books of Berryhill &
Company, Inc., in a holding pattern, as accountant Amy Dempsey testified, while the parties
attempted to finalize their actual agreement. Even Glenn Mosell referred to it in his Broadway
Park deposition as an "interim substitute." These fundamental facts provide the evidence of
sufficient quantity and probative value that a reasonable jury could decide precisely as this jury
did.

C.

The express contract claim.

Plaintiff then picks and chooses the jury instructions it likes the best and argues that the
jury must have ignored them. Plaintiff jumps to Instruction No. 13, regarding contract
interpretation and argues the jury must have ignored it. Before getting to that step, however, a
contract must have been formed.

1.

The jury could reasonably have found no contract was formed.

Significantly, at trial Plaintiff did not object to Instructions No. 3, 4, 5 or 7, all of which
put the issue of whether or not a contract was formed squarely before the jury. 2 Instruction No. 4
correctly instructed the jury that the fourth element to complete a contract was "mutual
agreement by all parties to all essential terms." It then stated clearly the issue in dispute: "The

This Court found, as Judge Williamson ruled upon summary judgment, that
contract formation was an issue of fact left for the jury.
2
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parties do dispute whether there was mutual agreement between them to all essential terms."
Instruction No. 5 explained the requirement of "meeting of the minds," requiring all parties to a
contract to "have understood and accepted all of the essential terms of the contract."
Whether or not both parties actually understood and accepted that an actual loan was
being created was a crucial dispute at the heart of the trial. The admitted truth of Defendants'
evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, was that John Berryhill did
not understand nor accept that the transaction constituted a loan. The reassurance from Glenn
Mosell that "we have to call it something" and his suggestion that it was not really a loan, make
it entirely reasonable that the jury found that the parties had not achieved a meeting of the minds
so as to create a contract.
At Section Hof its briefing, Plaintiff discusses "meeting of the minds" as an affirmative
defense (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 14-15). Here, Plaintiff misunderstands how the doctrine of
"meeting of the minds" applies to its own claims. As Instructions No. 4 and 5 suggest, it is
Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate meeting of the minds as to all essential terms of the contract.

See also, Watson v. Gold N Diamonds, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95644 (D.D.C. Sept. 14,
2010) ('The party asserting the existence of a contract has the burden of proving its existence and
that there was a meeting of the minds as to all material respects") (citations omitted). Thus, it
was Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate meeting of the minds upon all essential terms, including
whether or not a loan was intended by both parties.3 It is not, strictly speaking, an affirmative

In its discussion of meeting of the minds, without citation or analysis Plaintiff
makes the bald claim that the contract was executory and rescission was the proper remedy
(Plaintiff's Memorandum: 14), despite having never pled or prayed for rescission. Executory
3
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defense.
Moreover, pursuant to Instruction No. 7, the jury reasonably could have concluded that
negotiations and agreement as to all essential terms had not occurred until the parties reduced
their complete agreement to writing, which never happened.
In its discussion of proving an express contract at Section Il(C). Plaintiff once again slips
and slides as to what the purportedly express contract actually was. Plaintiff points to Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1 and the series of checks provided by Plaintiff, which, it now claims, were "delivered at
Berryhill's request and based on Berryhill's promise he was selling one-half of his business to
Mosell Equities" (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 4) (emphasis added). Now, suddenly, the express
contract was to sell one-half of the business, rather than to enter into a loan transaction. The
difficulty Plaintiff has in deciding whether the contract represented fish or fowl itself
demonstrates the lack of meeting of the minds as to this essential element.

2.

The alleged contract was ambiguous and the jury could reasonably
have found no loan transaction was intended.

At Section Il(D), Plaintiff continues to view the evidence as to the intent of the parties,
citing its favorite witnesses and drawing every inference in its own favor. First, Plaintiff
erroneously supposes that by giving Instruction No. 11, the Court had negated the earlier contract
formation instructions and was thereby instructing the jury that "the contract existed" (Plaintiff's

contracts exist when neither side has substantially performed and the obligations of both parties
are so far unperformed that the failure to complete performance excuses the other side from
performing. See, e.g., In re Wegner, 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff's own
allegations indicate that it claimed it had completely performed, not just substantially performed.
Thus, there is not the factual predicate for Plaintiff's new claim of an executory contract.
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
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Memorandum: 6). This is wholly unsupported. Second, Plaintiff maintains its fixation on its
own cross-examination of John Berryhill, during which he was finally badgered into choosing
between "loan" and "equity." What Plaintiff's fixation on its own questioning ignores is that
Mr. Berryhill also testified that he did not have a good understanding of what was even meant by
equity in this context.
More significant is that Plaintiff continues to insist on a false choice, as if loan or equity
are the only two categories into which the funds could be placed. As Amy Dempsey testified, the
funds were placed into a holding account while the parties sorted out their agreement. She did not
consider the funds to be either a loan or equity, because the parties, including Mr. Mosell, never
clarified the nature of the funds to her.
Plaintiff then argues that if the word "loan" meant "equity," then Plaintiff's Exhibit 1
would create an absurdity, since if the funds were already equity, there was no need for them to
be "transitioned" (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 9). There are two problems with this argument:
first, as demonstrated above, it is not just a choice between loan and equity, as Plaintiff insists;
and second, the "transition" could easily refer to the parties' eventual, anticipated partnership
agreement, regardless of how the funds were characterized.
Plaintiff complains that the word "loan" must be given its ordinary meaning, as also
pointed out in Instructions No. 11 and 13. Yet, the second part of Instruction No. 11 clarifies that
language must be given its ordinary meaning, "unless you find from the evidence that a special
meaning was intended." The very words "loan" that "will be transitioned" by themselves suggest
a special meaning was intended and that a simple lender-debtor relationship was not being
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
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created. There is ample basis for the jury to have concluded that, construed as a whole,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and the series of checks, did not create a loan transaction, based on the
language of the alleged agreement and the conduct of the parties. Obviously, Plaintiff continues
to wish the focus to remain on the word "loan" in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The point is that the
alleged contract must be construed as a whole, as set forth in Instruction No. 11. The jury had
every reason to conclude reasonably that a loan transaction was not intended and thus there was
no breach of a loan transaction.

3.

There was no breach of the alleged contract.

Again, resolving inferences in its own favor, Plaintiff argues that it made demand on
Berryhill to either consummate the "buy in" or pay back the loan. This claim was disputed in
significant part, because at no time did Glenn Mosell sign any "buy in" documents, present them
to John Berryhill for signing, or suggest that the attorneys finalize the documents. In fact, rather
than making demand on Berryhill & Company, Inc., to consummate the "buy in," Mosell testified
that he approached John Berryhill in the summer of 2008 and suggested an entirely new deal,
where John could go find another investor to provide $200,000 and Plaintiff would retain 25% of
Berryhill & Company, Inc.
As Defendants pointed out, in this litigation Plaintiff chose its theories and elected its
remedy - that the funds remained a loan. As shown above, the jury reasonably could have
concluded, even if a contract existed, it was not a loan contract. Thus, Berryhill & Company,
Inc., did not breach the contract by failing to repay it as a loan.
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D.

No implied-in-fact contract existed that was breached.

For very similar reasons, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the parties'
conduct and the attending circumstances did not demonstrate "the terms and existence of the
contract," as required in Instruction No. 18. As Instruction No. 18 also indicates, to find an
implied-in-fact contract, "the facts must be such that the intent of the parties to make a contract
can be inferred from their conduct." Plaintiff had the burden of proof of showing all of the
elements. As with the express contract, the jury had ample basis to conclude that Plaintiff did
not sustain its burden in showing that the conduct at issue demonstrated "the terms and
existence" of a loan. If the jury found an implied-in-fact contract, but decided it was not a loan
transaction, then Berryhill & Company did not breach the implied-in-fact contract by failing to
repay the funds upon demand like a loan.
Plaintiff continues to argue that the mere fact that the word "loan" appears on Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1 and most of the checks should, without much more, carry the day (Plaintiff's
Memorandum: 12). The jury obviously heard that argument, but did not believe the issue was
that simple. As indicated above, the conduct of the parties, including Mosell's own
equivocations to Amy Dempsey as to the true nature of the funds, belied the claim that the parties
intended a simple loan transaction.
E.

There was adequate evidence to support the defense of equitable
estoppel.

The Special Verdict used by the jury did not specifically address the defense of equitable
estoppel as a separate finding, but there was ample factual basis for the jury to conclude that the
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elements were met. Instruction No. 20 set forth the elements at subsections 1-4. Plaintiff argues
that John Berryhill's testimony was insufficient to provide a reasonable basis for meeting the
elements, because it was "self-serving" (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 13). Obviously, Plaintiff
again misconstrues the standard for Judgment NOV. Drawing reasonable inferences in
Defendants' favor, the jury could have concluded that Berryhill & Company, Inc., relied on
Glenn Mosell's suggestion that the only reason for the use of the word "loan," was "we have to
call it something," not to worry about it, that it was not really a loan. Instruction No. 20 requires
only that the defendant relied on the misrepresentation or concealment "to the defendant's
prejudice."
By the time that Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was formed, the principals of the parties had been
working together for almost two years. They had already been involved in the Broadway Park
litigation. During the dispute over the Broadway Park strip mall, John Berryhill relied on Glenn
Mosell to tell him what to write in communications with the opposing party. They had already
agreed to move the Berryhill & Company restaurant downtown and work had commenced on the
space. By this time, the jury could well have concluded that Berryhill & Company relied on
Glenn Mosell's statement to its prejudice4 suggesting that the word "loan" really did not indicate
a loan, they just had to call it something.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude reasonably that the
defense of equitable estoppel applied.

Instruction No. 20 does not require "reasonable reliance," as do the affirmative
fraud instructions. Plaintiff's discussion of reasonable or detrimental reliance in this context is
beside the point (Plaintiff's Memorandum: 13-14).
4

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 11

001374

F.

Plaintiff did not sustain its burden regarding unjust enrichment.

Again, Plaintiff draws every inference its own favor. Plaintiff claims that Glenn Mosell
"delivered the money based on Berryhill's offer to sell and promise the funds delivered remained
a loan until the 'buy in' was complete. Mosell' s testimony was undisputed" (Plaintiff's
Memorandum: 15). Yet that testimony was hotly disputed. Neither Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 nor the
testimony of anyone other than Mosell suggested that the promise was that the funds "remained a
loan until the 'buy in' was complete. Rather, the handwritten note on Exhibit 1 said the funds
"will be transitioned," not that they might or could and that the funds would "remain" a loan
regardless.
Plaintiff's repetition of its arguments at trial and the jury's unanimous refusal to accept
them on the unjust enrichment claim does not render the jury's findings a "travesty" (Plaintiff's
Memorandum: 19). John Berryhill testified credibly that, instead of $385,000 going to categories
included in his breakdown of that total, almost $300,000 ended up building the restaurant and
expansion space that Glenn Mosell desired. Berryhill & Company has been forced to incur
further debt and make larger rent payments. At the end of the lease term, Berryhill & Company
will be able to remove practically nothing, according to witness Jim Tomlinson. Additionally,
Plaintiff did not just get a "sexy" restaurant to show potential investors in Polo Cove, Plaintiff
obtained the Berryhill brand and used it in one form or another in all of the promotional materials
offered into evidence.
Plaintiff now complains that Defendants did not provide proof of the value of these items
as a "setoff." Yet again, Plaintiff misapplies the relevant burden of proof. It always was
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Plaintiff's own burden, as made explicit by Instruction No. 19, to prove that "[u]nder the
circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without compensating
the plaintiff for its value" (emphasis added) and "the amount that would be unjust for the
defendant to retain" (emphasis added). In Instruction No. 31, the jury was correctly instructed
that the "measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual amount of the
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it would be unjust for
one party to retain (emphasis added). Instruction No. 31 makes clear that the Plaintiff has the
burden of proving the amount of the benefit unjustly retained. Plaintiff never provided the jury
with any proof of any value or amount other than the full $405,000 it was claiming as a loan, as
was its choice. Having made that choice, Plaintiff cannot be heard to switch the burden and
claim that Defendants were required to make Plaintiff's proof for it.
Accordingly, there was an adequate basis for the jury's conclusion as to Plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim.

G.

Plaintiff's conversion claim.

Plaintiff argues that Glenn Mosell's testimony as to certain personal property had to be
accepted without further proof. Obviously, the jury did not believe that Plaintiff sustained its
burden as to the entire amount claimed. According to Instruction No. 32, Plaintiff had the burden
of proving "the fair market value of the property kept," not just what Plaintiff claims to have paid
for it. Given the fact that the jury awarded 50% of the amount for which Plaintiff provided some
written proof indicates that they sought more than Plaintiff's own testimony. Such a conclusion
is eminently reasonable. If anything, Plaintiff had a complete failure of proof as to actual market
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value of the items asserted, but the jury nonetheless did Plaintiff a favor and estimated the value,
applying a 50% depreciation factor.

H.

Plaintiff does not contest the jury's conclusion on its fraud in the
inducement claim.

Plaintiff apparently does not seek Judgment NOV on its fraud claim, having failed to
address it in its motion or briefing.

II.

Plaintiff does not make the required showing for a new trial.

Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6). According to
recent authority,
Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), a district court may grant a new trial based on the ground
of 'insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision.' I.R.C.P.
59( a)( 6). 'A trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground if, after making his
or her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the
evidence, the judge determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear
weight of the evidence.
(emphasis added)
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,430 (Idaho 2008) (citations omitted). In Johannsen, the
Idaho Supreme Court cited to the district court's findings, which they explicitly quoted with
approval:
Here the district court judge stated, 'I exercise my discretion and can only grant
this motion if I'm convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of
the evidence ... ' He continued, ' .. .it was a good trial, a good issue, and the jury
decided it one way. They could have gone the other way, but they went the way
they did and found no breach of contract.' Here, the district court recognized
Appellant's motion for a new trial as an issue of discretion, it acted within the
bounds of the law, properly applied the applicable legal standard and reached its
decision through an exercise of reason by explaining that the issue was one for the
jury and that it made a reasonable determination based on the evidence before it.
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We hold that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant's motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence.
146 Idaho at 430. Finally, the Supreme Court also emphasized that "any motion for a new trial
based on insufficiency of the evidence must 'set forth the factual grounds therefor with
particularity.' I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7)." 146 Idaho at 430.
As the Johannsen makes clear, the Court's role is not to second-guess or substitute its
opinion for that of the jury, it is limited to those instances where the jury's conclusions are not in
accord with the "clear weight of the evidence." Rather than repeat or rehash their earlier
discussion, as Plaintiff largely does, Defendants simply state that, just as Plaintiff has not shown
that it is entitled to Judgment NOV, because the evidence was of sufficient quality and probative
value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusions as the jury, Plaintiff has not shown
that jury's verdict in this case is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence.
Thus, Plaintiff's motion for new trial should be denied.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John Berryhill,
respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment NOV, or in the
alternative, for New Trial.

~

DATED this 'Bday of September, 2010.
HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LL

~k\
Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH n.JDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
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Defendants-Counter Claimants.

Judge Goff

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Mosell Equities and provides the Court with its reply
memorandum in support of motion for JNOV and new trial.
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REPLY ARGUMENT

I. BERRYHILL MISREPRESENTS THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS.
Berryhill concedes Mosell Equities' argument that the Court is constrained to evaluate
whether there was substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict in light of and in
adherence to the criteria established in the jury instructions. Berryhill therefore agrees that
evidence could never be substantial or competent if it was considered in violation of the
instructions.
Then, in closing, Berryhill appears to argue that the standards for deciding whether to
grant a JNOV motion or Motion for New Trial are similar and therefore the arguments he raises
in support of his opposition to the JNOV motion also carry the day in defense of the new trial
motion. However, that simply is not the case. While a JNOV standard is substantial as the
moving party asks the judge to reverse the verdict and enter judgment for the aggrieved party,
essentially disregarding the jury verdict altogether, the standard is clearly lower for granting a
new trial, in which the judge rules the verdict was not in accord with the "clear weight of the
evidence," and sets aside the verdict. While successfully avoiding the verdict in the present case,
the proponent of the motion for new trial gets a new trial, not a verdict in its favor. Clearly the
divergent standards recognize this difference.
In considering the Motion for New Trial, the Court acts as the 13th juror and is entitled to
weigh evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses - an issue that warrants substantial
consideration in this case post trial.
II. BERRYHILL'S TESTIMONY WAS INCREDIBLE.

At trial, Berryhill testified he did not intend the term "loan" really to mean "loan,"
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although he wrote "loan" on Exhibit 1, although he accepted 9 checks on which Glenn
Mosell had clearly indicated "loan" on the memo line, (Exhibits 2-10), checks which Berryhill
acknowledged he freely accepted, and although loan was the term which his attorney Victoria
Meier identified in ownership documents that Berryhill directed her to draft.
During the trial, after repeated questions and evasive answers about what Berryhill
believed the term "loan" really meant in the context of the agreement, Berryhill testified he
believed "loan" meant "equity." However, in his response brief, Berryhill contends he was
"badgered" into "choosing" "equity," when that is not what he really meant. So once again, we
are back to square one - Berryhill contends there was no meeting of the minds - loan does not
mean loan, but he cannot tell us just what he intended. "I know I wrote 'loan,' but I really did
not mean 'loan,' but I don't really know what I meant."
Moreover, although Berryhill contends Mosell told him to write "loan" on Exhibit 1,
because "we have to call it something," testimony that Mosell emphatically denied, Berryhill
cannot tell us, if he believed the $400,000.00 he received was not a loan, just what he believed
"it" actually was.
Addressing the credibility issue in support of the new trial motion, the Court must
consider whether Berryhill legitimately believed something else (which he has been unable to
identify) or whether his feigned ignorance is merely a fa9ade to support his contention there was
no "meeting of the minds." One would think that to establish this defense, the proponent would
have to prove a reasonable alternative to contradict the language used in the contract? In other
words, the proponent would have to establish that while the contract says "x" I really meant "y",
and that he had some reasonable basis to claim he believed the contract really meant "y."
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However, all we have is Berryhill claiming he wrote "loan" but then cannot articulate just
what he intended the contract to mean. How does such a contention establish substantial or
competent evidence to support this defense? Essentially, Berryhill's contention is that he
understood Mosell Equities was giving him checks, over $400,000.00, but cannot articulate just
what he believed the check were for? As Berryhill 's testimony is nothing short of incredible, the
Court should disregard this testimony when considering Mosell Equities' entitlement to a new
trial.

III. THERE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
A VERDICT THAT NO EXPRESS CONTRACT WAS FORMED.
Berryhill seems to argue that whenever parties claim to disagree as to terms of a contract,
then there is "no meeting of the minds." However, that contention is not substantiated by case
law. First, the analysis is broad - did the parties intend to contract? In other words, regardless of
any specific terms, was there an offer and acceptance? In Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith,
212 P.3d 992, 147 Idaho 562 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the two criteria: offer
and acceptance, which must be shown to establish a "meeting of the minds"to intend to contract.
There must be a meeting of the minds between parties for a contract to be formed.
Barry v. Pacific West Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831, 103 P.3d 440,444
(2004). "A meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation of intent to
contract which takes the fonn of an offer and acceptance." Id. (Emphasis
added)
Instruction No. 8 is consistent with this ruling.
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
An express contract may consist of an offer by one party that is accepted
by another party.
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the party
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making the offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed.
An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the party to whom the offer
was directed that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the offer.
To complete the express contract, the acceptance must be absolute and
unqualified. If the response to the offer changes the terms of the offer in any
manner, it is a counter offer but not an acceptance.
The acceptance is not complete until it has been communicated to the
party making the offer.
The Panike & Sons Farms case, as here, the contracts were written and relatively simple.
However, like Berryhill, the Defendant in Panike & Sons Farms case claimed there was no
"meeting of the minds" because the Defendant claimed he did not understand the terms of the
contract to mean what was written in the contract. The Supreme Court disagreed and found the
parties conduct in drafting their contract evidenced an intent to contract. The Supreme Court
ruled a subsequent disagreement as to the terms of a written contract do not invalidate the
contract because the intent to contract was manifested by the parties drafting and signing a
document they intended as a contract. Such analysis is equally applicable to the situation here.
Clearly, on the 9 checks marked loan, Mosell was making an offer, and that offer was
acknowledged and accepted by Berryhill when he accepted the checks as written. Mosell
Equities therefore met its burden to establish an offer and acceptance.
In Berryhill's response, he contends Mosell Equities had the burden of establishing "a
meeting of the minds on all essential terms." However, Mosell Equities met that burden when it
proved an offer and acceptance - 10 of them, with a separate contract, Exhibit 1, confirming the
parties' intent regarding the 10 checks.
Berryhill claims, despite writing "loan" in Exhibit 1, and then accepting nine checks
conspicuously marked "loan," he did not understand the parties agreed to a loan. However,
notwithstanding this testimony, there was no doubt the parties intended to contract. In fact,
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Berryhill testified in the Broadway Park case that he understood and believed Mosell Equities
already owned 50% of Berryhill & Company - pursuant to a contract to purchase that interest.
Despite the verdict, there simply is not substantial or competent evidence to establish no contract
was formed.

IV. BERRYHILL FAILED TO ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE OF AN AMBIGUITY.
The real issue here is the intent of the parties regarding the terms of the contract that
neither party denies existed. Consequently, as argued previously, the Court when considering
whether substantial and competent evidence exists to support the verdict, Jury Instruction Nos.
11 and 13 apply.
At trial, Mosell testified "loan" meant loan and that is what he wrote on 9 checks. He
also testified he confirmed with Berryhill's bookkeeper that Berryhill was accounting for those
funds as loans. Mosell also testified the funds were loans because the anticipated "buy in" had
not occurred.
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question oflaw, and this Court can rule as a matter
of law the contracts were not ambiguous if Berryhill has failed to establish a reasonable basis for
an ambiguity. In other words, Berryhill has to present compelling testimony to support his
contention the simple and unambiguous term "loan" really means something else. When
considering such testimony, however, as Mosell Equities argued in its initial brief, the Court
must disregard any testimony offered to support an interpretation of the contract that would
violate the criteria stated in Jury Instruction 11 and 13.
Although Mosell Equities argued previously the Court should disregard Berryhill's
testimony that "loan" really meant "equity," as this contention "is inconsistent with the plain,
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ordinary meaning of the written agreement," (Instruction No. 13) and such an interpretation
would create "contradictions and absurdities" (Instruction No. 11), these argument are equally
applicable to Berryhill 's contention now that he really did not mean equity but does not really
know what he meant. Berryhill appears to claim "loan" is ambiguous, but then cannot tell us
why. In other words, Berryhill claims "loan" really means something else, but he just cannot put
his finger on what it really means.
The reality, Berryhill has presented no admissible testimony or proof that "loan" meant
anything other than "loan." Without such testimony, the contract is unambiguous and the Court
can interpret the unambiguous contract as a matter of law.
In High Valley Concrete v. Sargent, Idaho Supreme Court Doc. No 35313 (July 8, 2010),
the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion for JNOV and ruled a court can
disregard the "substantial and competent evidence" standard when addressing a question oflaw.
We begin with an analysis of the basic question of whether substantial and
competent evidence existed to support the determination that the jury based its
verdict upon. Because we find, as a matter of law, that Beck did not owe Sargent
a fiduciary duty and thus the district court erred in upholding the jury's verdict,
the Court need not address the other issues raised by Appellants regarding Beck's
motion for j.n.o.v.
As is the case here, since Berryhill has failed to establish an ambiguity in the contract

through admissible testimony, the Court, not the jury, interprets the contract. This Court
therefore can rule as a matter oflaw, regardless of the verdict, the contract was for a loan and
Grant Mosell Equities' motion for JNOV.
V. THERE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL OR COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
FINDING THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT.

The same argument applies to the breach of contract issue. First, "A breach of contract
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occurs when there is a failure to perform a contractual duty." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates,
LLC, 140 Idaho 354,361, 93 P.3d 685, 692 (2004), quoting Daniels v. Anderson, 113 Idaho 838,
840, 748 P.2d 829,831 (Ct.App.1987). Here the facts establish both and express and implied-infact contract. There is no dispute that despite the clear and unambiguous language in the express
contract or Berryhill 's conduct confirming his understanding the funds were a loan, Berryhill
steadfastly denied the funds were a loan and refused to tender the funds or to make payment
arrangements when requested.
As when considering an unambiguous contract, the Court is free to review the facts and

rule as a matter of law whether a breach occurred, regardless of the verdict.
In determining the intent of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a
whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534,
538 (2000). If a contract is found ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of
fact. Id. (citing Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814,
823, 41 P.3d 242, 251 (2002)). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of
law. Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 13, 43 P.3d 768, 772 (2002)
(citing Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389, 391-92, 957 P.2d 1387, 1389-90
(1998)). Whether the facts establish a violation of the contract is a question of
law reviewed de novo. Barnett, 133 Idaho at 234,985 P.2d at 114 (citing United
States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir.1991)).
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,361, 93 P.3d 685, 692 (2004) (Emphasis
added).
As there was a contract, that contract was for a loan, and Berryhill denies a loan existed
and has refused to remit payment, the Court must conclude there was a breach of either an
express or implied-in-fact contract.
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VI. THERE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
BERRYHILL'S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE.
Berryhill contends the jury could have concluded that Mosell's alleged statement, "'we
have to call it something" somehow misled Berryhill into believing "loan" really did not mean
loan, but some other and still undefined term.
There is no substantial and competent evidence however to establish, assuming Mosell
did make this statement, the statement was false or misleading. The reality, under the
circumstances of the parties' relationship the funds had to be either loans or payment for equity
in the company. Despite Berryhill's contention there were other possibilities, which he is still
unable to identify, that is the only rational and logical conclusion. "We have to call it something"
suggests the reality that as the parties had not finalized the "buy in" agreement, they could not
call the funds "equity." Consequently, as the parties could not call the funds "equity," "we have
to call it something" merely referred to identifying the funds as "loans," which Berryhill
acknowledged by drafting Exhibit 1. There simply is proof that the statement "we have to call it
something" is a misrepresentation or is a false statement. As the statement cannot be construed
as false, there certainly is no substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict, assuming
the jurors even considered this issue 1.

VII. THE COURT CAN APPLY RESCISSION AND ORDER BERRYHILL TO RETURN
MOSELL EQUITIES' $405,000.00.
Mosell Equities steadfa;tly asserted it had loaned fund<s to Berryhill and therefore it was
entitled to recover those funds, plus accumulated interest. Despite the verdict however, Mosell
Equities is not without entitlement to the equitable remedy of rescission. Recently in O'Connor
Mosell Equities argued previously that in order for this defense to apply, the Jurors would have had to have found
an express contract but then awarded no or less damages than Mosell Equities requested. As the verdict indicates
the Jury found no express contract, it appears they did not consider this defense.
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
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v. Harger Const., Inc., 188 P.3d 846, 145 Idaho 904 (2008), the Supreme Court ruled that a court
has equitable power to grant rescission even where that party had not pled a claim of rescission,
as long as the defendant had raised a defense from which rescission would apply, and the parties
presented evidence to support or refute that defense to avoid the parties' contract. While the
defense in O'Conner was mutual mistake, rescission is equally available when a party seeks to
avoid a contact using the "no meeting of the minds" defense. Simpson v. Johnson, 100 Idaho
357, 597 P.2d 600 (1979).

As Berryhill sought to avoid the contract by alleging there was no meeting of the minds,
and now contends there was substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict,
this Court must also return the parties to their pre-contracting positions. Mosell Equities is
therefore entitled to an order directing Berryhill & Company to immediately return all of Mos ell
Equities' $405,000.00, if the Court denies either Mosell Equities' motion for JNOV or for new
trial.

CONCLUSION
Once again, Mosell Equities very respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for
JNOV as there is not substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict on any
claim or defense.
In the alternative, Mosell Equities again very respectfully requests the Court grant its
Motion for New Trial as the jury's verdict was not in accord with the clear weight of the
evidence presented at trial.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of October, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of October, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via the manner indicated to:

The Honorable Dennis Goff

To chambers via e-mail and US Mail

Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

Via facsimile transmission and e-mail

ERIC R. CLARK

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 11
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI~MO>,...l.,..O""F----::F=::--:1Lee,:-t-.-:-:/;i_~,:-::.f'.3-;;;.-A.M _ _ _ __.,

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CVOC0909974
vs.

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL ill and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That the Honorable Dennis Goff, District Judge, has reset this
matter for hearing for Motion for JNOV and in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial on the 7 th
day of October, 2010 at 3:00 p.m., at the Ada County Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise,
Id.
J. David Navarro

Clerk of t h ~
Ada County, I

By: _ _ _ _ _~ - - - ~ Deputy

V

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
~

I hereby certify that on this___!_ day of October, 2010, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:
Eric R. Clark
VIA: Facsimile
(208) 939-7136

Daniel E. Williams
VIA: Facsimile
(208) 345-7894

CC: Counsel/ nt
Notice of Hearing
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NO.

tl ' 31-

AM,

Fill:D
P.M _ _ __

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
ON COUNT 1 OF ITS COMPLAINT

Judge Goff
Defendants.

******
THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict, and in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial. The parties appeared
through their respective counsel of record on Wednesday, October 6, 2010, according to notice,

\
and each party had provided briefs in support of and in opposition to theft respective positions,
which the Court reviewed and considered.

~

~

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - I

DICTON

OR001392INAL
\

During the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from each counsel, and thereafter
stated the Court's decision and bases for that decision on the record. The Court now
incorporates its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October
6, 2010 as if set forth herein.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count I is hereby GRANTED.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the remaining counts, and Plaintiff's Motion For New
Trial are hereby DENIED.
ENTERED THIS

1,1,¢

day of October 20 I 0.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
COUNT l OF ITS COMPLAINT - 2
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.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~f

'I--

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of October, 2010, I served the
foregoing, by having a true and complete copy delivered via US Mail, postage prepaid, and
addressed to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - 3
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•
FILED
Friday. October 29. 2010 at 03:21 PM

J. DA'(IQNAVARRO. CLERK OF THE COURT

Il'J THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CASE NO. CV-OC-2009-09974

MOSELL EQUITIES LLC
Plaintiff,

vs.

NOTICE OF HEARING

BERRYHILL & COMPANY INC
JOHN E BERRYHILL Ill
AMY BERRYHILL
Defendant.

The Court has set this matter for:

STATUS CONFERENCE ...... WEDNESDAY. NOVEMBER 10. 2010@
2:45 PM.

Dated Friday, October 29, 2010

DARLA WILLIAMSON
District Judge

I\Jotice of Hearing

Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on Friday, October 29, 2010, I mailed (served)
a true and correct copy of the within instrument to:

ERIC R CLARK
ATTORl'JEY AT LAW
PO BOX 2504
EAGLE ID 83616

DANIEL E WILLIAMS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 1776
BOISE ID 83701

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

ourt
~~
Deputy

Notice of Hearing

Page 2

Clerk
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NOY. 4. 2010

NO. 9499

3:48PM

P. 2

•

NQ..., . - - •

DANIEL E. Wll,LIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise,ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

A.M

. , ..... ..

;11,fD

,:eM . .

~
s::?

NOV uJt 2010
J. DAVID NAVAA,:tO, Clerk
By J. FIANCALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)

) Case No. CV OC 0909974
)

Plaintiff,
VS,

BERRYIDLL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)

MOTION BY DEFENDANT
BERRYHILL& COMPANY, INC.,
TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Defendant Betryhill & Company, Inc., by and through its counsel of record, pursuant to

Rule 60, I.R.C.P., hereby moves the Court to Amend/Correct its Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 of its Complaint filed October 26,

2010. Defendant's proposed Amended Order 1s attached as Exhibit A hereto.
MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHILL & COMPANY, lNC.,
TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER, P. l

001397

•

'

NOV. 4. 2010 3:49PM

NO. 9499

P. 3

u'b-

DATED this _f_ day of November, 2010.

HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, ll..P

J~

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

u~
I hereby certify that on this _j_ day of November, 2010, a tiue and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel a.s indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys

_

Via Hand Delivery

/'Via Facsimile: 939-7136
Via U.S. Mail

P. 0. Box 2504

Eagle, ID 83616

.,
Daniel E. Williams

MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHIIL & COMPANY, INC.,
TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER, P. 2
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NO. 9499

NOV. 4. 2010 3:49PM

P. 4

•

DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300

P, 0, Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@tbomaswilliamslaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUlTIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,

)
)

)

Plaintiff,
VS,

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYIIlLL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defend ants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0909974
(PROPOSED)

AMENDED ORDER GRANTTh"G
IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT, AND IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR
NEWTRIAL

THIS MA1TER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs Molionfor Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict, and in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial. The parties appeared

through their respective counsel of record on Thursday, October 7, 2010, pursuant to notice. and
(PROPOSED) AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND1NG THE VERDICT, AND IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEWTRIAL, P. 1

EXHIBIT-4.001399

NOV. 4. 2010 3:49PM

-

•

NO. 9499

P. 5

each party had provided briefs in support of and in opposition to their respective positions, which
the Court reviewed and considered.
During the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from each counsel, and thereafter
stated the Court's decision and bases for that decision on the record. The Court now incorporates
its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October 7, 2010 as if
fully set forth herein.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiffs Motion For Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count I as to contract fonnation is hereby GRANTED.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion for New
Trial on the remaining elements of Count 1 is hereby GRANTED.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS FURTIIER ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict on the remaining counts, and Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial on
the remaining counts are hereby DENIED.
DATED this __ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _., 2010.

District Judge

(PROPOSED) AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTlFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. AND IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 2

001400

NOV. 4. 2010 3:49PM

-

NO. 9499

P. 6

DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP

121 N. 9th St., Suite 300

J. DAVIO NAVAAPIO, Clerk

P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

By J. RANDALL
DEPU"rf

Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants

IN tHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited,
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

)
)

)
)
)

vs.

Case No. CV OC 0909974

)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION BY DEFENDANT
BERRYIIlLL & COMPANY, INC.,
TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER

)

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYIDLL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

Defendants.

)
)

)
)
)

)

On October 26, 2010, the trial court issued an Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 of its Complaint filed October 26, 2010 ("the
subject Order") in a fonn provided by Plaintiff's counsel. The subject Order was Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM 1N SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHil.L &
COMPANY, INC., TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER, P. 1

001401

NOV. 4. 2010 3: 50PM

NO. 9499

P. 7

second proposed form of Order. An earlier version had simply prnvided for a new trial on Count
One, the breach of express contract claim against Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 60(a) and 60(b)(6), I.R.C.P., Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.,
moves the Court to amend/correct the subject Order in the following areas:

I.

Plaintiff's proposed form of Order misidentified the date of the relevant hearing

on Plaintiff's Motion. The subject Order refers to and incorporates the trial court's comments,
rationale, and ultimate decision communicated on October 6, 2010. The relevant hearing took
place on October 7, 2010, at 3:00 p.m., because of a conflict with another trial being heard by the
trial court.
2.

Plaintiff's proposed form of Order inaccurately suggests that Judgment NOV is

granted as to all of Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint. This directly contradicts the clear
instmctions of the trial court on October 7, 2010. Toe trial court indicated that it was granting
Judgment NOV only as to the issue of contract formation. All other issues as to Count One were
to be the subject of a new trial. Immediately after the October 7, 2010, hearing, Defendant
requested that a transcript of the hearing be prepared, but Defendant has not yet received lhe
transcript. Defendant anticipates, however, that Plaintiff will agree that the Court's directions in
this regard were clear.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., respectfully requests
that the Comt grant its Motion to Amend/Correct the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstancling the Verdict and enter an Amended Order in the form attached to
Defendant's current motion.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHILL &
COMP ANY, INC., TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER. P. 2

001402
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NOV. 4. 2010 3:50PM
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(,:!:---

DATED this ..I._ day of November, 2010.

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce1tify that on t h i s ~November, 2010, a nue and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was served on opposing counsel as indicated below:

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attomeys
P. O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

__ Via Hand Delivery
--Via Facsimile: 939-7136
_
Via U.S. Mail

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANT BERRYHILL &
COMPANY, JNC., TO AMEND/CORRECT ORDER, P. 3
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NOV O5 2010
J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
.

By A. GARDEN
OEPUTY

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0909974
OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
AMEND/CORRECT ORDER

Judges Williamson & Goff

Defendants-Counter Claimants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff Mosell Equities and provides the Court with its Objection
and Opposition to the Defendant's motion to amend/correct order.

OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT
ORDER- I

001404

=

ARGUMENT
Mosell Equities has filed an affidavit in support of this objection and in opposition to the
Defendant's motion, which includes an e-mail string between counsel and between counsel and
Judge Goff. Mosell Equities also provided a copy of the order as proposed, and a copy of the
order that Judge Goff ultimately signed.
In Exhibit 1, the e-mail string, Defendant's counsel writes to Judge Goff on October 14,
2010 and states his objection to the order as drafted according to the Judge's recollection. The
Defendant's motion now contains the same objection.
Notwithstanding the Defendant's objection, however, Judge Goff reviewed, considered
and signed the Order attached as Exhibit 3, which is the same order, Exhibit 2, to which
Defendant's counsel voiced his objections to Judge Goff.
The Defendant claim~ that it is entitled to a new trial on the remaining elements of the
contracts claim, which apparently means whether the contract was ambiguous, the terms if it
was, and whether or not there was a breach. At the JNOV hearing, Mosell Equities argued that
for Berryhill to establish that "loan" really did not mean loan, then he had to provide a
reasonable alternative definition to establish the contract was ambiguous. The record clearly
established that Berryhill contended that loan did not mean loan, but could not articulate just
what he thought it meant. He once testified that it really meant "equity," but he then recanted
that statement, but never offered any other explanation. "For a contract term to be ambiguous,
there must be at least two different reasonable interpretations of the term." Armstrong v. Farmers
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 (2006). However, despite 4 and a half days of

OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT
ORDER-2

001405

trial, Berryhill never provided a reasonable interpretation of the term "loan." In fact, Berryhill's
conduct related to the money established that he understood and treated the money as a loan.
As Berryhill failed to establish the unambiguous term loan meant anything other than the
ordinary and reasonable meaning, the contract was not ambiguous. In other words, Judge Goff
could easily have concluded that the contract was unambiguous and therefore ruled as a matter of
law it was a loan.
Additionally, having found the contract was unambiguous, Judge Goff could then have
very reasonably concluded there was no evidence of "sufficient quantity and probative value that
reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury," regarding the
breach issue. The unambiguous contract was for a loan; Berryhill received the money and
accounted for it as a loan, then he acknowledged through his Attorney (Victoria Meier's
documents - Exhibit 35.) that the money was a loan, and then untimely denied the money was
ever a loan and refused to pay the money back. Consequently, having found a contract existed,
having found the contract was unambiguous, Judge Goff could easily and appropriately have
found there was no credible evidence presented that Berryhill's conduct constituted anything but
a breach of the loan.

CONCLUSION
Comparing Defendant's objections in Exhibit 1 with the Defendant's objections in this
motion, the Defendant clearly is seeking relief that Judge Goff has considered and rejected. The
Defendant claims Judge Goffs order is incorrect, when in fact, Judge Goff clearly stated
otherwise. Considering the Defendants made the very same arguments and Judge Goff refused
to correct/alter the Order after reviewing and considering the Defendant's e-mail, there does not
OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT
ORDER-3

001406

appear to be any legal or factual basis on which this Court could possibly grant the Defendant's
Motion. Mosell Equities respectfully requests the the Court sustain this objection and refuse to
grant the Defendant's Motion. 1
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of November, 2010.
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day ofNovember, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via the manner indicated to:

Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

Via facsimile transmission and e-mail

ERIC R. CLARK

1

The Plaintiff has no objection to the motion as it pertains to correcting the date of the hearing.

OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT
ORDER-4
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NOV O5 2010

\

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

By A. GARDEN
DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC R. CLARK
FILED IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
CORRECT/AMEND ORDER

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

Eric R. Clark, being first duly sworn, and upon personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances recited herein, deposes and states:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years, and I have personal knowledge of the facts as stated

in this affidavit.

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC R. CLARK - I

001408

2.

Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of an e-mail "string" containing

numerous e-mails relating to the presentation to Judge Goff of the order in question in the
Defendant's Motion to Correct/Amend Order, including Dan Williams'e-mail to Judge Goff in
which Mr. Williams voiced his objection to the order as presented.
3.

Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the proposed order the Affiant

submitted to Judge Goff.
4.

Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the Order Judge Goff signed on

October 22, 2010.
Further your affiant s.ayeth naught.
DATED this 5th day ofNovember 2010.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5th day ofNovember 2010.
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AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC R. CLARK - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of November 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via facsimile transmission to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC R. CLARK - 3

001410

Windows Live Hotmail Prin.essage

Page 1 of 4

RE: PROPOSED ORDER
From: ERJC CLARK (eclark101@hotmail.com)
Sent Thu 10/14/10 3:04 PM
To: Dan Williams (danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com)
Cc: Judge Goff (dcgoff69@msn.com)
I'm not sure why you didn't tell me that when I asked you for your input originally?

Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER
Date: Thu. 14 Oct 2010 14:55:19 -0600
From: Danw@Thomaswilliamslaw.com
To: eclark101@hotmail.com; dcgoff69@msn.com
CC: dctyleni@adaweb.net

This is incorrect. My notes indicate that Judge Goff granted the motion JNOV only as to
contract fonnation, not as to all of the allegations of Count I. He granted new trial as to the
balance of the issues regarding breach of contract.
Dan Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP
Plaza One Twenty One
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 345-7800

THOMAS, WILLIAMS
& PA AK .

From: ERIC CLARK [mailto:eclark101@hobnail.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 14, 2010 2:53 PM
To: Judge Goff
Cc: Nichol; Dan Williams
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER
Judge Goff:
Thank you for your response. I have made the corrections as indicated In your e-mall, and I have
attached the modified proposed order. I have also attached a COJJY in Word format which should be
easier to 'WOrk with In case you would like to add or modify my language. I wlll deliver envelopes to
Nichol today or tomorrow.
Thank you,

EXHIBIT
Eric

http://sn 109w.snt 109.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e882ee23-4ae l-48b4-... 001411
11/4/l0 I0

Page 2of 4

Windows Live Hotmail PriAessage

From: dc.goff69@msn.com
To: eclarkl01@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2010 13:49:39 -0600

Eric,
I attempted to correct your proposed order but was unable to do so with my limited skills. I granted
your JNOV with regard to Count One express contract rendering moot your New Trial motion. I denied
your JNOV as well as the New Trial motions as to all other counts. I hope this acklresses any concerns
Dan had. I wlll be In Boise next week and will be able to sign it or have Nicole modify it. Thank you.
Dennis
~-.. -----·-----------rror, •••••••

K

K•rr•-----•-•ro•K-----•••

····---··· 0

·----··

• • • • - - ~ - - - - - - -

From: eclark101@hotmail.com
To: dctyleni@adaweb.net; dc.goff69@msn.com
CC: danw@twplegal.com
Subject: FW: PROPOSED ORDER
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2010 11:56:13 -0600

Dear Judge Goff:
Attached Is the Plaintiff's proposed order regarding the Court's decision granting a New Trial.
I previously submitted the order to Mr. Williams, and his response is attached below. If you would like
to make any changes, corrections, etc... please let me know and I wlll either make the revisions or
provide a copy in Word format to Nichol for the revisions.
Thank you,

Eric

- ......------........ ···--············---- ........................ _....................

__

. .,

...........---·-- - - ~ ~ -·--- ..- - - - - - -

Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER
Date: Thu, 14 0d: 201010:44:43 -0600
From: Danw@Thomaswilliamslaw.com
To: eclark101@hotmail.com
I am not sure whether or not this reflects what the Court intended. Why don't you submit and see what
he does. Just don't tel him I have stipulated to it.
Dan WIiiiams
Thomas, WIiiiams & Park, LLP
Plaza One Twenty One
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300 '
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 345-7800

THOMAS, WILLIAMS
A PA.AK.,

From: ERIC OARK [mailto:edark101@hotmail.com]

sent: Wednesday, October 13, 2010 1:23 PM
http://sn 109w.sntl 09.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e882ee23-4ae l-48b4-... 001412
11/4/20 I0

Windows Live Hotmail Pri-essage

Page 3 of 4

To: Dan WIiiiams
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER

Ok. I removed the sentence containing the language you objected to. Let me know if this works.
Thanks, Eric
-----------------------------

Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2010 13:05:01 -0600
From: Danw@Thomaswllliamslaw.com
To: eclarklOl@hobnall.com
Not really. 1 think what you said is what he said too.
Dan Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP
Plaza One Twenty One
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 345-7800

THOMAS, WILLIAMS
& PARK .

From: ERIC CLARK [mallto:eclark101@hobnail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 13, 2010 11:49 AM
To: Dan WIiiiams
Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER
Do you have proposed language?

Subject: RE: PROPOSED ORDER
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2010 11:28:47 -0600
From: Danw@Thomaswilliamslaw.com
To: eclark1Ql@hotmail.com
There is nothing upon which to base the assertion that the jury found otherwiseH as to whether there
was an express contract.
Dan Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP
Plaza One Twenty One
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300
Boise, IO 83702
(208) 345-7800

http://sn 109w.sntl 09.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e882ee23-4ae1-48b4-... 001413
J 1/4/2010

Windows Live Hotmail PriAessage

Page4 of 4

THOMAS, WILLIAMS
& PAAK_.

From: ERIC CLARK [mailto:eclark101@hotmail.com]
sent: Tuesday, October 12, 2010 3:29 PM
To: Dan WIiiiams

SUbject: PROPOSED ORDER

Dan:
Attached is our proposed order regarding the Judge's decision last week. Plea;e let me know if you
have any objections, corrections, suggestions, etc•••
Thanks, Eric

http://sn 109w.sntl 09 .mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=e882ee23-4ae1-48b4-... 001414
11/4/2010

-

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
ON COUNT 1 OF ITS COMPLAINT

Judge Goff
Defendants.

******
THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict, and in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial. The parties appeared
through their respective counsel ofrecord on Wednesday, October 6, 2010, according to notice,
and each party had provided briefs in support of and in opposition to their respective positions,
which the Court reviewed and considered.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - I

EXHIBIT~
001415

During the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from each counsel, and thereafter
stated the Court's decision and bases for that decision on the record. The Court now
incorporates its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October
6, 2010 as if set forth herein.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 is hereby GRANTED.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the remaining counts, and Plaintiff's Motion For New
Trial are hereby DENIED.
ENTERED THIS _ _ _ _ day of October 2010.

Dennis Goff
Senior District Judge

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
COUNT 1 OF ITS COMPLAINT - 2

001416

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ _ _ _ day of October, 201 0, I served the
foregoing, by having a true and complete copy delivered via US Mail, postage prepaid, and
addressed to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOC IATES, AITORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 839 l 6

Clerk of the District Court

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - 3

001417
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ERIC R. CLARK. Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, A ITORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax:208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

vs.
BERRYHILL &COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
ON COUNT 1 OF ITS COMPLAINT

Judge Goff
Defendants.

THIS MATIER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict. a11d in the Airemative, Motion/or New Trial. The parties appeared
through their n:spective counsel of record on Wednesday. October 6, 2010. according to notice,
and each party had provided briefs in support of and in opposition ro their respective positions,
which the Court reviewed and considered.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT • I

EXHIBIT__,_

0RIG
INA L
001418
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During the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from each counsel, and thereafter
stated the Court's decision and bases for that decision on the record. The Court now
incorporates its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October
6, 2010 as if set forth herein.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 is hereby GRANTED.
NOW. 111EREFORB, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED, the Plaintiffs Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the remaining counts, and Plaintiff"s Motion For New
Trial are hereby DENIED.
ENTERED nns

13,,11/day of October 2010.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - 2

001419
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•
CLERK'S CERTIFJCA~ F SERVICE

~f

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of October, 2010, I served the
foregoing, by having a true and complete copy deli vercd via US Mail, postage prepaid. and
addressed to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, Wll.LIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300

P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID. 83701
ERIC R. CLARK. Esq.
CLARK & AS SOCIATES, ATIORNEYS

P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616

ORDER ORANTINO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWrrHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT - 3

001420
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA~...f}ll~m!,f;fllF7A~-H-~=-t
1

THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

2
3

4

MOSELL EQUITITES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

5

Plaintiff,

Case No. CVOC0909974

6
7
8

9
10

ORDER OF CLARIFICATION

VS.

BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC., an
Idaho Corporation, JOHN E.
BERRYHILL III, individually,
Defendant.

11
12

The Court having reviewed and considered each parties' arguments on the form of order, and

13

the defendant's testimony at trial as to his intentions (set forth in Exhibit 21 ), the Court now

14

incorporates its comments, rationale, and ultimate decision communicated to counsel on October 6,

15

2010 and orders clarification of the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding

16

the Verdict on Count I of Its Complaint dated October 26, 2010, as set forth herein.

17

The Court ruled that Judge Williamson had granted summary judgment that there was an

18

express contract between the parties as set forth in Exhibit 1. Judge Williamson further ruled that
19

what was left at issue for the jury with regard to Count I was the ambiguity of what would occur in th
20

event the parties failed to substantially perform the express contract and whether Exhibit 1 had been
21
22

modified by subsequent agreements. This Court failed to properly instruct the jury to reflect the prior

23

summary judgment order of Judge Williamson. This Court granted the Motion for Judgment

24

Notwithstanding the Verdict as to Count I only and denied the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding

25
26

Jy)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 1
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the Verdict and the Motion for New Trial as to all other counts and ordered a retrial on Count I in
1
2
3

accordance with Judge Williamson's summary judgment order.
The Court further commented that the jury may have been confused by the Court's jury

4

instructions regarding damages as to Count I. This Court commented it was aware of only three

5

different measures of damages with regard to Count I: I) Rescission, which the plaintiffrequested in

6

the original trial and which defendant argued the parties could not be returned to their pre-contract

7

status; 2) Specific Performance requiring the defendant to issue fifty {50) percent of stock in

8

Berryhill restaurant to the plaintiff (The plaintiff did not want this remedy); or 3) The Value of the
9

alleged breach of contract that defendant would have to pay plaintiff fifty percent of the value of
10

Berryhill restaurant. which the plaintiff did not request in the original trial. The jury may not have
11

12
13
14

15
16
17

had all jury instructions they needed to detennine the issues of Count I.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion For Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count I: express contract is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTIIER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial as to Count I: express
contract is moot

r
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Nonvithstanding the

18

Verdict and Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial on the remaining counts are hereby DENIED.
19

"l!z--·

Dated this~ day of November, 2010.
20
21

22

23

24
25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER~ Page 2
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1
2

3

4

5

6
7

8

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, J. David Navarroi the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by Unite
States Mail, on this ~<v\tay of November, 2010, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISIO
AND ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this caus
in envelopes addressed as follows:
Eric R. Clark
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
PO Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701-1776

10
11

12

J. DAVID NAVARRO

13

14

15
16
17
18

19
20

21
22

23
24

25

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 3
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12/2/2010 9:51 AM
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FROM: .39-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

-76919

PAGE: 002 OF 003
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DEC DI 2010
J. DAVID NAVAIIIPIO C'
By J. RAND
, ,e,n
DE'PUTy All.

-4,

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-685-2320
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR
TRIAL SETTING

VS.

BERRYHILL & COMP ANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants.

******
The Plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby requests that this Court, in light of Judge
Goff's recent Order of Clarification entered November 23, 2010, reset this case for trial.
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court set the trial within six months to allow
the Plaintiff to move to amend its Complaint, according to Rule 15(d), IRCP, to again pursue a

REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING - 1

.

'

;.

,.

..,__
l
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12/2/2010 9:51 AM

FROM: .39-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

.76919

PAGE: 003 OF 003

claim for piercing the corporate veil. Mr. Berryhill presented testimony at trial that his company
was insolvent and unable to meet its current financial obligations.
Additionally, this timeframe would allow the Plaintiff to pursue summary judgment. The
Plaintiff believes that based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court can rule as a matter of
law the contract was unambiguous, and further, that no genuine issue of material fact exists
regarding a breach of that contract.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark,
For the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via US Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

ERIC R. CLARK

REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING - 2

001425

•
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920)
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300
P. 0. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone (208) 345-7800
Fax: (208) 345-7894
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com

•:: .

• tf:l/7
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DEC Q6 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By CARLY LATIMORE
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho limited
liability company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

Plaintiff/Respondent,
-vsNOTICE OF APPEAL
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation, JOHN E.
BERRYHILL III and AMY BERRYHILL,
individually, and as husband and wife,
Defendants/Appellant.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MOSELL EQUITIES, AND ITS
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ERIC R. CLARK, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

Defendant, Berryhill & Company, Inc., appeals against the above-named Plaintiff,

to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict entered on the 26th day of October, 2010, by the HonorableDennis
Goff, Senior District Judge.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

001426

•

,

2.

Appellant hereby appeals as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the

above-referenced Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
which is deemed to include all interlocutory judgments, orders and decrees as provided under
Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e).
3.

The issue the Appellant intends to assert on appeal is that the court erred in

granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which also mandated a
new trial.
4.

Appellant, Berryhill & Company, Inc., has a right to appeal since the Order

described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule
1 l(a)(5) and (6).
5.

Appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's transcript in hard copy and

electronic format.
6.

Appellant requests a scanned copy of the clerk's record to include the following

documents in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:

7.

(a)

all correspondence directed by the parties to the Court; and

(b)

all correspondence between the parties which the Court received copies of.

I hereby certify that:
(a)

a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;

(b)

the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript of the September 7-15, 2010 trial;
(c)

the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid;

(d)

the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

service of this notice has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

001427

•

./ .P-

•

DATED this _D_ day of December, 2010.
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants/Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

001428

•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h i s ~of December, 2010, I served a copy of the foregoing
instrument on opposing counsel as indicated below:
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P. 0. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

_ _ Via Hand Delivery

....JL... Via Facsimile - 939-7136
Via U.S. Mail

and mailed a copy to the court reporter at:
Sue Wolf
Ada County Transcript Dept.
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., Room 4171
Boise, ID 83702

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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NO.

A.M===::-=.'7!.:_J1.1Lll,,~rbb+{~~~~LD£C 17 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerh
ByE,HO!.Mes
OE?lfTY

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Id 83616
Office: 208-830-8084
Fax: 208-939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
eclark@Clark-Attomeys.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,

Case No. CV OC 0909974

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross
Appellant,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as
husband and wife,
Defendants/Appellants/CrossRespondents.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. AN IDAHO CORPORATION, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III,
AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, DANIELE. WILLIAMS, AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1

001430

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

Parties. Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, appeals against the above-named

Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill, to the Idaho Supreme Court from
the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict entered on the
26th day of October, 2010, by the Honorable Dennis Goff, Senior District Judge.
2.

Designation of Appeal and Jurisdictional Statement. Mosell Equities, LLC

hereby appeals as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the above-referenced Order
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which is deemed to
include all interlocutory judgments, orders and decrees as provided under Idaho Appellate Rule
17(e). Mosell Equities, LLC has a right to cross appeal since the Order described in paragraph 1
above is an appealable order as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(5) and (6).
3.

Issues on Cross Appeal. While Mosell Equities, LLC agrees wholeheartedly with

Judge Goffs ruling that Mosell Equities, LLC was entitled to JNOV regarding the existence of
an express contract, Mosell Equities, LLC asserts on cross appeal that Judge Goff erred by not
granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in its entirety on Count I.
4.

No additional reporter's transcript is requested.

5.

The cross-appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated by
the appellant in the initial notice of appeal: None.
6.

The cross-appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered

or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition to those requested
in the original notice of appeal: None.

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2

001431

7.

-

I certify:

(a) That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional transcript
have been served on the reporter.
(b) (1) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation
of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents requested in the cross-appeal, if
necessary.
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule
20.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of December, 2010.
CLARK & AS SOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

~---

Eric R. Clark
Attorney for Cross-Appellant

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3

001432

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of December, 2010, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via the manner indicated to:
Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

Sue Wolf
Ada County Transcript Dept.
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St., Room 4171
Boise, ID 83 702

Via facsimile transmission

Via US Mail

~--ERIC R. CLARK

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MOSELL EQUITITES, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CVOC0909974

vs.

JUDGMENT

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho Corporation, JOHN E.
BERRYHILL ill, individually,
Defendant.

The Court having entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1, Express Contract, of Its Complaint on October 26, 2010
and its subsequent Order of Clarification dated November 23, 2010;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict on Count I: express contract is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial as to Count I: express
contract is moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict and Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial on the remaining counts are hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this ~ Y of January, 2011.

JUDGMENT - Page 1
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•
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, I. David Navarro, the u n d e r s i ~ } do hereby certify that I have mailed, by
United States Mail, on this I ~ay of
O10, one copy of the JUDGMENT as notice
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed
as follows:
ERIC R. CLARK
ATTORNEY AT LAW
POBOX2504
EAGLE, ID 83616
DANIELE. WILLIAMS
1HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
PO BOX 1776
BOISE, ID 83701-1776

I. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

Ad~
By

lA

DeputycierkY

JUDGMENT - Page 2
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A.M.___,_______,pM--+---

1

TO:

2

SEP O6 2011
CLERK OF THE COURT, IDAHO SUPREME COURT
451 WEST STATE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO
CHRISTOPHER 0. RIC , Clerk
FAX
( 2 0 8) 3 3 4 - 2 616
By BRADLEY J. THIE
DEPUTY

3

)

MOSELL EQUITIES,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

4

DOCKET NO.

)
5

vs.

6

BERRYHILL
et a 1,

Case No. CRFE-2008-0023268

)
)
&

COMPANY,

INC.,

)

NOTICE OF LODGING

)

7

Defendant/Appellant.
8

38338-2010

)
)

----------------

)
)
)

9

10

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT(S)

LODGED

11

12

Notice is hereby given that on September 6,

13

I

14

for the following dates/proceedings:

lodged five

(5)

transcript (s),

2011,

totalling 1,034 pages,

15
16
17

09-07-10
09-08-10
09-09-10
09-14-10
09-15-10

Jury
Jury
Jury
Jury
Jury

Trial.,
Trial.,
Trial.,
Trial.,
Trial.,

Day
Day
Day
Day
Day

1
2
3

4
5

18
19

for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court

20

Clerk for Ada County,

in the Fourth Judicial District.

21

22
23

D

Susan M. Wolf,
RPR, CSR No. 72~

24
25
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 38338
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
and
JOHN E. BERRYHILL, III,
Defendant-Cross Respondent,
and
AMY BERRYHILL,
Defendant.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 25th day of August, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
1

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOUR1H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE
STATEOFIDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Judge Goff /Ric Nelson
District Judge Clerk

9/07/2010-9/15/ 10

MOSELL EQUITES,
Plaintiff,

vs.

EXHIBIT LIST
Case No.
CVOC0909974

BERRYHILL & COMP ANY ET AL,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs Counsel:
ERIC CLARK.
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY

· BY
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.

NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Pltf.

11

Pltf.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Pltf..
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.

Pltf.

(JURY TRIAL)

Defendants Counsel:
DANIEL WILLIAMS
DEFENSE ATTONREY

DESCRIPTION
STATUS
Loan Agreement w/Check
Adm
Check #5127 6/28/07
Adm
Check # 5137 7/30/07
Adm
Check #5139 8/07/07
Adm
Check #5140 08/16/07
Adm
Check #5141 08/16/07
Adm
Check #5196 10/09/07
Adm
Check #5201 10/26/07
Adm
Check #5154 12/04/07
Adm
Check #5164 12/19/07
Adm
Check #524 7 04/30/07
Adm
Check #5009 09/21/05
Adm
Check #5046 09/09/06
Adm
Check #5070 08/07/06
Adm
Check #5102 02/13/07
Adm
Check #5112 05/01/07
Adm
Check #5117 05/29/07
Adm
Berryhill's BCO Development Outline Adm
Berryhill's Offer #1
Adm
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DATE
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
· 09/08/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/07/10·
09/07/10
09/07/10
09/07/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/07/10
09/07/10
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-·

•
Pltf. 20
Pltf. 21
Pltf. . 23
Pltf. 25
Pltf. 27
Pltf. 30
Pltf. 31
Pltf. 32
Pltf. 33
Pltf. 34
Pltf. 35

Berryhill' s Offer #2
Adm
Berryhill' s Offer #3
Adm
Check from BH&C to John Berryhill 1125/08 Adm
BH&CFlyer
Adm
Polo Cove Business Card
Adm
Boise Urban Liaison Article
Adm
Mosell Comps
Adm
Berryhill Comps
Adm
BH&C Register Mosell Equities
Adm
Kim Gourley Documents
Adm
Victoria Meier Documents
.Adm

09/15/10
09/09/10
09/08/10
09/09/10
09/08/10
09/09/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/09/10
09/07/10
09/08/10

Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.
Pltf.

37
38
39
44
45
46
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Dempsey - Berryhill Email 03/05/08 Adm
Email String Mosell/Berryhill Sept/Oct 2008 Adm
Epitome Bill for Furniture
Adm
Polo Cove Exec Summary 02/29/07 Adm
Polo Cove Exec Summary 08/18/08 Adm
BH&Co Transaction Acct~Polo CoveAdm
BH&Co Balance Sheet 12/31/05
Adm
BH&Co Balance Sheet 12/31/06
Adm
BH&Co Balance Sheet 12/3 l/(J7
Adm
BH&C Balance Sheet 06/30/08
Adm
BH&Co Balance Sheet 12/31/08
Adm
BH&C Profit - Loss 2005
Adm
BH&C Profit - Loss 2006
Adm
BH&C Profit - Loss 2007
Adm
BH&C Profit - Loss 2008
Adm
BH&C Profit - Loss 2009
Adm

09/08/10
09/14/10 ·
09/08/10
09/07/10
09/07/10
09/15/10
09/15/10
09/15/10
09/15/10
09i08/10
09/15/10
09/14/10
09/14/10
09/14/10
09/14/10
09/14/10

Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd

E
G

Personal Guaranty
Adm
Restaurant Lease Berryhill & Comp Adm
J
Sketch of Crackerbox Space
Adm
K
Boise P&D Cert of Value
Adm
L
Boise P&D Cert of Occupancy.
Adm
N
John Berryhill Business Card
Adm
s
Email from Mosell to Berryhill 6/28/07Adm
T
Email from Mosell to Foerstel, BH 06/28/07 Adm
V
Email String Mosen to Angie Riff Adm
00
Invoice Berryhill & Polo Cove 01/01/08 Adm
QQ
Memo to file from Victoria Meier 0l/22/08Adm
uu Polo Cove Exec Overview
'Adm
xx Ron Bitner Business Card
Adm
zz Letter from Tomlinson to Berryhill Adm
AAA Blue Prints Expansion ·
Adm
BBB Concepts & Illustrations of Polo Cove Amd
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09/14/10
09/14/10
· 09/09/10
09/14/10
09/14/10
09/09/10
09/14/10
09/14/10
09/08/10
09/14/10
09/09/10
09/08/10
09/09/10
09/09/10
09/14/10
09/14/10
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•
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Oefd
Defd
Defd
Defd
Defd
. Defd
Defd

CCC-I Summary Cost Breakdown
Adm
CCC-2 BH&C Itemization
Adm
ODD Polo Cove Exec Overview 06/18/08 Adm
EEE Polo Cove Exec Overview 02/29/08 Adm
GGG Web Si~ Design (Foerstel)
Adm
ill
Narrative, to Canyon Co P&Z
Adm
JJJ
Report Potential Market Demand
Adm
KKK Polo Cove Exec Overview 03/10/08 Adm
LLL Polo Cove Exec Overview
Adm
MMM Email From Mosell to Berryhill 9/3/08 Adm
BBBB Executive Overview
Adm
EEEE Mosell Entities
Adm
FFFF Timeline
Adm

Defd YY-1 . Email (Russell Case-Hawley Troxell)Pulblished Only
Defd Depo of Glenn Mosell
Published Only

Exhibit List Page 3 of 3

09/14/10
09/14/10
· 09/08/10
09/14/10
09/14/10
09/08/10
09/08/10
09/14/10
09/14/10
09/08/10
09/14/10
09/08/10
09/14/10
09/07/10
09/08/10
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 38338
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

VS.

BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
and
JOHN E. BERRYHILL, III,
Defendant-Cross Respondent,
and
AMY BERRYHILL,
Defendant.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS

ERIC R. CLARK

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

EAGLE, IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

SEP O 6 ZUll

Date of Service: - - - - - - - -

B
yQ,~'
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an ldaho limited
liability company,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 38338
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
and
JOHN E. BERRYHILL, III,
Defendant-Cross Respondent,
and
AMY BERRYHILL,
Defendant.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
6th day of December, 2010.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

By------=-==-=-""--__,.__--='-"-............._
Deputy Clerk
-

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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'

